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Course work

The theme: Types of general typology

Student: Rakhmatova M

Group: 409 B

Teacher: _____

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Types of general typology

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General Typology of Modern Direct Democracy

The typology which is used here was developed by Rolf Büchi of IRI Europe. It offers a coordinate system, covering all procedures of popular votes on substantive issues. This means that popular votes on persons and parties, like for example recall procedures, are NOT included. The basic structure of the proposed classification is based on the division of popular vote procedures into three different types: initiative, referendum and plebiscite.

The initiative comprises procedures where the author of the ballot proposal is THE SAME as the initiator of the procedure, the referendum procedures where the author of the ballot proposal is NOT the same as the initiator of the procedure. Finally the plebiscite comprises procedures initiated by a representative authority. There exist procedures and practices where elements of different types of procedure are mixed like, for example, the agenda setting initiative. Such procedures are usually the outcome of a compromise between proponents and opponents of direct democracy, often resulting in bad legal design.

Popular vote procedures can be considered as political tools, of which different types can be identified: initiative, referendum and plebiscite. Just like a hammer or screwdriver exists in different forms, also initiative, referendum and plebiscite exist in different forms for different applications. One form of a referendum is for example a referendum triggered by law, another a citizen-initiated referendum. In the following the different forms of popular vote procedures and their characteristics will be described. The term popular vote is used to designate a vote on a substantive political issue made by the voters, as opposed to a vote made by elected representatives. The term does not indicate of what type the designated procedure is, and no particular definition of direct democracy is implied.

On the one hand a typology is needed to avoid confusions in the discussions of direct democracy. Confusions arise when different types of procedures are given the same name, like when the word 'referendum' is used indistinguishably for authorities' controlled popular votes and for real referendums. Inversely a good deal of confusion results if the same procedure is given many different names, for example, if an agenda setting initiative is also called people's petition, popular initiative and people's proposition. On the other hand different countries use different juridical terminologies. Without a typology it is not possible to compare the repertoire of popular vote procedures between countries.

The aim of this typology is to classify the really existing procedures in a realistic and not only formal way. The words 'initiative' and 'referendum' designate two different types of procedures, whose use is controlled by minorities (a group of

citizens) except for the obligatory referendum, which is determined by law. The word 'plebiscite' is used to designate a third type of procedure: authorities' controlled popular votes. The distinction between citizen-initiated referendums and authority-initiated plebiscites is crucial; whereas referendums are tools of the people, plebiscites operate as tools of power holders for legitimization and mobilization or for bypassing other representative institutions or for disengaging from tough policies.

What does this typology look like?

This classification of popular vote procedures includes only votes on substantive issues, not on people (like recall elections).
Itdistinguishespopularvoteproceduresaccordingtowho i

1. the author of the ballot proposal (a group of citizens, a minority of a representative authority, a representative authority)
2. the initiator of the procedure (a group of citizens, law, a minority of a representative authority, a representative authority).
3. the decision-maker (the whole electorate, a representative authority).

As a result we get five direct democratic procedures and four procedures, which empower representatives, not citizens. Unlike direct democratic procedures, plebiscites can be binding or merely consultative, in which case the final decision is made by representatives.

There are so many ways to tweak assessment methods that educators often are unable to see the overall picture. Today's posting aims to cut through the distinctions in such a way that those untrained in educational research can more easily discriminate the place of MODEL rubrics. In the process the typology should simplify the discussion of our methods.

The Rubrics Rubrics table in the very first posting of this Community of Practice received an enthusiastic response from the 1,100 member ASSESS listserv. But where do rubrics fit in the broader context of assessment methods? We have far fewer choices that many it might seem from our literature. Assessment responses can be divided into whether they are defined and organized by the rater, the program or an external organization with options for evaluators being either limited to one-dimensional choices (e.g., grades, holistic scores, mouse clicks), multidimensional choices (e.g., rubrics, surveys, and multiple choice tests), short answers, categorized narratives, or free narratives.

The difference between rubrics, surveys and standardized tests has more to do with analysis than with the structure of the options. By considering the analysis, it becomes apparent that the "quantitative-qualitative" distinction is misleading. Surveys consists of a series of PAGE rubrics (e,g,, options may be a five point Likert scale) and multiple choice tests consist of a usually longer series of

SWELL rubrics (the options are progressively more difficult). To analyze, the choices are given numbers, which are summed into a single total.

In contrast, the analysis of assessments called "rubrics" recognizes the problem of nonequivalent choices (e.g. adding counts of apples, oranges, peas and watermelons into a single total). There are three basic differences between MODEL rubrics and other kinds of rubrics. First MODEL rubrics are sequenced developmentally. Second, there is a unique description of each level of each dimension. Third, a unique title is given to each description.

From a mathematician's point of view the characteristics of MODEL rubrics enable an analysis that resembles set theory more than statistics. From the public's point of view they enable results that appear more descriptive than quantitative. Instead of giving a single score based on nonequivalent sums MODEL rubrics generate a title that describes the pattern of performance. Thus, contrast two ratings that are possible with the Rubrics Rubrics: (1) SWELL rubrics, pulled off the internet, used across a program, analyzed for differences to write an accreditation report and (2) MODEL rubrics written by a committee, used in a capstone course to count students passing a benchmark for accreditation purposes. That these radically different outcomes would get the same score in a typical survey is a sign of the non-authenticity of the survey analysis.

This typology proposes that we will find it easier to communicate our assessment methods to the public if we describe them first in terms of who creates them and secondly according to the richness of choices they provide to evaluators. An important question for this community relating to a typology of assessment methods is the following:

Should we replace the quantitative/qualitative distinction with a distinction according to variety of potential responses?

