# MINISTRY OF HIGHER AND SECONDARY SPECIAL EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

Urgench State University

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### MEANING CONSTRUCTION OF COGNITIVE INTROSPECTION METAPHORS AS EVIDENCED IN ENGLISH AND UZBEK

Dissertation

For defending Master's degree on specialty 5A120102-Linguistics (English Language)

Supervisor:

f.f.n, dots.Ermetova J. I.

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UDK

#### SABIROVA KHOSIYAT MAKSUDOVNA

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#### INTRODUCTION

As being independent, the role of education and science has been being empowered which led to enhance the quality of not only economy but also society. The President of Uzbekistan I. A. Karimov has been emphasizing on the necessity of the well educated members of society as well as scientists, in turn he is paying more attention to teaching foreign languages, especially English language in any field of academic life as can be seen in "Kadrlar Tayyorlashning Milliy Dasturi". The reason is that well experienced scientists, translators and teachers are vitally important to contribute our country's economy, education and society. So that, there are mounting of positive changes in education and science. As for Comparative Linguistics is the base of teaching foreign languages (FLT). Thus teaching and learning languages by comparing with each other has been remaining as the core issue of FLT.

In this dissertation, comparative linguistics is integrated with other fields of the science including cognitive linguistics, neurolinguistics and others.

#### The topicality of the theme

Research on meaning construction of metaphors in English and Uzbek languages as linguistic evidence in cognitive linguistics that researching how people perceive and conceptualize their inner experiences of cognitive and psychological processes, need to be improved and advanced in order to be more aware of the reflection of the objective world in subject's mind. Since people simulate internal states similar to how they simulate external. Because, simulations of internal states could provide much of the conceptual content central to abstract concepts. Since to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. However, the scientific study of concepts has primarily focused so far on concrete concepts; we actually know remarkably little about abstract concepts, even from the perspective of traditional cognitive theories. Nevertheless, abstract concepts appear to play central roles throughout human

cognition, especially in meta-cognition, social interaction, education, industry, and social institutions. Regardless of whether simulations of introspections and situations underlie the representation of abstract concepts, much more effort should be devoted to understanding. Thus, the research on metaphors those are used to reason abstract introspective concepts of cognitive and emotional experiences by the tool of metaphors should be advanced in order to be much more aware of the truth, since truth cannot exist independent of the human mind. This dissertation is devoted to compare metaphors in two languages including English and Uzbek and advance metaphors those are used to reason abstract introspective concepts of cognitive and emotional experiences. Moreover, in this research work I raised some questions related to understanding of the meaning and logic. As a result I made hypothesis and coined or brought two new scientific terms by basing on neurolinguistics, neurology, psycholinguistics, cognitive linguistics and cognitive science.

#### Object of the research work

As an object of investigating, both new and dead metaphors including collocations, phrases, idioms are investigated and compared, as regards the books of Jennifer Seid, W McMordie, "English idioms and how to use them", Cowie, Mackin and McCaig, "Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms", and "O'zbek tilining izohli lug'ati", Uygun's 'Tanlangan asarlar', 'Robert Burns' Classic Poetry series' published in 2004.

#### Purpose of the work

The meaning construction of metaphors languages in English and Uzbek language as linguistic evidence in cognitive linguistics and neuroscience that researching how people perceive and conceptualize their inner experiences of cognitive and psychological processes is not meticulously studied yet and comparison of both languages is not researched as well. Thus, the results of this paper have significant value in cognitive linguistics, philosophy and in other science fields.

#### The scope and task of the work

Finding specific features of metaphors and generalizing similarities and differences by comparing the conceptual mappings of metaphors in two languages, in English and Uzbek, is the task of the research work as well as emphasizing to investigate more about the cognation and understanding of the meaning of the words and metaphors in both languages. Furthermore the followings are the key tasks of this dissertation:

- 1. Finding the theoretical issues of cognitive linguistics including semantics, stylistics and neurolinguistics and cognitive science.
- 2. Identifying as well as inducing, deducing the features of the usage of conceptual metaphors and comparing them in both English and Uzbek.
- 3. Classifying orientational metaphors in Uzbek and comparing it with English.

Moreover, following the views of well known cognitive linguists of my dissertation paper, in the fourth chapter of this research work I made my hypothesis and tried to answers to these following questions:

- 1. Do we use the same neuron circuitry or the same neural substrate used in imagining, understanding when reasoning our mental and psychological processes once we use or comprehend dead abstract metaphors UNCONSCIOUSLY without emphasizing on their meaning construction?
- 2. Or are there any levels those should be able to show the influence of neuron circuitry such as conscious and unconscious levels?

#### **Analyzed references through the topic**

In this dissertation paper, I refer the thoughts of linguists, cognitive scientists, and other scholar's view those can support my hypotheses I made by reopening some questions in the fourth chapter those are related to metaphors newly conceived in Uzbek and in English as well as their cognitive and neurological levels. The linguists I referred in this work are George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark J Landau, Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, Diego Duqeu, Daniel Kahneman, Axel Cleeremans, George Orwell, Gallese, Goldman, Rizzolatti &

Craighero, Ramachandran, Decety as well as Uzbek linguists' view namely Abduazizov A., Muhamedova S, Safarov Sh. and others.

Furthermore, investigating both new and dead metaphors including phrases, idioms are investigated and compared, as regards the books of Jennifer Seid, W McMordie, "English idioms and how to use them", Cowie, Mackin and McCaig, "Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms", Moscow and "O'zbek tilining izohli lug'ati". In the third chapter, as an object of the paper I analyzed Uygun's 'Tanlangan asarlar', published in 1955 and 'Robert Burns' Classic Poetry series' published in 2004. When it comes to the fourth chapter it is mostly about the influence of metaphors in human cognation, so that a number of experiments' results of neurology are taken into consideration as an object of this research work.

#### The method of investigation.

Comparative method, induction, deduction, cross-cultural and pragmatic method as well as linguistic methods are taken as the key methods of the research work.

#### **Novelty of the dissertation**

The meaning construction of introspective metaphors related to cognitive and emotional experiences is not studied meticulously yet (not only in English and Uzbek but in other languages). Furthermore, in this research work I raised some questions related to understanding of the meaning and logic. As a result I made hypothesis (by basing on the survey I made) and brought two new scientific terms into cognitive science field by basing on neurolinguistics, neurology, psycholinguistics, cognitive linguistics and cognitive science which will be helpful and notable in cognitive linguistics as well as semantics.

**Practical value of the work** is the results and novelty of research can be used as a source in a number of fields, namely in semantics, cognitive linguistics, neurolinguistics, psycholinguistics as well as in mass media. What are notable about the practical value of the findings are the answers arisen in the fourth

chapter which gives a way for writers and journalists to analyze recipients' reaction to the meaning.

The structure of the given work encompasses an introduction, four chapters (including conclusions after each chapter), references, a conclusion, a bibliography and appendixes.

### CHAPTER 1: COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS THEORIES AS WELL AS COGNITIVE SIMULATION THEORIES

While researching I rose very basic question again and again "What is metaphor at all?". As for George Lakoff and Turner say that to understand what is metaphorical, we should understand what is not metaphorical: consider real dog as an example-it is not metaphorical since the concept of the real dog is understood and structured on its own terms. But, they say, 'dog's loyalty' is metaphorical, because in this case the instinctive property of the dog is understood in terms of human's personal trade, or in other words-its structure imported from completely different conceptual domain.

