

AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE: TWO SCENARIOS OF RECENT SITUATIONS

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Annotation

This work is devoted to the problems and sorting them out, which concern territory of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has rich natural resource reserves, it has a growing number of educated individuals who could contribute to the workforce, its geographic location is advantageous in terms of transportation and trade, and it has the potential for agriculture.

Afghanistan is of the utmost importance for the countries of Central Asian region because it has potential to serve as a transit corridor through which oil and gas can flow into Pakistani and Indian markets. Central Asian states can easily gain access to the Indian Ocean and diversify their trade partners if Afghanistan attains stability. Afghanistan plays a truly strategic role for the rejuvenation of project the Modern-Day Silk Road.(1)

Nowadays international society wants to find a way of regulation of afghan problem and after 2014 they made a decision resting in the country a bit longer. International players are looking scenario of 'regional solution' as a reality, so they are sure that some conceptual paradigms like 'good neighborhood', 'non-military model' will work with Afghanistan and they can help to strengthen peace and stability in a whole region.

In his 1999 opening ceremony of the group "6+2" on Afghanistan, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov announced "the peoples of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan are traditionally connected with historical generality. I want to declare unequivocally: there was never enmity between the Uzbek and Afghans – the river

Amu Darya united us during many centuries. And today our most good and biggest desire is to see peaceful, stable and safe Afghanistan. We want to see in Kabul strong, represented by wide layers of the population, authoritative government capable to ensure the national concord and internal stability, respecting norms of international law and guaranteeing maintenance of good-neighborhood with neighboring countries”.(2)

Today many leaders of the world came to an understanding that the military solution of the Afghan conflict does not exist. Western countries took financial responsibility before Kabul during the period 2014 till 2024 and signed an agreement on strategic partnership. US military forces will assist at the process of educating Afghan national army personals.

In 2013 State of the Union speech, US President Barack Obama announced that by the end of 2014 “our war in Afghanistan will be over” and, a month earlier, that “by the end of next year, 2014, the transition will be complete – Afghans will have full responsibility for their security, and this war will come to a responsible end.” The military transition, successful or not, is in full swing. Of course the war will not come to an end in 2014, responsible or otherwise. Even if the military drawdown goes as planned, “America’s commitment to a unified and sovereign Afghanistan will endure, but the nature of America’s commitment will change” the president said.(3)

On the military side, US enduring commitment will focus on training, equipping and funding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and some counterterrorism efforts that allow to pursue remnants of al Qaeda and their affiliates. As the United States draws down, so too will the remaining coalition countries of the International Security assistance Forces (ISAF) under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command.

But the United States and its ISAF allies have massive civilian programs as do multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The coalition partners and other donors pledged \$16 billion over four years through 2016 (an amount each year equal to Afghanistan’s entire gross domestic

product) subject to several serious but not very specific performance commitments by the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, especially better governance and the reduction of corruption.(4)

Presently, the real objectives need to be not just modest but more strategic plans need to derive from objectives, resource and obstacles. Three areas are most critical for the survival of an independent, coherent, reasonably decent Afghanistan: security, governance and economic growth, in that order. Each is necessary for the next and although they are linked, that is the logic order. Other areas and objectives are desirable, no doubt, but these three are essential, and the essential should define the assistance strategy with the desirable added if possible. Moreover, each of the three essential areas is itself uncertain. With heavy concentration on these three, the resulting country will still be suboptimal, no doubt, but optimality is not in the cards in Afghanistan unrealistic expectations.

Governance and economic growth – the remaining two areas should be the primary prongs of the civilian side. Their success will depend on the context of post-withdrawal Afghanistan and on the performance, not the promises, of the government and people of Afghanistan.

According to optimistic scenario ANSF will succeed in holding almost all current territory, institutionalize real command and control, win Afghan loyalties, and establish the conviction among Afghans that they can ultimately defeat the Taliban or at least confine them to a chronic but not existential problem, and certainly that they can prevent a Taliban problem.

But there is a pessimistic scenario, so it is daunting that if ANSF fare poorly or even collapse the Taliban will begin to recapture considerably more territory and gain momentum. Consistent series of limited Taliban successes would probably trigger a set of defensive responses. If the Taliban gains become extensive and sustained, some form of the Northern Alliance among the non-Pashtun populations would probably attempt to carve out a part of the country with a possible civil war between the minorities and the Pashtuns.

In conclusion it is important to say that the coalition partners can offer assistance to the next Afghan administration. But the fundamental choices must now be made by Afghans not foreigners. What kind of society do they want? What kind of state do Afghans want, what policies should it pursue, what realistic expectations can Afghans have? Because the military solution of Afghan conflict does not exist, this idea is being repeated not only one time it is stated a million times. The days when the coalition countries and other donors attempt to do so will end with the drawdown of 2014.

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3. Gerald F. Hyman, “Afghanistan after the Drawdown” A report of the CSIS Hills Program on Governance, Washington, 2014 –P.5. http://books.google.co.uz/books?id=Zo1_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA30&dq=votes+in+Afghanistan&hl=ru&sa=X&ei=L-5VVLKwHYO1OvnOgZAF&ved=0CCQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=true
4. Mirzokhid Rahimov, “Uzbekistan’s relationship with Afghanistan”, Afghanistan and its neighbours: Regional Views, New Delhi, Delhi Policy group Publication, 2014, pp.46-47.