This work develops and presents a typology of lexicographical labels with the focus on standard bilingual dictionaries. Generally, a lexicographical label can be described as a meta-entry in a dictionary article which indicates to the dictionary user that the entry it is addressed to represents an element of some form of marked language usage, for example informal language, jargon, geographical variation and temporal variation. Lexicographical labels contextualise their addresses in terms of actual language usage and therefore provide important pragmatic guidance to the dictionary user, thereby promoting communicative success. They have a long history and have not only become a lexicographical tradition, but also an indispensable instrument of description for the lexicographer. This article takes cognisance of an initial definition of lexicographical labels, the fact that a number of typologies of lexicographical labels have been proposed and the concept of markedness as it pertains to

language usage. With regard to existing typologies, it is noted that while they are more or less similar at the superficial level, there are significant differences in deeper classifications and subclassifications. The literature suggests that this is the result of general confusion and a lack of consensus about the use of lexicographical labels and the pragmatic parameters that they represent, which is in turn caused by the absence of a theoretical basis for their classification and standardisation. Hence, the initial definition and the concept of markednessrepresents the point of departure for developing precisely such a theoretical basis. The concept of markedness is extended to lexicographical markedness, since what is regarded as linguistically marked is not necessarily marked for lexicographical purposes. A different set of norms have to be applied when deciding if a source or target language entry should be labelled. This implies that the linguistic markedness of a lexical item does not presuppose its labelling in a dictionary. The norms which should be applied to determine lexicographical markedness, and as such define lexicographical labels, include (i) the dictionary type, as a product of the purpose, function(s), typical usage situation and target user profile of the dictionary, which includes referential equivalence and translingually transposed lexicographical markedness in the case of a bilingual dictionary; (ii) certain linguistic criteria that apply to linguistic markedness, like usage restrictions pertaining to specific domains as well as relevant formal and stylistic criteria; (iii) the dictionary-specific context. Based on these norms, the following typology of lexicographical labels is proposed: Lexicographical labels Main class 1: Domain labels, which indicate that specific source and target language elements belong to a specific domain 1(a): Geographical labels, which indicate spatial distribution, for example British English 1(b): Temporal labels, which indicate marked temporal status 1(b)(i): Periodicising labels, which indicate specific source and target language elements' marked usage relative to contemporary language usage, for example archaic, old and neologism. 1(b)(ii): Historical labels, which mark specific source and target language elements that refer to referents which existed earlier but currently do not exist any longer, for example historical. 1(c): Frequency labels, which indicate marked usage frequency 1(c)(i): Absolute frequency labels, like rare 1(c)(ii): Relative frequency labels, like less frequently used 1(d): Technical labels, which indicate specific source and target language elements' term status in particular specialisation areas, for example medical and soccer 1(e): Cultural labels, which indicate the culture-specificity of particular source and target language elements, for example German cultural tradition Main class 2: Linguistic labels, which indicate specific source and target language elements' linguistic exceptionality in terms of the dictionary type Main class 3: Stylistic labels, which indicate specific

source and target language elements' stylistic markedness(a): Register labels, which mark specific source and target language elements that belong to a specific situation or set of circumstances, for example journalese and poetic (b): Socio-stylistic labels, which indicate the suitability of specific source or target language elements at a specific style level, for example formal and vulgar (c): Stylistic-functional labels, which indicate the marked and deliberate conversational implicatures that specific source and target language elements can represent, for example euphemism and racist It is emphasised that the proposed typology is not necessarily exhaustive, nor should it be regarded as prescriptive or rigoristic. All identified classes are open classes, meaning that new elements can be added as knowledge about labels and pragmatic data in dictionaries expands. Rather, the typology should be seen as a functional product of scientific description. Regardless of the typology or the typological framework that a dictionary's editorial team may select for any planned dictionary, one requirement remains constant for a user-friendly dictionary, namely that the target user should be empowered, through the user guide (and other dictionary components, where appropriate), to functionally interpret any label that might appear in the dictionary. Aligning these features to the purpose and function(s) that have been identified for a dictionary in the planning stages as part of the dictionary plan would ensure communicative equivalence in the dictionary and result in successful lingual communication. Although the typology has been developed with the focus on standard bilingual dictionaries, it can ideally be utilised for any dictionary type.

Linguistic typology is a subfield of linguistics that studies and classifies languages according to their structural features. Its aim is to describe and explain the common properties and the structural diversity of the world's languages. It includes three subdisciplines: qualitative typology, which deals with the issue of comparing languages and within-language variance; quantitative typology, which deals with the distribution of structural patterns in the world's languages; and theoretical typology, which explains these distributions.

Qualitative typology develops cross-linguistically viable notions or types which provide a framework for the description and comparison of individual languages.[1] A few examples appear below.

Typological systems[edit]

Subject–verb–object positioning[edit]

Main article: Word order

One set of types reflects the basic order of subject, verb, and direct object in sentences:

Subject–verb–object

Subject–object–verb

Verb–subject–object

Verb–object–subject

Object–subject–verb

Object–verb–subject

These labels usually appear abbreviated as "SVO" and so forth, and may be called "typologies" of the languages to which they apply.[1]

Some languages split verbs into an auxiliary and an infinitive or participle, and put the subject and/or object between them. For instance, German ("Ichhabeeinen Fuchs im Wald gesehen" - *"I have a fox in-the woods seen"), Dutch ("Hans vermoeddedat Jan Marie zaglerenzwemmen" - *"Hans suspected that Jan Marie saw teach swim") and Welsh ("Mae'rgwiriosillafuwedi'igwblhau" - *"Is the checking spelling after its to complete"). In this case, linguists base the typology on the non-analytic tenses (i.e. those sentences in which the verb is not split) or on the position of the auxiliary. German is thus SVO in main clauses[1] and Welsh is VSO (and preposition phrases would go after the infinitive).

Many typologists classify both German and Dutch as V2 languages, as the verb invariantly occurs as the second element of a full clause.

Some languages allow varying degrees of freedom in their constituent order that pose a problem for their classification within the subject–verb–object schema. To define a basic constituent order type in this case, one generally looks at frequency of different types in declarative affirmative main clauses in pragmatically neutral contexts, preferably with only old referents. Thus, for instance, Russian is widely considered an SVO language, as this is the most frequent constituent order under such conditions—all sorts of variations are possible, though, and occur in texts. In many inflected languages, such as Russian, Latin, and Greek, departures from the default word-orders are permissible but usually imply a shift in focus, an emphasis on the final element, or some special context. In the poetry of these languages, the word order may also

shift freely to meet metrical demands. Additionally, freedom of word order may vary within the same language—for example, formal, literary, or archaizing varieties may have different, stricter, or more lenient constituent-order structures than an informal spoken variety of the same language.

On the other hand, when there is no clear preference under the described conditions, the language is considered to have "flexible constituent order" (a type unto itself).

An additional problem is that in languages without living speech communities, such as Latin, Hellenic Greek, and Old Church Slavonic, linguists have only written evidence, perhaps written in a poetic, formalizing, or archaic style that mischaracterizes the actual daily use of the language. The daily spoken language of a Sophocles or a Cicero might have exhibited a different or much more regular syntax than their written legacy indicates.

Morphosyntacticalignment[edit]

Main article: Morphosyntactic alignment

Another common classification distinguishes nominative–accusative languages and ergative–absolutive ones. In a language with cases, the classification depends on whether the subject of an intransitive verb has the same case as the agent(A) or the patient(P) of a transitive verb. If a language has no cases, but the word order is AVP or PVA, then a classification may reflect whether the subject of an intransitive verb appears on the same side as the agent or the patient of the transitive verb.