Cognitive linguistics field were enriched mostly by American, French and Russian linguists. After the Independence of Uzbekistan, cognitive linguistics field has been being researched by a number of Uzbek linguists such as Abduazizov A, Muhamedova S, Safarov Sh. However, terms and definitions in Cognitive linguistics field fall apart according to the countries; one of the Uzbek linguists Shahriyar Safarov [36.p.286]. implies the reason of this is about the different cultural background and worldview of both American and Russian linguists since they use cognitive linguistic terms and definitions in different ways cause of their different cultural background and outlook. For instance, (Sh. Safarov says) American cognitive linguists focus on generativist views while Russian cognitive linguists mainly rely upon structure and logic of the word in terms of semantics.

In this chapter, I infer the thoughts of Uzbek linguists and American cognitive scientists as well as other scholar's view those can support cognitive analyzes I made in the second and third chapters of this paper as well as my hypotheses I made by reopening some questions in the second and fourth chapter those are related to metaphors conceived in Uzbek and in English as well as their cognitive and neurological levels (or semantic levels as I divided them into two semantic levels in Chapter IV).

### 1.1. Cognitive Linguistics Theories: Conceptual Metaphor, Meaning construction, Embodied and Disembodied views by scholars

As cognitive scientists said "metaphor" is used ubiquitously in not only language but also in thought and action those are embodied and fundamentally metaphorical in nature although metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. That is why, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor, but G Lakoff and Mark J. have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.[12.p.8] However, for over two million metaphor was studied as one of the part of the literature as well as within the discipline known as rhetoric, for instance since the time of Aristotle there are adequate evidences related to metaphor which is based on the comparison of two categories that identified with implicit comparison rather than the comparison is not explicitly marked by contrasting with simile where the comparison is overtly signaled by the use of as or like those is called resemblance metaphor. As for Lakoff and Turner [22.p.74] implies resemblance metaphors based on physical resemblance have been called image metaphors. In other words, image metaphors are one subset of resemblance-based metaphors. Here, I want to refer the Conceptual Metaphor Theory that was one of the initial theoretical frameworks identified as part of the cognitive semantics enterprise and supported much of the early theoretical impetus for the cognitive approach which was first proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their 1980 book "Metaphors We Live By" which was the cause for a number of subsequent publications, as a result this theory changed the game both within cognitive linguistics and within the cognitive and social sciences, particularly in neighboring disciplines like cognitive psychology and anthropology. Moreover, in this dissertation I focused not just on linguistics, cognitive science and psychology but also neurology since our thinking is biologically up to the neuron cells those work within synapses. As mentioned above the metaphor is not simply a stylistic feature of language, but that thought itself is fundamentally metaphorical in nature because of being embodied, so the basic premise of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is the same with this view as a number of evidences are supported in the book of "Metaphors We Live By" by G Lakoff and Mark J. that metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, as emphasized above that metaphor is embodied, according to the view of Conceptual Metaphor Theory implied and evidenced by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark J Landau and other linguists that conceptual structure is organized according to cross domain mappings or correspondences between conceptual domains. Some of these mappings are due to pre-conceptual embodied experiences while others build on these experiences in order to form more complex conceptual structures. For instance, we can think about and talk about QUANTITY in terms of VERTICAL ELEVATION, as can be seen in this example: "She got a really high mark in the test" where high relates not literally to physical height but to a good mark. According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this is because the conceptual domain QUANTITY is conventionally structured and therefore understood in terms of the conceptual domain VERTICAL ELEVATION. operations involving mappings, such **CONCEPTUAL** Conceptual as METAPHOR, are known more generally as CONCEPTUAL PROJECTION that can project the concept of both individual and society. In addition to these linguistic evidences, Schubert [40.p. 64] also demonstrated that the status of social groups is understood partly in terms of vertical position. As for his experiment: "Specifically, judgments of a group's social power were facilitated when information about the groups was presented in the positions implied by the metaphor POWER IS UP: powerful groups were identified more accurately as powerful when the group's name was presented at the top of a computer screen, whereas powerless groups were identified more accurately as powerless when they were at the bottom of the screen." Another recent study by Meier and

Robinson ruled out the possibility that these effects were due to an association between power and generic positivism, which is also associated with UP (Meier and Robinson, 2004). These results show that manipulating aspects of a metaphor's source domain (e.g., vertical position) can shape perception and judgment of even socially relevant target domains (status) without their metaphorical connection being explicitly primed [40. p. 43]. The association of target and source domains are called conceptual metaphor as hypothesized by Lakoff and Johnson with the example of LOVE, which is the target (the domain being described), is conventionally structured in terms of JOURNEYS, which is the source (the domain in terms of which the target is described). Thus, Lakoff and Johnson infer that the conventional association of one domain with another makes the metaphor. They say that "what makes it conceptual (rather than purely linguistic) is the idea that the motivation for the metaphor resides at the level of conceptual domains. That's why, as mentioned above about the proposals of Lakoff and Johnson that we not only speak in metaphorical terms, but also think in metaphorical terms. From this perspective, linguistic expressions that are metaphorical in nature are simply reflection of an underlying conceptual association. The second important claim to emerge from "Metaphors We Live By" was that conceptual metaphors are grounded in the nature of our everyday interaction with the world. That is, conceptual metaphor has an experiential basis [48.p. 95]. In the second chapter, I supported a number of examples in Uzbek and in English those can inform us about one of the main features of conceptual metaphor which show that human being's brain is like a container and all mental and psychological processes and experiences are as subjects or objects as well as being container themselves for human being.

What is intriguing about metaphors is that as mentioned above thinking in metaphorical terms than just speaking in it, G Lakoff and Mark J. implied in the book 'Philosophy in the Flesh' that all of our thoughts are carried out by the brain. All of the concepts we use in thinking are characterized physically in the

brain, which has been shaped by evolution to run a body in the world. Given these facts, G Lakoff and Mark J. raised certain questions naturally: Exactly how are concepts characterized in a physical brain? To what extent are concepts shaped by the peculiarities of our body-brain system? And do concepts make direct use of the brain's sensory-motor system? The traditional answer to the last two questions was, "Not at all" as unanswered by the cognitive linguistics. Because, this answer comes from a traditional western philosophy which claims that rational thought is wholly independent of our bodies, even independent of the way our bodies have shaped our brains. Or in shorted traditional western philosophy claims that rational thought is disembodied and this concept also assumes that concepts are uniquely human — that no aspect of our animal heritage has any bearing on our capacity for rational thought. G Lakoff and Mark J disagree with this traditional view: They believe that evidences in neuroscience and cognitive science demonstrated a theory of the very opposite character, as a result a theory of concepts has been being worked out in detail within the Neural Theory of Language (NTL), furthermore in this dissertation paper where there are a number of evidences I provided in the second and fourth chapters. According to NTL, rational thought are embodied, because, human concepts make direct use of the sensory-motor capacities of our body-brain system, many of which are also present in non-human primates. The evidence from neuroscience as well as other cognitive sciences strongly support the view of concepts as embodied, while there appears to be no empirical evidence supporting the traditional view of concepts as disembodied.[13. p.79]

As referred above, the structural metaphors of those where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another. But, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson implied that there is another kind of metaphorical concept, one that does not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. These are called orientational metaphors, since most of them have to do with spatial orientation: up down, inout, front back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. The second chapter of

my research paper deals with this orientational as well as personification metaphors those are related to cognitive and psychological processes. When it comes to the spatial orientations Lakoff and Johnson say "it arises from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial orientation; for example, HAPPY IS UP. The fact that the concept HAPPY is oriented UP leads to English expressions like "I'm feeling up today." Such metaphorical orientations are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience. As for Experiential Bases of Metaphors are values deeply embedded in our culture, but they are yet not clearly known. In general the major orientations up-down, in-out, central-peripheral, active-passive, etc., seem to cut across all cultures, but which concepts are oriented which way and which orientations are most important vary from culture to culture. As for Ontological point of view, since, spatial orientations provide an extraordinarily rich basis for understanding concepts in orientational terms Entity and substance metaphors have their own role, because our experience of physical objects and substances provides a further basis for understanding—one that goes beyond mere orientation. Realizing as well as understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us treat them as concrete entities, as a result we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them. Once abstract or sometimes concrete things are not clearly discrete or bounded, we still categorize them, the reason for this is that human purposes typically require us to impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete just as we are: entities bounded by a surface. Since the basic experiences of human spatial orientations give rise to orientational metaphors, our own bodies or our experiences with physical objects provide the basis for a wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing cognitive and psychological processes such as emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances, especially rezoning the brain as a container whereas reasoning the cognitive and

psychological processes as personified subject or object as I pointed in this following second chapter. And it in turn leads to some implications about Container

#### Metaphors such as Land Areas:

Being physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins, we experience the rest of the world as outside us, thus each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation, it means we project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces, as a result they are also viewed as containers with an inside and an outside such as rooms and houses." [12.p. 57] One of the most interesting findings related to my research paper is that cognitive and psychological processes are the subject or objects those move from one brain into another or comes from another brain as moving from room to room is moving from one container to another.