Many languages show mixed accusative and ergative behaviour (for example: ergative morphology marking the verb arguments, on top of an accusative syntax). Other languages (called "active languages") have two types of intransitive verbs—some of them ("active verbs") join the subject in the same case as the agent of a transitive verb, and the rest ("stative verbs") join the subject in the same case as the patient. Yet other languages behave ergatively only in some contexts (this "split ergativity" is usually based on the grammatical person of the arguments or on the tense/aspect of the verb). For example, only some verbs in Georgian behave this way, and, as a rule, only while using the perfective (aorist).

Phonological Systems

Linguistic typology will also apply to the structure and spread of sound systems in languages world-wide in identifying patterns. Ultimately, the goal is to

understand the patterns of relative frequency between sounds and their co-occurrences and why they are thus. An example of this relative spread can be seen in trying to explain why contrastive voicing commonly occurs with plosives, such as in English with "neat" and "need", but much fewer have this occur in fricatives, such as the English "niece" and "knees". According to a worldwide sample of 637 languages,[2] 62% have the voicing contrast in stops but only 35% have this in fricatives. In the vast majority of those cases, the absence of voicing contrast occurs because there is a lack of voiced fricatives and because all languages have some form of plosive, but there are languages with no fricatives. Below is a chart showing the breakdown of these languages, showing the numbers as shown in this sample and how they relate to each other.

Plosive Voicing		Fricative Voicing	
Yes	No	Total	
Yes	117	218	395 (62%)
No	44	198	242 (38%)
Total	221 (35%)	416 (65%)	637

Languages worldwide also vary in the number of sounds that are used within them. These languages can go from very small phonemic inventories (Rotokas with six consonants and five vowels) to very large inventories (!Xóõ with 128 consonants and 28 vowels). An interesting phonological observation found with this data is that the larger a consonant inventory a language has, the more likely it is to contain a sound from a defined set of complex consonants (clicks, glottalized consonants, doubly articulated labial-velar stops, lateral fricatives and affricates, uvular and pharyngeal consonants, and dental or alveolar non-sibilant fricatives). Of this list, only about 26% of languages in a surveyof over 600 with small inventories (less than 19 consonants) contain a member of this set, while 51% of average languages (19-25) contain at least one member and 69% of large consonant inventories (greater than 25 consonants) contain a member of this set. It is then seen that complex consonants are in proportion to the size of the inventory..

Vowels contain a more modest number of phonemes, with the average being 5-6, which 51% of the languages in the survey have. About a third of the languages have larger than average vowel inventories. Most interesting though is the lack of relationship between consonant inventory size and vowel inventory

size. Below is a chart showing this lack of predictability between consonant and vowel inventory sizes in relation to each other.

What is the condition of possibility for creating such a typology? What must necessarily be known before the typology can be formulated? The answer to these questions is of course that it is necessary to have a more or less conscious or clear conception of what it is essential to know about man, combined with a conception of the way in which the audiovisual material in the archive can be expected to contribute. Some of the most important aspects of the problem of selection are to be found in the thinking connected with formulation of the subject-typology. The distinction between essentials and inessentials, which in the typology is formulated in a general way and in relation to the archive's purpose, rests on criteria derived from conceptions of a metaphysical character such as conceptions of 'man', of 'society', of 'culture' etc. It is in these concepts, which in our knowledge and actions work in a heuristic and not a deterministic way, that our personal 'philosophy of history' or our personal 'metaphysic' are to be found. All these concepts are often very vague and only partly consciously analysed, but nevertheless they are necessary and form the basis for our image of world. They are a kind of a priori, torso-like, but absolutely necessary total-image of our life-world, and in reality it is this flickering and unanalysed image, which is fundamental for our thinking knowledge, when we act, and when we select. It is the flickering, metaphysical image, which is behind both the formulation of the general subject-typology and the specific selection decisions. In the typology the image has been formulated in a general way - in the specific selection the image has the character of a heuristic basis for a decision. Everyone who has made decisions about essential/unessential has to find his arguments in these metaphysical conceptions if his selection decision is being criticized and therefore needs some kind of argument. It is an eventual critique, which makes clear the metaphysical character of selection work - and metaphysics does not mean pseudo-religious conceptions, but the common principles and concepts, which create coherence and integration in our thinking. Coherence and integration are the key words!

It can be seen therefore that the problem of selection is founded one kind of metaphysics; but it also has other philosophical aspects. One of these lies within theory of knowledge. One could say, that the metaphysical part of the problem is concerned with the answers to the question: what are the conditions of possibility for selections - what is the a priori in selection? But the theory of knowledge

problem is concerned with the answers to the question: why must this material be selected and that erased? It is the structure or logic of thinking in practical selection work we are looking to find. How does the selector motivate a specific selection?

At this point the discussion can take advantage of the previously mentioned debate about the relationship between general and specific knowledge, between nomological and ontological knowledge. In the space available we can mention only a few elements in the dominant conception of the problem and some of the points of critique. The dominating school is positivism, and it is the positivistic conception which underlies what many Americans call 'hard' science'.

The literature about positivism is very large, but a classical representative is Carl G Hempel, whose articles The Function of General Laws in History, (1942) and Studies in the Logic of Explanation (1948) are worthy of reading. In short, the positivistic ideal is, that when you must explain an event, then it is necessary to split it up into several parts, so that every part can be explained by means of the general laws formulated within secure sciences. If, for instance, you must explain a specific traffic accident, the first thing to do is to establish the experiential data; influence of alcohol, braking distance, the specific traffic situation, mental condition of the driver, etc., and then you will investigate these data by means of the relevant sciences, which in the case will be: medical science, technical science, traffic-sociology, psychology and so on. The general knowledge from these sciences, which can be used, is called 'covering laws' because they are considered to cover the established facts. After the analysis of the facts by means of the respective sciences, the positivist nominates the sum of these separate explanations to be the explanation.

The same kind of procedure is involved when a selector motivates a specific selection by referring to it being 'covered' by one or often several categories in the subject-typology of the archive. But this kind of explanation suffers from great weaknesses and the critique of positivism is about to uncover some of them. A brief critique of positivistic theory of knowledge can be found in Maurice Mandelbaum's article: The problem of covering laws, in History and theory, (1961), and a very profound critique can be found in one of the most exciting, modern philosophical works, Bernard Lonergan's Insight. A study of human understanding, (1958).

The starting point for Lonergan's theory of knowledge is the analysis of the event, which we call an insight. He is not interested in insight as a psychological phenomenon, but analyses the character of the increase of our knowledge, which

is involved when we get an insight. For Lonergan it is, so to speak, the insight, which is the atoms of knowledge – for the positivists the atoms are verbally, formulated, elementary statements about what is considered the reality. There are of course many problems involved in this, but the point is, that the positivistic summing up of their many separate explanations involves an insight, an epistemological operation, which is overlooked by the positivists. The separate explanations of the mentioned traffic accident are: influence of alcohol, bad brakes, bad traffic conditions and a depressed driver, and the positivist considers it unproblematic to put a circle around all these separate explanations and to nominate the sum: The explanation!

What is overlooked is that the circle or summing up involves an increase of our knowledge, and therefore it must be motivated. The positivistic theory of knowledge is unable to motivate the summing up! There are perhaps secure sciences which can be used in explaining the separate parts of the event - but there is no science which can explain how the specific parts of the event are integrated again; remember the key words are coherence and integration! The positivistic theory of knowledge will only be able to create explanations in the form a long string of possible separate explanations. In the same way, a positivistic selector can only motivate his specific selections by referring to this or that point in the explicit subject-typology of the archive - that is the reason why a positivistic selector always has an explicit and very detailed subject-typology: he simply cannot live without it.

In short, the problem for the positivist is, that his theory of knowledge does not include principles by means of which coherence and integration can be created. In practical work there are no differences between a positivist and a non-positivist. The difference is in their philosophical and methodological understanding of what is involved in their practical work. To the positivist, the integrating principles of coherence are 'unscientific' or 'subjective' and are, therefore, not included in his theory of knowledge. But the selector with a fully developed self-awareness will recognise the integrating insights, which are involved as a necessary part of his work and these integrating principles are exactly the same metaphysical principles, which have been mentioned before. It is, therefore, a self-delusion to believe that a reference to some selection-typology can be used as a proper motivation for selection - unless of course the typology is so restricted that the problem of integration does not exist. Then the positivistic understanding can be used, because no integrations of separate explanations or motivations are involved. If, for instance, the archive must select every kind of material on a certain person, then it is obvious that the motivation problem does

not exist. However, in that case the question remains as to whether selection is involved at all.

The problem of selection has only been solved in a very general way in the formulation of the archive's subject-typology. The kind of general solution of the problem in the subject-typology cannot be directly used to solve specific problem of selection. Often you will have a feeling that the selection problem is buried in the typology. For instance, the typology contains the category 'contemporary history', but within this very category there are essentials and inessentials. And furthermore, the category contemporary history cannot be defined in relation to history as a science. It is defined in accordance with the nature of audiovisual material or the needs of the programme producing departments. This means that the criteria traditionally used in the science history cannot be directly applied. A typology can only in a very restricted sense be used to solve specific ad hoc selection problems. It can be used to give potential customers a general idea of what can be found in the archive, and it can be used to define in a formal way the working-purpose of the archive. It can also be used in the selection of material, which may be unambiguously described as in a particular category.

Application of a general typology presupposes an integrated insight into the elements of the specific problem of selection. Otherwise you will not be able to discover that the typologies or categories are involved in the specific problem - and in the same way you are unable to discover the specific integration of the categories. In short, the application of a general typology needs interpretation in every specific selection decision. The typology is only one out of several factors involved in specific selection work, and it must be stressed that the typology itself does not contain principles by means of which the integration can be motivated. The principle of integration is to be found in ourselves in the form of the aforementioned heuristic, pre-scientific, but necessary total-image, which is activated in the meeting between the selector and his specific selection problem.

Therefore selection is a kind of metaphysical achievement resulting in a creative, integrating insight and decision, and it is founded on a complicated combination of our more or less conscious and educated total-image, explicitly formulated general subject-typology and understanding of the specific selection-problem involved. Selection is not in the category objective, secure, hard science, but in the category meaningful, subjective action. For that reason a selection decision will always have to live with the possibility of being questioned. The selection decision is not a science but an action, which is open, creative and perhaps even playful - and long may it continue to be so. Objectivity in selection,

for instance in the form of percentage selection or the impossible (in the long run) total selection will transform archives into stores and the creative, educated selection into automatic, mechanical sorting.

Therefore, in reply to the first of the two questions raised in the paper's introduction, I am of the opinion that the problem about the philosophical conception of selection is best solved by conceiving selection as meaningful subjective action, always open to debate, and as a philosophical method I would recommend self-awareness in relation to the practical selection work based upon the epistemological phenomenon insight as understood by Bernard Lonergan.

The second question, which was raised in the introduction, concerned the methodological conception of selection. The problem has only been touched upon and space decrees only a very brief mention of the research-discipline, which will be staid the selector to make his practical work transparent. What I have in mind is the decision-making theory.

To recapitulate, I tried at the beginning to show the presence of a kind of metaphysical heuristic total-image, our subjective-reality, as a foundation for selection-work. This image was formulated in the general subject-typology as a description of what categories of material the archive must select to fulfil its purpose. The general subject-typology has the character of a normative description, however specific selections are not description, but decisions! The typology and the specific selection are two different ways of thinking about the same problem and that is why the problem of essential/unessential seems buried in the typology when you try to motivate specific selections by means of the typology. The typology is not a set of rules to be followed blindly; rather it is a kind of framework for creativity. The specific selection is a creative decision, and it is of course unwise not to use the large literature about this subject to reach a more profound understanding of what is involved in decisions.

Some of the fundamental works within the discipline are to be found in the general action theory, but the most directly usable works are strangely enough to be found in the special elaboration of the theory for analysis of political decision-making. Richard Snyder, Graham T Allison and John D Steinbruner ought to be mentioned and if you are interested in analysis of the concept meaningful subjective action, Alfred Schutz ought to be consulted. Space forbids me to enter into details of decision-making theory, but the self-understanding of the selector will be much improved by studying the decision-making theory's analysis of the many very complicated factors involved in decisions, from the cultural blind

spots, through the organisational forms of the archive itself and on to the individual psychology of the selector.

Understanding these factors cannot, of course, make selection objective but it can make the selection decisions less arbitrary - and the selection debate can profit from the definitions and the very differentiated concepts within the decision-theory. Another problem, which can be illuminated by decision-making theory, is the problem of differentiating between types of selection. Earlier in the paper I outlined the type of selection in my own archive, but there are of course a lot of other types - one of them I have referred to elsewhere as sorting. In the decision-theory there are at least six different paradigms or types, each of them characterizing a type of decision. For instance, there is an analytical paradigm, a cognitive paradigm and a cybernetic paradigm - the last one can, with advantage, be used to characterize the very simplified and automatic form of selection, which I have called sorting. But these differentiations and refinements will come in connection with the intensified selection debate, which we can expect in the years to come.