As mentioned above that cross domain mapping of entities is a conceptual metaphor which is a mapping of entities, structures, and relations from one conceptual domain (the `source') onto a different domain (the `target') The entities and structures mapped from the source domain give rise to a parallel conceptual structure in the target domain, so that the cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than merely highlighting pre-existing similarities between the source and target domains. [13.p.173]

However, metaphors are unidirectional which means that metaphors map structure from a source domain to a target domain but not vice versa. Lakoff and Turner observed that 'Unidirectionality' holds even when two different metaphors share the same domains. For example, they identified the two metaphors PEOPLE ARE MACHINES and MACHINES ARE PEOPLE. [47.p. 293] Further support for the inter-conceptual manipulation hypothesis comes from evidence that situational manipulating how people conceive of or feel

about a source domain influences their attitudes toward a metaphorically related target domain.

Moreover, Metaphoric mappings carry Metaphorical entailments that means in addition to the individual mappings that conceptual metaphors bring with them, which also provide additional, sometimes quite detailed knowledge, because aspects of the source domain that are not explicitly stated in the mappings can be inferred, so metaphoric mappings carry entailments or rich inferences.

To Mark Landau's knowledge there are no studies dealing with chronically active metaphors that show the effects of using different source domains to structure the same target domain (i.e., that can be taken as evidence for the cross domain mapping hypothesis). This is perhaps not surprising given that by chronically active it means that a given target domain is routinely and automatically conceptualized in terms of a particular source domain. In addition to this implication of Mark Landau, almost all of my findings are shown as a linguistic evidence in the following second chapter which encompasses examples as well as fourth chapter that is devoted to prove my hypotheses about the role of sensory motor system in using metaphors related to reasoning abstract cognitive and psychological processes. Mark Landau says "individual differences in familiarity and motivation, because, people may apply different source domains to highlight and downplay aspects of the target domain in ways that accord with their experience and motivations. This is perhaps most evidence in the context of persuasion, where select metaphors can be particularly effective in portraying people, events, and social issues in certain ways and evoking particular reactions, for example 'good and bad' are routinely and automatically understood partly in terms of 'bright and dark' [27.p.192]

When it comes to Metaphors and image schemas; the idea that certain concepts were image-schematic in nature was exploited by Conceptual Metaphor theory of Theory Lakoff and Johnson both argued as that image schemas could serve as source domains for metaphoric mapping which means image schemas appear to be knowledge structures that emerge directly from pre-conceptual embodied

experience. So that these structures are meaningful at the conceptual level precisely because they derive from the level of bodily experience, which is directly meaningful. As Mark J Landau said, Clearly, highly abstract concepts are unlikely to be directly structured in terms of simple image schemas but are more likely to be structured in complex ways by inheritance relations: a network of intermediate mappings. It also seems likely that certain concepts must relate in part to subjective experiences like emotions. Despite these caveats, Conceptual Metaphor Theory holds that abstract concepts can, at least in part, be traced back to image schemas. [27.p.43] Mark Johnson in his work, in 1987, "The body in literature" says that the Mind offers the claim that all thinking originates in bodily experience. A range of schemata formed during our early experience manipulating a physical world of surfaces, distances, and forces, lays the foundation of later, more abstract modes of thought. By extension and transformation such "image schemata," as Johnson terms them, determine the processes of rational and propositional thinking and emphasized mostly on the qualities and dynamics of the image schemata, the (generally unnoticed) metaphoricity of the transformations underlying abstract thought, and the new significance that should be attributed to the imagination, which is the general term Johnson wishes to claim for the MENTAL PROCESSES he expounds. He thinks that our bodily interactions with the world around us involve repeated patterns of experience, which, following earlier thinkers such as Kant and Bartlett, Johnson terms schemata and it is later called as a "image schemata" An essential view in Conceptual Metaphor Theory is up to hiding and highlighting, once a target is structured in terms of a particular source, this highlights certain aspects of the target while simultaneously hiding other aspects.

Johnson's theory of conflation is the basis for Grady's theory of primary metaphor "Early conflations in everyday experience should lead to the automatic formation of hundreds of primary metaphors that pair subjective experience and judgment with sensorimotor experience. Each primary metaphor, Grady hypothesizes, is simple, an atomic component of the molecular

structure of complex metaphors. Complex metaphors are formed from primary ones through conventional conceptual blending, that is, the fitting together of small metaphorical "pieces" into larger wholes. As Grady suggested that conventional blends are the mechanism by which two or more primary metaphors can be brought together to form larger complex metaphors. The integrated theory-the four parts together-has an overwhelming implication: We have no choice but unconsciously a large system of primary metaphors are acquired automatically and unconsciously simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in the everyday world from our earliest years. Because of the way neural connections are formed during the period of conflation, we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors. [13.p. 68]

When it comes to conceptualizing abstract domains, it is the aspect which encompasses a lot of unanswered questions. So, some evidences related to Abstract target domain is supported in Diego Duqeu's work "Attention Metaphors, he says that in everyday discourse, as well as in science, concepts of attention are defined by metaphors. In scientific theories these metaphors determine what attention is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomena. However, there are not any exact phenomena yet. [8.p.31] Lakoff and Johnson explains it as IDEAS (Or MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS. They say LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS. COMMUNICATION IS SENDING. The speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea/objects out of the word/containers. Reddy documents this with more than a hundred types of expressions in English, which he estimates account for at least 70 percent of Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. And we have found a way to begin to identify in detail just what the metaphors are that structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do. [12.p.57] However, Diego Duqeu referred two quotes about attention in his "Attention Metaphors" work that "Everyone knows what attention is" (William James, 1890, 1950) and second quote is that "No one knows what attention is" that is coined by Pashler. Here Diego Duqeu infers that there is no general agreement about what a theory of attention ought to explain in the field of attention research. [8.p.32] The reason of this is implied in the book of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's "Philosophy in the Flesh" by the term of cognitive unconscious: "we can have no direct conscious awareness of most of what goes on in our minds that is essential and fundamental to all conceptions of cognitive science, and it is called as a cognitive unconscious that is vast and intricately structured including not only all our automatic cognitive operations, but also all our implicit knowledge. All of our knowledge and beliefs are framed in terms of a conceptual system that resides mostly in the cognitive unconscious which shapes how we automatically and unconsciously comprehend what we experience."