The history of linguistic research can easily be described with certain basic scientific paradigms that have dominated the objectives, methods, and empirics of this discipline since at least the age of humanism. These paradigms oscillate between two poles that were titled philosophical and harmonic traditions. In modern terms we can tentatively equate the philosophical tradition to deductive approaches, whereas harmonic paradigms tend towards inductive methods. In the heydays of philosophical grammars, that is between say 1750 and 1850, it was rationalism, especially its variant in terms of Wolffianlogicism that dominated the explanatory access to language. Today, this explanatory basis has become much broader and less restricted to a single causal paradigm. Though the mental domain still plays the most important role in this respect. Other parameters such as communication, cultural and social knowledge, the habitus of a speech community, as well as parameters anchored in the interaction of human biology and cognition have partly led to the assumption of a multicausal scenario in order to access the ontology of language.

The harmonic paradigm mainly is an output of early European romanticism based on the tradition of sensualism and French encyclopedias. It yields in the description of the grammatica vulgaris or grammaireparticulière of a language in order to provide the basis for establishing a more general typology often based on a naturalist interpretation of verbal behavior. Though comparisons have been

introduced as a descriptive method already in classical times that have also been exploited by the tradition of the Grammar of Port Royal in the 17th century. It was the non-rationalistic movement of early Romanticism by which this method became popular. It gradually undermined the philosophical tradition also because colonialism provided the Europeans with a growing knowledge of exotic languages that questioned the structures of which most of the early axioms related to the ontology of language were built upon.

From a historical perspective we can describe a significant interaction of methodical paradigms and the quantity of linguistic materials If the amount of data processed during a period of inductive research reaches a critical mass the paradigm may face a drastic shift to deductive procedures. Indicates such periods of inductivism with the help of the label Mithridates. By this term I refer to the two Mithridates publications listed in. Both of Gesner's Mithridates, de differentiislinguarum from 1555 and Adelung'sMithridates or AllgemeineSprachenkunde from 1806-1817 represent typical efforts to document the contemporary encyclopedic knowledge of linguistic diversity. Until now we have to assume that at least four such Mithridates periods, the last of which mainly started in two centers after World War II. The first one was located in Paris in 1945. A year that is associated with the beginning of a series of meetings organized by the Société de Linguistique de Paris and devoted to problems of mass comparison. Second, in 1951 a first informal meeting of linguists, anthropologists, and psycholinguists took place at Cornell University that represented the first steps towards the famous Dobbs Ferry Conference of 1961. This conference prepared the ground for an increasing interest in language typology and language universals described from a radical inductive point of view. Contrary to earlier Mithridates periods, the inductive tradition survived despite of the challenge that emerged from the growing MIT paradigm the propagation of which started especially with Chomsky's review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior in 1959.

Since then, inductive and deductive procedures of linguistic argumentation have coexisted in a more or less pronounced form of apartheid.Linguistic research is normally classified according to such labels as typology or syntax which represent the two sides of the linguistic war that still takes place between East Coast and West Coast Linguistics.

Whereas the MIT paradigm strongly maintained a position that followed the basic axioms of ineptness and Universal Grammar. Typology underwent several substantial shifts in the last four decades that also documented a shift from

inductive to more deductive procedures. This shift may be explained by the dynamics of the forthMithridates period itself, but obviously it also was the academic success of syntax theories that promoted a gradual movement of the typological paradigm towards some methodical assumptions often related to the MIT orthodoxy. The two terms that best document this paradigmatic shift are universals and cognition.

> If we try to classify the changes that have taken place in the theoretical and methodical paradigms of typology it seems useful to refer to Croft's terminology (Croft 1990). He distinguishes between typological classification, typological generalization, and typological approach or typology proper. These labels correspond to three distinct types of typological tradition that started in the beginning of the 19th century, cf. The strongly inductive approach of typological classification can be characterized as a pre-theoretical way to account for the diversity of language systems. It had its heydays in the last century, but still formed a part of the paradigm of Classical American Structuralism. The above mentioned Dobbs Ferry Conference opened the way to develop a methodological basis for comparative research in terms of linguistic universals. It is interesting to note that the Dobbs Ferry Conference, sponsored by the Committee on Linguistics and Psychology of the Social Science Research Council already anticipated the interdisciplinary orientation that is characteristic for the third phase in typological research. Namely Typology proper: Among the members of the preparatory meeting at Bloomington in 1953 we find six linguists, six psychologists, and one anthropologist. The Hullian psychologist Charles E. Osgood commented upon the meeting as follows (...) while linguists had an admirable and well worked out method, it was applied merely to the description of individual languages. Could the linguists present tell him anything about all languages? That would be of the highest interest to psychologists" (Greenberg et al. 1978:v). The famous Memorandum Concerning Language Universals, formulated by Joseph H. Greenberg, Charles E. Osgood, and James J. Jenkins and circulated among the participants of Dobbs Ferry in 1961, stressed the interdisciplinary option (cf. „(...) since language is at once both an aspect of individual behavior and an aspect of human culture, its universals provide the major point of contact with underlying psychological principles (psycholin-guistics) and the major source of implications for human culture in general (ethnolinguistics)" (Greenberg et al. 1978:xv).

Yet, it took another 20 years before parts of the community of typologists adopted the scientific implications underlying the Memorandum. This step can be

characterized as a shift towards a more explanatory paradigm. Naturally, the orientation of this paradigm was co-determinated by the cognitive turn associated with the MIT orthodoxy. Some of its renegades such as George Lakoff, JamesMcCawley, and the psychologist George Miller entered the paradigm of functionalism and typology and heavily influenced the way explanatory domains were established for linguistic phenomena. These anchor domains can be identified among others with the help of the term's communication, interaction, culture, habitus, cybernetics, and cognition. Today in fact, communication and cognition represent the two most basic domains which, however, are often though to stand in a somewhat antagonistic relationship,cf.The scheme also indicates that features such as culture, habitus, and interaction represent secondary domains that can be claimed by both the communicative and the cognitive paradigm. In more recent years, the diachronic perspective as a device to explain linguistic data has gained special interest both with respect to system immanence and the dynamics of the anchor domains themselves.

The impact of MIT cognitivism on typological research can hardly be described in terms of a well formulated theoretical debate. Rather, this impact has to be characterized as implicit and tacit. Rather, it was the output of what is often called the Roschian Revolution, that is the psychological research in the tradition of EleonorRosch, that was often pronounced as the framework underlying cognitive thinking in typology. The LAUD symposium held in Duisburg in 1990 marked „the birth of cognitive linguistics as a broadly grounded, self-conscious intellectual movement", as Langacker has put it.