In four decades, it has discovered that most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness, inaccessible to consciousness and operating too quickly to be focused on. As evidence in by cognitive scientists that to understand even the simplest utterance, we must perform these and other incredibly complex forms of thought automatically and without noticeable effort below the level of consciousness. Since there are different meanings of cognitive unconscious Lakoff and Johnson used the term cognitive in the richest possible sense, to describe any mental operations and structures that are involved in language, meaning, perception, conceptual systems, and reason. The reason for this is that our conceptual systems and our reason arise from our bodies; the term cognitive is used for aspects of our sensor-motor system that contribute to our abilities to conceptualize and to reason. Since cognitive operations are largely unconscious, the term cognitive unconscious accurately describes all unconscious mental operations concerned with conceptual systems, meaning, inference, and language [13.p. 49]. Diego Duqeu refers that this fact is quite evident in the field of attention research, where even a cursory survey reveals that there is no general agreement about what a theory of attention ought to explain. Different theories have different views of what counts as attention. And moreover, as for the attention metaphor, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson say that the cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than merely highlighting pre-existing similarities between the source and target domains. So that, although the metaphors do not "create" the phenomena of attention, in the sense of causing processes to exist that did not exist before, they do constitute our conceptual understanding of phenomena associated with attention, and the metaphors give us the means for making sense of those phenomena. Thus, in his essay Diego Duqeu argues that there is no way to identify attention independent of some theory of attention, and he argues that theories of attention are structured largely by conceptual metaphors. These metaphors provide the logic for our thinking and reasoning about the nature. [8.p.29] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggested that metaphors make sense of our experience in the same way conventional metaphors do: they provide coherent structure, highlighting some things and hiding others as well as providing a partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of another kind of experience that may involve preexisting isolated similarities, the creation of new similarities, and more. However, the metaphors in Uzbek language are good source to investigate human being's thought since it is one of the young languages founded by A. Navoi in 15th century compared to other languages such as Arabian, Latin, Chinese those hide Moreover they the real meaning of words as turning them as dead metaphors. say, "Since metaphors or concepts pervade our normal conceptual system because of being important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.) that leads to metaphorical definition in our conceptual system. Most of the evidences of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson come from language—from the meanings of words and phrases and from the way humans make sense of their experiences which indicates the metaphor as an explaining,

understanding and conceptualizing tool although it can not support clearly delineated and general concept in our experience. Thus, it is the issue of dictionary makers. Because, when it comes to Definition and Understanding, dictionary makers have not found it important to try to give a general account of how people understand normal concepts in terms of systematic metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS MONEY, etc. When it turns to the Objects of Metaphorical Definition, Natural Kinds of Experience plays an essential role that metaphors allow us to understand one domain of experience in terms of another which suggests that understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience and not in terms of isolated concepts." Consequently it led them to raise a fundamental question: "What constitutes a "basic domain of experience"? Each such domain is a structured whole within our experience that is conceptualized as what we have called an experiential gestalts those are experientially basic, because they characterize structured wholes within recurrent human experiences, thus they represent coherent organizations of our experiences in terms of natural dimensions (parts, stages, causes, etc.). As a result the domains of experience that are organized as gestalts in terms of such natural dimensions seem to us to be natural kinds of experiences those are a the product of our bodies (perceptual and motor apparatus, mental capacities, emotional makeup, etc.), and our interactions with our physical environment (moving, manipulating objects, eating, etc.), and also our interactions with other people within our culture (in terms of social, political, economic, and religious institutions), so that these "natural" kinds of experience are products of human nature those may be universal, while others vary from culture to culture." This kind of case can be seen by the examples I supported in the third chapter of this paper, namely in Uygun's and Robert Burn's poems.

The difference between coherence and consistency is crucial, because, the various metaphorical structuring of a concept serve different purposes by highlighting different aspects of the concept. It means that where there is an

overlapping of purposes, there is an overlapping of metaphors and hence coherence between them and permissible mixed metaphors fall into this overlap.

In general, complete consistency across metaphors is rare; coherence, on the other hand, is typical and it is the role of purpose. As for Complex Coherences across Metaphors led George Lakoff and Mark Johnson to a view of definition that is very different from the standard view which seeks to be "objective," that assumes that experiences and objects have inherent properties and that human beings understand them solely in terms of some number of properties. Lakoff and Johnson argues that our concepts of objects, like our concepts of events and activities, are characterizable as multidimensional gestalts whose dimensions emerge naturally from our experience in the world. As mentioned, in the book called "Woman, Fire and Dangerous thins" by George Lakoff, Categorization is primarily a means of comprehending the world where it is said that "EVERYTHING IN THE UNIVERSE IS EITHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE CATEGORY." As for categorization is primarily a means of comprehending the world, the myth of objectivism and subjectivist those have been arguing till today are the concern for internal aspects of understanding. Once it comes to sharing the same culture, knowledge, values, and assumptions, mutual understanding plays a notable role that is different from CONDUIT metaphor that is on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products says George Lakoff. When it turns to the capacity for self-understanding presupposes the capacity for mutual understanding. Common sense tells us that it's easier to understand ourselves than to understand other people. After all, we tend to think that we have direct access to our own feelings and ideas and not to anybody else's. Self-understanding seems prior to mutual under-standing, and in some ways it is. The discovery of mirror neurons can be example for this, and it will be discussed in the fourth chapter of my research paper. The vital point of this types of understanding related to my hypothesis is the examples from therapy that much of self-understanding involves consciously recognizing previously unconscious metaphors and how

we live by them. It involves the constant construction of new coherences in your life, coherences that give new meaning to old experiences. In order to investigate I took collocations and expressions in both English and Uzbek language as a source. We know in each language including English there are a mounting of derived words those hide their real meaning in the originated language, but as for English, especially Uzbek language, founded by A. Navoi in 15<sup>th</sup> century, discrete the mystery of human thought since it is one of the young languages compared to Arabian, Latin, Chinese and other languages. In the second chapter a number of metaphors in both Uzbek and English are given to support this view about the influence of newly invented metaphors as well as my hypotheses I made in the Fourth Chapter.

As GEORGE ORWELL said, "a newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead". [14.p.27] Why dead metaphors are suggested to paraphrase with some vivid new metaphor? New metaphors those have more influence than dead metaphors those are used unconsciously, automatically. It means, dead metaphors have not influence, while new metaphors are influential. Following this hypothesis of my dissertation paper, the fourth chapter searches answers to these following questions: Do we use the same neuron circuitry or the same neural substrate used in imagining is used in understanding when reasoning our mental and psychological processes once we use dead abstract metaphors UNCONSCIOUSLY? Lakoff and Johnson infer the process of self understanding is the continual development of new life stories for yourself. They say "The experientialist approach to the process of self-understanding involves: Developing an awareness of the metaphors we live by and an awareness of where they enter into our everyday lives and where they do not. My hypotheses given in the fourth chapter about the levels of semantic consciousness relies on a number of evidences including this view: Rituals are coherently structured, and unified aspect of our experience, it means that we are constantly performing rituals those all are repeated structured practices, some THAN OTHERS, and some emerging spontaneously. Each ritual is a repeated, coherently structured, and unified aspect of our experience said George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. They also referred that the creation of new metaphors or new understanding Aesthetic Experience has significant role, because from the experientialist perspective, metaphor is a matter of imaginative rationality. New metaphors are capable of creating new understandings and, therefore, new realities. But metaphor is not merely a matter of language. It is a matter of conceptual structure. And conceptual structure is not merely a matter of the intellect—it involves all the natural dimensions of our experience, including aspects of our sense experiences: color, shape, texture, sound, etc. These dimensions structure not only mundane experience but aesthetic experience as well-implied by Lakoff and Johnson." [12. p. 37]

In the book "Philosophy in Flesh" George Lakoff and Mark Johnson through Cognitive Science reopened Central Philosophical and scientific Questions: Who Are We? And they emphasized that the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, those are three major findings of cognitive science. They argue that reason is not completely conscious, not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged, not purely literal, but largely metaphorical and imaginative as well as being embodied, evolutionary and it includes not only our capacity for logical inference, but also our ability to conduct inquiry, to solve problems, to evaluate, to criticize, to deliberate about how we should act, and to reach an understanding of ourselves, other people, and the world, so that a radical change in our understanding of reason is therefore a radical change in our understanding of ourselves. Lakoff and Johnson argues that there exists neither Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn't moral, because, reason arises from the body, no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. Moreover, human language is not a totally genetic innovation. Rather, central aspects of language arise evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other neural systems that are present in "lower" animals. [13.p.28]

Once I was talking with one of my American friend, we argued about the color types of human beings but not the originated race of them. Personally, Bruno Mars is one of my favorite singers whose skin color looks like black to me. Moreover, my skin color looks like brown according to my perception, and what's more my mother used to call me black lady bug when I was a child. However, my American friend I mentioned above thinks Bruno is not black and I am not brown. When it comes to the truth, "In the book of Metaphors We Live By" Lakoff and Johnson suggested some implications about Metaphor, Truth, and Action. They say that metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities and new metaphors also like conventional metaphors, can have the power to define reality by doing this through a coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others. The acceptance of the metaphor, which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that it highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true. As for the meaning, they say, is private, which is always a matter of what is meaningful and significant to a person stemmed from his or her intuition, imagination, feeling, and individual experience. Thus, meanings have no natural structure. Context is unstructured: The context needed for understanding an utterance—the physical, cultural, personal, and inter-personal context—has no natural structure. Meaning cannot he naturally or adequately represented: This is a consequence of the facts that meanings have no natural structure, that they can never be fully known or communicated to another person, and that the context needed to understand them is unstructured. Their view about the meaning supports my personal speculation I presented in at the ending of fourth chapter stressing on the issue about "Coining New Metaphors", which is natural habit of human being, is not set of ready made assumptions, but it is contingent, ongoing and mental result of both individual and society.

Turning to "Primary Metaphor and Subjective Experience", as explained by Lakoff and Johnson, is our subjective mental life is enormous in scope and richness. We make (subjective judgments about such abstract things as importance, similarity, difficulty, and morality, and we have subjective experiences of desire, affection, intimacy, and achievement. Yet, as rich as these experiences are, much of the way we conceptualize them, reason about them, and visualize them comes from other domains of experience. These other domains are mostly sensory-motor domains. Lakoff and Johnson addressed some evidences of investigations by Christopher Johnson Joe Grady, Srini Narayanan, and Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier. Johnson's theory of conflation in the course of learning is based on young children's subjective: "Each primary metaphor has a minimal structure and arises naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means of conflation, during which cross domain associations are formed. Complex metaphors are formed by conceptual blending. Universal early experiences lead to universal conflations, which then develop into universal (or widespread) conventional conceptual metaphors." When it comes to neural theory of metaphor investigated by Narayanan: the "associations" made during the period of conflation are realized neurally in simultaneous activations that result in permanent neural connections being made across the neural networks that define conceptual domains. These connections form the anatomical basis of source-totarget activations that constitute metaphorical entailments. In turn, Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual blending shows distinct conceptual domains that can be co-activated, and under certain conditions, connections across the domains can be formed, leading to new inferences. Such "conceptual blends" may be either conventional or wholly original. Grady suggests that conventional blends are the mechanism by which two or more primary metaphors can be brought together to form larger complex metaphors. By integrating these four

investigations George Lakoff and Mark Johnson emphasized an overwhelming implication: "We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in the everyday world from our earliest years. We have no choice in this. Because of the way neural connections are formed during the period of conflation, we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors." As for the Sensorimotor Structuring of Subjective Experience, In 'Metaphors We Live By', the evidences are given that conceptual metaphors are mappings across conceptual domains that structure our reasoning, our experience, and our everyday language. Also, Johnson tried to find the answer for "knowing and seeing" hypothesis where domains were conflated.

### 1.2. Linguistic and neurological theories supporting the difference between new and dead metaphors

As I mentioned above, fourth Chapter of my research paper is devoted to The Role of Motor Cortex & Neural Circuitry in Conceptualizing abstract Cognitive and Psychological Processes as a subject and object that is related to grounded cognation which mostly includes the works of Lawrence W. Barsalou, George Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese, Srinivas S. Narayanan, and others whose researches are influential on neuroscience as well as cognitive linguistics as well as neurologists such as Augusto Buchweitz, Robert A. Mason, Leda M. B. Tomitch, Marcel Adam Just.

As for Lawrence W. Barsalou stresses on the origins of grounded cognition which has been the dominant view of cognition for most of recorded history. What's more, twentieth century cognitive constructs reemerged during the Cognitive Revolution after Watson's nineteenth-century studies of introspection, banishing imagery from much of psychology for not being sufficiently scientific, along with other cognitive constructs which was from Watson's study, because theories of knowledge started to adopt a wide variety of amodal representations, including feature lists, semantic networks, and frames those were emphasized by

Barsalou and Hale in the 1990s. Lawrence W. Barsalou referred that Grounded theories are often viewed as only using sensory-motor representations of the external world to represent knowledge. As a result, it is argued that grounded theories cannot represent abstract concepts not grounded externally. However, I argue that abstract grounded theories can represent abstract concepts as in the second chapter I supported by examples related to psychological and mental abstract concepts those can be subject, object those come and go from Brain Container. Moreover I'm not only game in the town, recent embodiment theorists such as Barsalou, Wiemer propose that knowledge acquired from introspection is central to the representation of abstract concepts.

Furthermore, the theories of Grounded Cognition and Cognitive Linguistics Theories were negative reactions to amodal theories of syntax originating in the Cognitive Revolution of Chomsky 1957, and positive champions for the roles of bodies, situations, and simulations in language. Gibbs as well as Lakoff and Johnson argued that abstract concepts are grounded metaphorically in embodied and situated knowledge. Turner says that abstract concepts using concrete metaphors are talked ubiquitously.

One of the shocks in science is the discovery of mirror neurons as well as Social Simulation Theories worked by Gallese, Goldman, Rizzolatti, Craighero, Ramachandran, Decety and other scientists' simulation theories propose that we represent other people's minds using simulations of our own minds. To feel someone else's pain, we simulate our own pain. Mirror neuron circuits typically underlie social simulation theories. Recent studies of Decety, Gallese shows that mirror circuits help perceivers infer an actor's intention, not simply recognize the action performed, thus circuits provide a general mechanism for understanding diverse mental states in others which supports other important social processes, such as imitation and social coordination as Rizzolatti and Arbib said. [31.p.4]

The invaluable work "The Brain's Concepts" by Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff is the central point of the fourth chapter of my paper. In their work

Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff have argued that contemporary neuroscience seems to suggest that concepts of a wide variety make direct use of the sensory-motor circuitry of the brain. They based their argument on the action concepts and with four central ideas triggered by neuroscience that encompasses multimodality, functional clusters, simulation, and parameters as well as vital neuroscience results such as visual and motor mental imagery, which, according to their hypothesis, imply sensory-motor simulation using the same brain resources as in observation and action and the next one is detailed results concerning mirror neurons, canonical neurons, and action-location neurons. By applying the four ideas to these results, they proposed, for the action concept of grasping, that a directly embodied schema for grasping satisfies all principal criteria for concepts. They argued that the same form may apply to all other action concepts, to object concepts, and to abstract concepts with conceptual content that is metaphorical. As a result these two scientists made hypotheses: "The same neural substrate used in imagining is used in understanding. As for the evidence of this hypothesis-that one can imagine grasping an object without actually grasping it. From this, it does not follow that actual grasping and imaginary grasping do not use a common neural substrate. One can reason about grasping without grasping; yet one may still use the same neural substrate in the sensory-motor system."

But, my hypothesis that is related to the role of sensory-motor system in using unconsciously the abstract concepts related to the concept of cognitive and psychological metaphors may not make use of the sensory-motor system. So that, my fourth chapter is based on the theories and implications about automacity, conscious, unconscious, those are devoted to prove the influence of newly invented metaphors those differ from unconsciously usage of everyday metaphors.