Although non-MIT oriented cognitive linguistics can certainly be characterized as the most rapidly expanding linguistic paradigm of the last decade, the impact of this linguistic theory on standard work in typology still lacks an adequate interpretation.

Today, Cognitive Linguistics – as opposed to ChomskyanCognitivism– are interested especially in the conceptual organization of linguistic knowledge, cf. which lists parts of the issues that are intended to be discussed at the forthcoming LAUD symposium in Konstanz in 2000:

· linguistic categories and cognitive models

· conceptual metaphors and metonymies, e.g. emotion concepts

· schemas and prototypes exploited and built up in and across language(s)

· construals within languages and across languages

· iconicity in language and thought

· language and space as the basis of concrete and abstract conceptualization

· language, culture and thought, i.e. language as a culture's symbolization

It is interesting to note that cross-linguistic comparison only plays a minor role in this listing. This fact corresponds to the methodical basis of today's Cognitive Linguistics. It is basically an interpretative framework that describes direct or indirect relationship between cognitive events and linguistic signs supported by the empirics of the sign in question and the psychological events that can be documented when this sign in processed. If you allow a somewhat polemic formulation, we may say that the old dictum in especially French semantics, namely that chaque mot a son histoire, is changed in Cognitive Grammar to chaquemorphème a son évènementcognitif. We are left with the impression that the strongly inductive orientation of linguistic typology prevented this discipline from developing a theoretical superstructure that would be capable of systematically incorporating possible explanatory paradigms. Rather, we can observe two

different types of reaction towards the general challenge of cognitivism: One the one hand, typologists are inclined to return to some rigid kind of descriptivism, as formulated for instance by Bob Dixon in his Basic Linguistic Theory. This rollback is accompanied by the trend to establish some kind of categorial typology based on mere linguistic categories, a trend that has its sources in Humboldt's claim for a categorical encyclopedia as well as in Bloomfieldian thinking and the post-war activities of the Scoot de Linguistique de Paris, cf. One the other hand, the explanatory domain established by cognitivism is often accessed quite arbitrarily in linguistic typology.

The linguistic discourse with the framework of typology is hence characterized by a certain reluctance to systematic superstructures that would formulate a deductive theory to approach the empirics of typology. Still, the need of such superstructures – whatever they might be – seems necessary to prevent typology from self-contained or even self-satisfied descriptivism and explanatory haphazardness. The obvious progress that has been achieved in the functional explanation of linguistic structures calls for the systematization of this experience

in terms of a unified account. The best way to approach this task seems to be by creating some kind of typology how and to which extent the explanatory domains are accessed. Such a metatypology would be clectic and cumulative in nature because we have to respect most of the empirical findings in linguistic typology as well as the ways of how they are explained. A – if you allow – philosophical superstructure of typology cannot and should not re-invent the wheel but should try to propose a theoretical framework that makes the many ends of typological explanation meet in an adequate format and that is based on the most central axiom of linguistic explanation, namely on derivationalism.

Naturally, it would be obvious to use the term Cognitive Typology in order to label such a framework. In fact, this term – already sometimes used in informal talks – will serve as the title for an intended conference the next year in Antwerp. However, these terms suggests that there is a consensus in typology regarding the definition of what is finally covered by cognition. Moreover, the term implies that there are different types of typology, among them the cognitive approach. Yet, the specification of the term typology normally yields at a given method applied to typology, not at the theoretical foundation of the discipline itself, cf. which lists some of these terms. Another term that might be useful is holistic typology. It refers to what is known as holistic cognitivism and explicitly names the anchor chosen for typological explanation. Still, the term should be used with great care, because it refers to an actual paradigm in cognitivism that is rather susceptible to re-orientation.

Furthermore, we have to note that typology itself rather represents a scientific method than the name for a program to explain human language. Consequently, a possible superstructure of typology should not be typology itself, but something that covers the typological approach as well as other domains of linguistic derivationalism, among them those mentioned in of your handout.

In the second part of my paper I want to introduce a theoretical framework that claims to contribute to the development of a general superstructure for linguistic typology. I cannot work out all the details of the proposed paradigm here, but will concentrate first on some of its general properties only, before I will turn to some considerations. The framework has been developed at the University of Munich and is labeled a Grammar of Scenes and Scenarios. Its basic assumptions are worked out in Schulze 1998; they will be further elaborated and evaluated in the forthcoming volumes of the series Person, Klasse, Kongruenz with the help of a specific empiric domain, namely that of the autochthonous East Caucasian languages .

The Grammar of Scenes and Scenarios, in short 'GSS', should be understood both as a model for linguistic description and explanation. Its deductive foundations are strongly related to what may be called Linguistic Constructivism By this is meant that „language emerged from brain structures which had been engineered for other functions, by co-opting them from their previous domains. In essence, language 'colonized' the earlier hominid brain; the end result is the modern human brain which is built for language, but not specifically genetically programmed for it" (Foley 1997:77). Hence, language systems are regarded as the routinization of the emergent activities of the cognitive-communicative interface. They are construed as a cognitive reality by human beings during the times of language acquisition in accordance with the linguistic knowledge of their instructors. It is important to note that GSS treats communication as a cognitive procedure: It is represented by a phylogenetically older cognitive substrate that is organized in a quasi-autonomous network or knowledge system, cf. Consequently, GSS tries to explain the grammar of a language on the basis of the acquired cognitive and (cognition based) communicative practice of an individual integrated into a collective. This practice is dominated by massive hypotheses about the self-attachment to a collective. It represents a strongly ritualized but construing interaction of the individual with environmental or world stimuli which corresponds to the habitus of a collective and which takes place in form of the tacit (poiematic) and/or articulate (pragmatic) activation of an acquired (and traditional) knowledge system.

Linguistic practice is thought to represent the individual reaction to a collective communicative and cognitive standard which itself is predominantly historical in nature. By this is meant that the linguistic knowledge system of an individual and its instantiation in a communicative community always reflects strategies of linguistic adaptation that have been functionalized long before the individual has acquired a given system. Hence, GSS argues that language as a 'metaphysical' phenomenon owns strong anachronistic features: It hardly ever meets the immediate synchronic needs of information processing and communication. It follows that functional and semantic aspects of language architectures are mainly to be explained in a diachronic perspective, though the potential to adopt newly established communicative and cognitive routines plays an important role in the dynamic potential of language systems. The assumption of an anachronistic ontology of language systems has an important consequence for linguistic explanation: Contrary to some other cognitive approaches, GSS does not establish a direct synchronic relationship between language systems and cognition, cf. Language systems and cognitive activities are thought to be structurally coupled

on the basis of a mainly diachronic relationship that presupposes an adequate linguistic treatment of the data in question.