When it comes to automaticity, John F. Kihlstrom said that Automatic process consume LITTLE or NO intentional resources [18.p.31]

When it comes to automacity, Yoav Bar-Anan and Brian A. Nosek imply that implicit cognition is closely related to the concept of automaticity – thoughts or actions that occur spontaneously or uncontrollably. Thoughts and actions that occur automatically may occur without attention or awareness. Thoughts and actions can occur WITHOUT AWARENESS and they are efficient in that they can happen while thinking about something else.

As one of the notable startling discoveries of cognitive science is a conceptual system that most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness, inaccessible to consciousness and operating too quickly to be focused on. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson also pointed out that during conversation comprehending the stream of sounds, assigning the structure of the sentence, picking out words and giving them meanings appropriate to context, making semantic and pragmatic sense of the sentences as a whole, framing what is said in terms relevant to the discussion are done unconsciously, and it is called as a cognitive unconsciousness. Moreover, Axel Cleeremans says some forms of learning and memory can also be unconscious. Memory for previous events can be expressed explicitly, as a conscious recollection, or implicitly, as automatic, unconscious influences on behavior.

In addition, Daniel Kahneman described mental life by the metaphor of two agents, called System 1 and System 2, which respectively produce fast and slow thinking. He says whenever you are conscious, and perhaps even when you are not, multiple computations are going on in your brain, which maintain and update current information. The assessments are carried out automatically by System 1, and one of their functions is to determine whether extra effort is required from System 2.

As a result, I raised the question which is one of the central points of my research paper: Why dead metaphors are suggested to paraphrase with some vivid new metaphor in? Because, can it be the reason to burn neurons, neuron circuitry?

As an evidence to my question GEORGE ORWELL inferred that 'A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead" which is ordinary word and that can generally be used without loss of vividness. But in between these two classes there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors which have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of inventing phrases for themselves. Examples are: "ring the changes on", "toe the line", "ride roughshod over"... Orwell suggests that writers scan their work for such dying forms and replace them with alternative language patterns.

Here, As Lakoff and Johnson implied that self-understanding seems prior to mutual under-standing, and in some ways it is. But any really deep understanding of why we do what we do, feel what we feel; change as we change, and even believe what we believe, takes us beyond ourselves. And it is almost all up to mirror neurons as mentioned above; Gallese, Goldman, Rizzolatti and Craighero, Ramachandran, Decety and other scientists' simulation theories propose that we represent other people's minds using simulations of our own minds. To feel someone else's pain, we simulate our own pain. Mirror neuron circuits typically underlie social simulation theories. Recent studies of Decety, Gallese shows that mirror circuits help perceivers infer an actor's intention, not simply recognize the action performed, thus circuits provide a general mechanism for understanding diverse mental states in others which supports other important social processes, such as imitation and social coordination as Rizzolatti and Arbib said.

As for Narayanan's theory; metaphorical mappings are physically realized as stable neural circuitry linking the sensory-motor system to other brain areas. Lakoff and Gallese argue that this Narayanan's theory does not mean that abstract concepts have no literal meaning at all. Indeed, they appear to have skeletal meanings that are literal — but even those skeletal meanings, they argued that make central use of some aspects of the sensory-motor system. They called such a use of the sensory-motor system "exploitation."; and they

supported example from Gibb's research on the conceptualization of love that includes a young woman's description of her first love experience. So, Lakoff and Gallese mentioned not just concrete concepts but also abstract ones such as: causation, love, and grasping idea, and they believe that these too make use of the sensory-motor system, but not in so direct a fashion.

However, when it comes to my findings related to abstract concept of cognitive and psychological metaphors those are used unconsciously may not make use of the sensory-motor system.

At the ending of the fourth chapter of this dissertation I cited the views of well known scholars those can support my hypotheses such as GEORGE ORWELL, as mentioned above, who said "A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead". In the fourth chapter I asked this question: Why GEORGE ORWELL suggested paraphrasing the dead metaphors with some vivid new metaphor in?" My guessing as an answer to this question is: "it can be reason to burn neurons, neuron circuitry and it gives chance to grab recipients' attention easily".

As an evidence from science I cited some results of neuroscience research experiments carried by a number of scientists including Augusto Buchweitz, Robert A. Mason, Leda M. B. Tomitch, Marcel Adam Just on "Brain activation for reading and listening comprehension: an fMRI study of modality effects and individual differences in language comprehension" compared the brain activation patterns associated with the comprehension of written and spoken Portuguese sentences and meanwhile it demonstrates modality fingerprints in brain activation: listening verses reading and more overall activation of the brain for listening comprehension.

These neuroscintific evidences also support my hypotheses on the levels of realizing of semantic meaning. In turn it gives me chance to divide these levels of neural substrate in realizing and understanding the meaning of content and logic into SEMANTIC ADAPTATION level which is like cognitive

unconscious level and SEMANTIC AMPLIFICATION level that is similar to cognitive conscious level.

#### **Conclusion of Chapter I**

In the first chapter, I cited various Cognitive Linguistics views and theories related to cognitive linguists, who gave their scientific speculations about conceptual metaphor, meaning construction, embodied and disembodied views, namely George Lakoff, Sh, Safarov, V.Gallese, Goldman, Rizzolatti and Craighero, Ramachandran, Decety, Mark Johnson and other cognitive scientists and linguists. And, I added some linguistic views and neurological theories show the difference between new and dead metaphors which can support my hypothesis related to semantic power levels. Mostly, I go along with the views of Lakoff and Johnson who think that language and thought can not be objective (I argued that our thinking is subjective and often unconscious rather than objective). Which means the meaning and reasoning is up to our subjective perception as can be seen by neurological evidences such as mirror neurons. Furthermore, some views of cognitive linguists about embodied theory are cited in this chapter, such as "Everything in the universe is either inside or outside the category" which is related to the examples I supported in the following second and third chapters. The scientific views and theories mentioned in this first chapter are being referred to the subjective mind which is programmed to coin new metaphors in order to build some influential and meaningful construction of the subjective logic (not objective) so that to express abstract emotional experiences to the recipient (for example in the following chapters metaphors those seem to be simple collocations in Uzbek and English are cited. I call them faded or dead metaphors, not collocations, since they have not so much influence as new coined metaphors have). In turn, hypothesis about 'Semantic Power' are implied in the fourth chapter.

All in all, the cognitive, neurological, neurolinguistics theories given in this initial first chapter are all to support the view about subjective language (as said by Lakoff and Johnson) and to prove my hypothesis about 'Semantic Power'.

#### **CHAPTER II: EMBODIED COGNATION AND DEAD METAPHORS:**

### NEW CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CROSS DOMAIN MAPPINGS IN ENGLISH AND UZBEK.

As Lakoff said "Everything in the universe is either inside or outside the category", and in his 'Metaphors We live by' book he emphasizes that we are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. Moreover in their next book "Philosophy in the Flesh", he implied "Image schemas are also comprehended through the body. Our bodies are containers that take in air and nutrients and emit wastes. We constantly orient our bodies with respect to containers-rooms, beds, buildings. We spend an inordinate amount of time putting things in and taking things out of containers".

We know in each language including English there are a mounting of derived words those hide their real meaning in the originated language. However, English, especially Uzbek language, founded by A. Navoi in 15<sup>th</sup> century, discrete the mystery of human thought since it is one of the young languages which can be easy source to investigate human cognation compared to other ancient languages such as Arabian, Latin, Chinese and others. In this chapter a number of metaphors in both Uzbek and English are given to support this view about the influence of newly invented metaphors and my hypotheses I made in the Fourth Chapter.