To sum up this point: The theoretical framework underlying GSS can be described as a basically diachronic model that owes much to holistic cognitivism, constructivism, and pragmatism. The structural coupling of adequate network components as well as the linguistic practice emerging from this coupling shape linguistic paradigms: These activities result in 'language' as a complex cognitive event – as an emergent activity of this polycentric complex. Though GSS does not accept the modularization of linguistic knowledge as a specific property of cognition itself, modularity plays an important role in the GSS framework, too. This is because the tendency of human beings to react on complex experience by singling out specific components can lead to the construction of adequate symbols. Linguistic modularity is thought to be such a construed symbol that is interpreted as a cognitive reality and that is exploited by human beings to create a cognitive hypothesis about the autonomy of language. People are used to think of language as if it were autonomous just because it is the most effective and most exploitable way to go through the experience of language.

Though GSS claims that this theoretical superstructure is valid for all aspects of linguistic reality, it focuses on the architecture of grammatical systems in order to meet one of the most central issues of today's typology, namely the typology of grammar. GSS hypothesizes that the ontology of language is based on routinized mental constructions of event experience (event images) that are structurally coupled with (tacit/articulate) linguistic knowledge and activated in an intra/inter-individual communicative (linguistic) context. From this it follows that language ensures the structural coupling of cognition and environment (as opposed to other unilateral connections), which aims at a mediated way to share human experience. Consequently, the most fundamental aspects of linguistic architecture should be described in terms

of this functional relationship, cf. However, it should be noted that the linguistic paradigmatization of event images is not the only parameter that organizes both linguistic knowledge and the architecture of grammatical systems. On the one hand we have to respect the above mentioned anachronistic aspect of language systems with respect to their cognitive condition, cf. (19). On the other hand, linguistic systems are liable to be affected by specifications of how communicative and linguistic practice is incorporated into the dynamics of the habitus of a speech community, cf

Still, GSS claims that the cognition communication interface represents the most basic domain of linguistic organization, to which we have to add the Interface established by the CoCo domain and the world knowledge base, cf. The activities related to these two interfaces strongly influence the way that people react on world stimuli in terms of linguistically oriented event images. It is assumed that the way of how such event images are processed by cognition is conditioned by the communicative knowledge base: Linguistically processed pattern recognition refers to a specific grammar that interprets and manipulates event images in a communicative perspective. In GSS, such event

images are called scenes.

Contrary to the tradition for instance of Joseph Grimes and Ronald Langacker, scenes in GSS are regarded as a kind of cognitive blueprint that is activated in pattern recognition. Hence, scenes do not share any real world properties, but reflect the way in which real world experience is construed on the basis of strongly idealized cognitive models or cognitive hypotheses. The blueprints of scenes are thought to be part of the evolution of cognitive and communicative behavior. Their basic structure is constituted by the architecture of those cognitive domains that have been involved in the emergence of scenic blueprint at all. It is assumed that there is a functional iconicity between the neurophysiological architecture of cognition and the architecture of scenes: Scenes cannot be processed but within the general frame of cognition. Their blueprints represent engrammatic structures that are stored in long term memory. The input of a world stimulus activates procedures of picturing or re-presenting such engrammatic structures in terms of what sometimes has been called scripts (Schank/Abelson), cf.

The CoCo interface establishes certain properties of scenic blueprints that can be tentatively labeled as scenic universals. By this is meant that the universal aspects of the CoCo interface forces a universal design of scenes irrespective of the way how a given scene is finally communicated. These universals are embedded into the general schemes or cognitive hypotheses of human beings regarding the communicative interpretability of world experience. Among them, we can describe the degree of time stability, object and relational permanence, movement, variation and change, localization, embodiment, and centrality. These universals are additionally characterized by the fact that linguistic scenes are only construed in a communicative context. Hence, we have to assume that basic parameters of intra- or inter-individual communication and interaction such as

role swapping or role exchange also belong to the universal design of such scenes.

All these universals constitute the kernel of prototypically organized scenes. Such structures gain complexity because of two factors. First, the universals can experience a different degree of particularization. By this it is meant that higher level domains as well as strategies of grammaticalizing a scene establish a peripheric structure within the prototypical organization of the scenic blueprints. Due to these particularized blueprints for instance some universals become more active or functional than others do. Second, scenic universals are liable to be a high degree of metaphorical extension. The earlier such a metaphorical process has become routinized and conventionalized, the more a resulting metaphor gains the status of a quasi-universal. Lists some of the most typical metaphorical paths: Perhaps the most prominent one is that of causality that stems from the universals of movement and change. Movement itself seems to result from the embodiment of figure-ground-relations which themselves are part of the overall scheme of internality and externally characteristic for the process of embodiment. Movement and location are metaphorized as time, which can interfere with causality and establishes modality.

Another universal property of the architecture of linguistic scenes is that the original image schema or gestalt has to be transferred into a serial sequence of information chunks that correspond to the linearity of linguistic expressions. In GSS, this type of linearization is called attention flow; a termed borrowed from the fragment of cognitive grammar as proposed by Scott DeLeancey. However, attention flow has a specific semantics in GSS: It refers to the fact that the cognitive constructive reaction on a world stimulus already presupposes the anticipation of the final linguistic output: Accordingly, the stimulus input is scanned with respect to possible segments. This anticipatory behavior is called attention in GSS. Though the construction of linearity itself is a universal scenic feature, its instantiation is highly particularized.

Depending on the communicative context, but also on the higher level domains mentioned above, scenes are grammaticalized to a very different extent. The term grammaticalization has a doubled reading in GSS: On the one hand, it refers to the traditional use of this term in the context of grammaticalizationresearch, that is in diachronic typology. On the other hand it denotes the process of verbalizing a construed scenes. This process is characterized by a complex interaction of different segments of the cognitive network, cf. which tries to outline some of those factors that are involved in the procedure of grammaticalization.

Unfortunately, I cannot discuss all the signal components of this polycentric network here. It should be sufficient to note that the relationship between the blueprint domain of the scenic architecture and the

grammatical network that establishes a part of the linguistic knowledge system is not regarded as a direct relation. The grammatical network does not simply translate the scenic architecture into a linguistic format but activates a complex relational network that plays the role of an interface between the two components. It shapes the paradigmatic structure of the grammatical network especially in a diachronic perspective, and restricts the expression of scenic information to the formal extension of the grammatical network.