In any language including Uzbek and English, reasoning the brain as a container by personifying psychological or emotional and cognitive processes as a subject and object is very common as we'll see in the following examples-and it is one of the novelties of my research work.

Since thought and action are embodied and fundamentally metaphorical in nature we create container metaphors once we reason most of our emotional and cognitive introspection experience and process as a container for us or vise verse: our brain is a container for them as can be seen in the following examples:

1. English: I made up my mind about something (Mind is a property or substance to make up)

Uzbek: Fikrga Keldim. (Idea as a container to come to)

Translation word by word: I came to this idea

2. English: He fainted

Uzbek: Hushdan Ketdi (Consciousness as a container to go from it)

Translation word by word: He/she went from consciousness

3. English: He went off the top (Frustration is a container to went off the top)

Uzbek: Jahli chiqdi (Brain as a container for frustration to lift from)

Translation word by word: His/her annoyance went out

In these cases, viewing mental processes of idea, conscious as a container allows us to refer to it, identify a particular aspect of it, act with respect to it, and perhaps even believe that we understand it although there is not any mental, emotional or cognitive introspection process or experience that can come or go from one container to another. Container metaphors like these are the one tool in order to express our introspection experiences or as Lakoff and said they are essential for even attempting to deal rationally with our experiences.

# 2.1. Container Metaphors: Brain is as Container for Mental and Emotional Processes, and at the same time Mental or Psychological Process is as a Container for Brain

#### a) Emotional and Mental Process is as a Container for Brain

The range of container metaphors that we use for such purposes is enormous in both English and in Uzbek, and more research needed to find evidences in other languages. The following list of found linguistic evidences or examples gives some idea of the kinds of purposes; along with representative examples of container metaphors that serve them those can reason mental process, experience as a container for mind as well as reasoning the mind or brain as a

container for mental process, experience as can be seen in the following examples where brain is as a container for mental and emotional experiences those are personified like subject or at least object, substance, property in both English and Uzbek languages:

- "Brain Is Usually As Container for mental experiences, those are personified like subject or at least object in Uzbek language"
- "Brain Is As Container for mental and emotional experiences, those are described as a subject, object, property, substance in English language":

#### Attention and Brain

1. English: I kept my mind on something (mind, concentration is a property or object to keep on a container)

Uzbek: Diqqat jamladim (Brain is as a container for attention to organize the attention)

Translation word by word: I gathered, organized my attention

2. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Diqqatim qochdi (Brain is as a container where attention can escape from)

Translation word by word: My attention ran away

Ear, information and Brain

3. English: Can you lend me your ear? (Ear, concentration is a property or object to give)

Uzbek: Qulog'inga Kiradimi? (Brain is as a container where information can enter into)

Translation word by word: does it enter into your ear?

Mouth, information and Brain

4. English: Hold your tongue (Tongue, patience is a property or object to hold)

Uzbek: Og'zingni ochma (Brain is as a container for information goes through mouth)

Translation word by word: Do not open your mouth

5. English: I made a slip of the tongue (Tongue is a property or object to make a slip)

Uzbek: Og'izimdan chiqib ketdi (Brain is as a container for information goes through mouth)

Translation word by word: It slipped from my mouth

Ear, information and Brain

6. English: I'm all ears

Uzbek: Quloq soldim (Brain is as a container that someone's ear can be put in)

Translation word by word: To put an ear into information

7. English: I put up her feelers

Uzbek: Og'iz soldim (Brain is as a container that someone's mouth, information can be put into)

Translation word by word: to put a mouth into information

8. English: He threw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to throw)

Uzbek: Nazar soldi (Brain is as a container that someone's glance can be put into information)

Translation word by word: To put a glance into information

Eye, ear, cognation, information and Brain

9. English: I throw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to throw)

Uzbek: Ko'rib oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some information by looking through eye)

Translation word by word: Take by looking

10.English: I drunk information in (Information is a substance or water to drink)

Uzbek: Ahborotni tinglab Oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some information by listening through ear)

Translation word by word: Take by listening

11.English: To pick up some new information (Information is a substance or object to pick up)

Uzbek: Bilib/tanib olmoq (Brain as a container that can take some information by knowing, recognizing through different sense)

Translation word by word: Take by recognizing, by knowing

12. English: To gain knowledge (Knowledge is a substance or object to gain)

Uzbek: Bilim olmoq (Brain as a container that can take some information by knowing, recognizing through different sense)

Translation word by word: Take Knowledge, Information

13. English: To give a piece of advice (Advice is a property, substance or object to give)

Uzbek: Maslahat bermoq (Advice is a property or substance to give)

Translation word by word: Give Knowledge, Information

Idea and Brain

14.English: I have an idea on my brain (idea is a property or object to have on brain container)

Uzbek: Fikr keldi (Brain as a container for idea to come into)

Translation word by word: idea came

15.English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Fikrim tarqadi (Brain as a container for idea to go)

Translation word by word: my idea stretched out

Thought and Brain

16.English: I lost the threat of point (thread of point is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Hayolim qochdi, uchdi (Brain as a container for thought to fly or escape from)

Translation word by word: my thought ran away, lifted up

17.English: I lost my head because of him (head is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Hayolim u tamon ketdi (Brain as a container for thought to go from it to somewhere)

Translation word by word: My thought went toward to him/her

18.English: I lost the threat of point (thread of point is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Hayolimni nimadir olib qochdi (Brain as a container for thought that can be taken away)

Translation word by word: Something took my thought away

Imagination and Brain

19. English: Being able to imagine

Uzbek: Tasavvurga sig'dira olishlik (Brain or imagination as a container which has its orthodox capacity for even, image, etc to fit in)

Translation word by word: Being able to fit something into the capacity of imagination.

Mind and Brain

20. English: I lost my head (head is property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Aqlim Ketdi (Brain as a container for mind to go from)

Translation word by word: My mind went away

21. English: You came to your sense (Sense is a container to come into)

Uzbek: Aqling kiribdi (Brain as a container for mind to come into)

Translation word by word: Your mind entered

Conscousness and Brain

22.English: I fainted

Uzbek: Hushim Ketdi (Brain as a container for consciousness to go from it)

Translation word by word: My consciousness wet away

23.English: He came to himself (Himself or consciousness is a container to come to)

Uzbek: Hushi qaytdi (Brain as a container for consciousness to come back)

Translation word by word: My consciousness came back

Memory and Brain

24.English: The address slept my mind (Address or memory is a subject to sleep from brain container)

Uzbek: Manzil esimdan chiqdi, ko'tarilibdi (<u>Brain</u> or memory as a <u>container</u> for information to lift from, to go from or out)

Translation word by word: the address went out/ lifted up from my memory

25.English: It came back to him (Memory is a subject to come to the <u>brain</u> container)

Uzbek: Esiga Tushdi, Keldi (<u>Brain</u> or memory as a <u>container</u> for information to come into)

Translation word by word: It dropped/came into his memory

26. English: My memory failed (Memory is a subject to fail)

Uzbek: Esimda qolmadi (Brain or memory as a container to keep information)

Translation word by word: It didn't stay in my memory

27.English: She is in her mind (She or consciousness is as a subject in the brain container)

Uzbek: Esi, Hushi joyida (Brain is as an ordinary container for memory or consciousness to be in)

Translation word by word: His/her consciousness is in its appropriate place.

28.English: He is off her rocker (He or consciousness is as a subject that goes off or out of the brain container)

Uzbek: Esi, hushi joyida emas (Brain is as an ordinary container for memory or consciousness to be or not to be in)

Translation word by word: His/her consciousness is not in its appropriate place.