This relational network is termed Operating System in GSS. It refers to those parts of the grammatical network that constitute the verbalization of scenes in a given speech community. Operating systems represent basically tacit or poiematic linguistic knowledge systems and guarantee an individual that it can express its communicative requirements in a routinized and conventionalized form. They help to grammaticalize the scenic architecture by anchoring a given scene in the grammatical, lexical, and conceptual network components. Though Operating Systems tend to be highly particularized reflecting the diachrony of linguistic and communicative practices in a speech community, they have to observe some general requirements that stem from the universal architecture of scenes, cf. The first column lists those CoCo parameters that condition and dominate the scenic architecture. The second column gives the correspondent architectural properties of the scene, whereas the third column refers to some of those linguistic strategies that become relevant in the verbalization of a scene.

It is important to note that all three domains are prototypically organized. With respect to the scenic architecture we can describe the following prerogatives that are located in the kernel of this prototypical structure:

1. Scenes are always construed according to a figure-ground scheme. Its metaphorical extension can be described as a vector relation between cause and effect.

2. There are no empty scenes: Scenes share a minimal extension, which is conditioned by the figure-ground relation. Hence a relation of one or more participants (actors and actants) characterizes every scene. Relations and actors can be secondarily masked or disguised, actors can be treated as anonymous.

3. The population of a scene is theoretically unlimited in number, however, the CoCo interface as well as principles of perception and information processing restrict the number of possible actors (usually, not more than three to four actors per scene).

4. Scenes are always located in (system) space and (system) time.

5. Every scene shows a perspective arrangement: This arrangement can by static or dynamic.

6. Every scene shows a notion of centrality: The most central perspective is taken by the construing individual which can delegate this role to either other Speech Act Participants (role swapping) or to actors in a given scene.

7. Every scene is structured according to the attention flow.

The organization of operating systems copies this prototypical arrangement to a certain extent. We can observe that the Accusative Ergative Continuum plays the most central part in the verbalization of scenes. The AEC dominates for instance figure-ground relations as well as the cause->effect vector, attention flow, time and space allocation, perspectivization, and – partly – centralization. Consequently, GSS treats the AEC as the most prominent aspect of a given operating system. The AEC itself can be characterized as a linguistic reaction upon the dynamics of the cause->effect vector in correlation with other parameters of the scenic architecture. It is claimed that every linguistic paradigm that becomes effective with respect to the verbalization of the cause->effect vector is subjected to the AEC. The AEC allows the description of the paradigmatic, syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic behavior of a given linguistic structure in view of the weighting of actors in a scene, cf. The more weight is layed upon the C domain, the more the paradigm behaves accusative-like. And vice versa: The more weight is layed upon the E domain the more is operates upon an Ergative-like schema. Naturally, we cannot claim that an operating system behaves totally accusative or Ergative. Rather we should assume that quite often the single linguistic units are differently located on the AEC – depending on the functional value a given paradigm has with respect to the scenic architecture. Lists some of those linguistic 'categories' that are sensitive for the AEC. Criteria of cognitive and communicative dominance as well as aspects of co-paradigmatization or structural coupling among the single paradigms help to describe the general dynamics within the polycentric structure of the operating system in question.

Conclusion

If you again turn to in your handout, you can see that my paper has been organized along the four basic explanatory domains of GSS. Namely the general theoretical framework, the Grammar of Scenes and Scenarios, its grammaticalization in terms of the operating system, and – finally – the organization of the operating system itself. Among the many questions that remain probably the most important is whether such a concept helps to develop a superstructure for language typology that is powerful enough to take into account the results of formal and functional typology. As well as current approaches to language theory in the framework of derivationalism. The fact that I did hardly ever use the term typology within this presentation of GSS may question the assertion that this framework is interested in typological data at all. But we have to bear in mind that typology itself on the first hand is nothing but the name for a methodical approach that claims to establish linguistic types for further evaluation. These types correspond to the observed diversity of linguistic systems. Hence, typology has acquired a connotation that is strongly connected with linguistic variation rather than with universals of human language. GSS accepts this methodical basis and heavily relies upon its descriptive and analytic output. GSS is a typological theory, because it is particularly interested in the process of linguistic diversification as a source to determine those parameters that are responsible for it. GSS is a typological theory also, because it tries to establish a typology of just those domains that are thought to constitute language as well as languages. Just as the diversity of linguistic paradigms calls for an adequate typological description, the systems that control the linguistic output have to be described in terms of their possible particularization. But contrary to many current approaches in language typology, GSS tries to integrate this kind of typological thinking into the broader context of universals of human communication and cognition. It aims at explaining the process of particularization on behalf of universal parameters, because you can only account for this process if you accept that everything that establishes a type via particularization must result from something more universal. Consequently, if you want to pursue the third level of typological research called typology proper namely to the explanation of linguistic types, you have to turn to a model that makes proposals concerning the conditional nature of these types. The way to simply call all those features universals that are common to all languages has

turned out to be a dead lock. In fact, the number of such features is considerably low and often enough we find nothing stated but pleonasms. GSS argues that universality can hardly be described in terms of paradigmatic features. Rather, it is the behavior of linguistic paradigms with respect to their derivational basis that bears some notions of universality. In this, GSS differs considerably from traditional typological approaches, which documents the basic structure of argumentation in GSS. The assumed explanatory power of GSS perhaps lies in the fact that it encompasses both inductive and deductive methods without giving technical priority to either one. It relies on the assumption that every linguistic unit – be it located on a micro- or on a macro level – in itself carries the whole world of cognitive events that are activated when this unit is produced. However, GSS cannot be regarded as a variant of Cognitive Linguistics because such a tradition implies that it interprets linguistic data from a cognitive perspective. From this it would follow that other perspectives are a valid option, too. GSS is more radical: It claims that language is nothing but part of the cognitive domain. Language does not exist beyond this domain, just as all human activities are finally processed by cognition. This basic claim of constructivism unmasks the term Cognitive Linguistics as yet another pleonasm.

Let me finally turn again to the title of this paper: If Cognitive Linguistics is a pleonasm than we have to change the title to either Linguistics meet typology which sounds more than absurd, or we have to reformulate it as Cognitive sciences meet language typology. The term meeting, however, suggests that it is a first step towards integration. Hence, we arrive at the name for a scientific program which can described as language typology becomes integrated into Cognitive sciences. It presupposes that the Cognitive sciences open their windows to the results already achieved by the high and very sophisticated standard language typology. Naturally, this claim has to work in the opposite direction, too. The framework of GSS tries to propose such a path for language typology as well as for language theory in general. Whether it can contribute to the progress of linguistic research or whether its assumptions are nothing but „straws in a wind that will die down or prove to be blowing elsewhere" only the future will tell.

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