### b) Brain as a container for Psychological Processes

Annoyance and Brain

29.English: He went off the top (Frustration is a container to went off the top)

Uzbek: Jahli chiqdi (Brain as a container for frustration to lift from)

Translation word by word: His/her annoyance went out

30. English: He held his breath (Breath is property or object to hold)

Uzbek: Jahilini yutdi (Brain as a container for frustration to take in by swallowing)

Translation word by word: He swallowed his annoyance

Mood and Brain

31. English: I am in a good mood (Mood is a container to be in)

Uzbek: Kayfiyati ko'tarildi (Mood is as a subject that can be increased)

Translation word by word: His mood is lifted

32.English: The bad news shook him up (Input information is as a subject to shake the recipient up)

Uzbek: Yamon habar uni kayfiyatini tushirdi (Mood is as a subject that can be decreased)

Translation word by word: Bad News made his mood drop.

**Inspiration and Brain** 

33.English: I am inspired

Uzbek: Ilhomim, ihlosim, havasim keldi (Brain as a container for inspiration/jealousness to come into)

Translation word by word: My inspiration/jealousness came

English: I lost muse, inspiration (Inspiration, muse is property or object to loose)

34.Uzbek: Ilhomim, ihlosim, havasim qaytdi (Brain as a container for inspiration/jealousness to escape from)

Translation word by word: My inspiration/jealousness went back/ran away

Anxiousness and Brain

35.English: I had something on my mind (something or concern is a substance to have it on the container)

Uzbek: Meni hovotir bosdi (Concern is a subject that can overcome, or conquer the self)

Translation word by word: Anxiousness conquered me

36.English: I got over my concern (Concern is a substance to get over)

Uzbek: Hovotir tarqadi (Concern is a subject that can leave the self)

Translation word by word: Anxiousness dissipated

Desire and Brain

37.English: I am raptures over doing something (Activity is a container to be raptures over)

Uzbek: Ko'rgim, kulgim, nimanidir qilgim keldi. (Brain as a container for desire to come to)

Translation word by word: My desire of seeing, laughing came

38.English: I am not raptures over doing something (Activity is a container to be or not to be raptures over)

Uzbek: Ko'rgim, kulgim, nimanidir qilgim kemayapdi. (Brain as a container for desire to come to or not to come to)

Translation word by word: The desire of looking, laughing is not coming

39. English: I want to have a nap (Napping is substance or object to have)

Uzbek: Uyqum Keldi (Brain as a container for sleep to come to)

Translation word by word: The desire of sleep came

40. English: To be awake, not wanting to have a nap

Uzbek: Uyqum qochdi (Brain as a container for sleep to escape from)

Translation word by word: The desire of sleep ran away

Cases and Brain

41.English: I went through a lot during my life (Life is a container to go through)

Uzbek: Boshimga ne kunlarni solmadi (Brain as a container for cases, days to put into)

Translation word by word: What days didn't s/he put in my head?

42.English: I went through a lot during my life (Life is a container to go through)

Uzbek: Boshimga ne kunlar tushmadi. (Brain as a container for cases, days to come to)

Translation word by word: What days were not dropped into my head?

43.English: I went through a lot during my life (Life is a container to go through)

Uzbek: Boshimdan nelar o'tmadi (Brain as a container for cases, days to go through)

Translation word by word: What days were not passed through my head?

Just above we have seen that Brain is as a container for mental and emotional experiences those are personified like subject or at least object, substance, property in both English and Uzbek languages. In contrast, in the following list of examples we can behold that psychological experiences are container for the subject or the self.

Idea and Brain

1. English: I made up my mind about something (Mind is a property or substance to make up)

Uzbek: Fikrga Keldim. (Idea as a container to come to)

Translation word by word: I came to this idea

2. English: I changed my mind (Mind is a property or substance to change)

Uzbek: Fikrimdan qaytdim (Idea as a container to come back)

Translation word by word: I returned from this idea

3. English: I made up my mind about something (Mind is a property or substance to make up)

Uzbek: Fikrda to'htadim (Idea as a container to stop at)

Translation word by word: I stopped at this idea

Mind and Brain

4. English: You lost your head (Head, cognitive consciousness is property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Aqlingdan ozibsan (Mind is a substance to loose)

Translation word by word: Your mind became thin

5. English: You came back your sense (Sense is a container to come back)

Uzbek: Aqlinga kelbsan (Mind as a container to come to)

Translation word by word: You came to your mind

Consciousness and Brain

6. English: He fainted

Uzbek: Hushdan Ketdi (Consciousness as a container to go from it)

Translation word by word: He/she went from consciousness

7. English: She came back himself (Himself or consciousness is a container to come back)

Uzbek: Hushiga qaytdi (Consciousness as a container to come back to)

Translation word by word: He came back to his consciousness

8. English: She is in the clouds (Self is a container to be out of it)

Uzbek: O'zidan Ketibdi. (Consciousness as a container to go from)

Translation word by word: He went away from his/her Consciousness

9. English: Come down to earth. (Self or morality is a container to come and go)

Uzbek: O'zinga Kel (Consciousness as a container to come to)

Translation word by word: Come back to yourself

Depession and Brain

10. English: He is in the doldrums (Depression is a container to be in)

Uzbek: U tushkunlikka tushgan (Depression as a container in context)

Translation word by word: He dropped to depression

11.English: He got over his depression (Depression is a subject or warrior to overcome)

Uzbek: U tushkunlikdan chiqdi (Depression as a container to go out from)

Translation word by word: lifting from depression

Sleep and Brain

12. English: He is dropping off

Uzbek: Uyquga ketayapdi (Sleep as a container to go to)

Translation word by word: He is moving to sleep

13.English: He woke up

Uzbek: Uyqudan turdi (Sleep as a container to go out)

Translation word by word: He lifted from sleep

# 2.2. Personification: Conceptual Structure of Mental and Emotional experience as subjects and objects

Emotional and cognitive processes are subject or object: Introspection Abstract Experience is a highly subjective phenomenon. It can NOT be Objective as Hansen and Pronin said

In the above examples I beheld that a number of examples that psychological experiences are subject or objects, properties, substance where the self or mind is a container.

In addition, as evidences supported in "Metaphors We live by" by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in many cases, the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities; this conceptual structure is called Personification. According to the view of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Lakoff & Johnson say "conceptual structure is organized according to cross domain mappings or correspondences between conceptual domains. Some of these mappings are due to pre-conceptual embodied experiences while others build on these experiences in order to form more complex conceptual structures. Cross domain mapping of entities is a conceptual metaphor which is a mapping of entities, structures, and relations from one conceptual domain (the `source') onto a different domain (the `target')". Moreover in the "Philosophy in the Flesh" they refer "The entities and structures mapped from the source domain give rise to a parallel conceptual structure in the target domain. The cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than merely highlighting preexisting similarities between the source and target domains. [13.p.368]

I mostly emphasize that Lakoff and Johnsen construed in their "Metaphors we live by" book that the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object in further specified as being a person. They also implied "This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with non human entities

in terms of human motions, characteristics and activities, such as "Inflation has attacked the foundation of our economy. Inflation has pinned us to the wall". We think of inflation as an adversary that can attack us, hurt us. The point here is that personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors, each picking out different aspects of a person or ways of looking at a person." [12.p.73] When it comes to my findings related to metaphors in Uzbek language are those where not only physical objects but also emotional as well as cognitive processes are specified as being a person as well as a subject, such as "DIQQATIM QOCHDI"-(Translation word by word: My attention ran away. Equivalent: I lost my head)

Till Today, the evidences those have been accumulated and have been increasing in Cognitive Linguistics of second generation refers that these metaphors are vital in human being's thought as said by Boroditsky & Ramscar. Human beings possess mass of information as well as knowledge about their bodies. In addition, Mark J. Landau delegated the systematisim of metaphorical expressions that was observed more than sixty years ago by Solomon Asch, who indicated that "everyday descriptions of people and their personalities are pervaded by metaphors grounded in concrete aspects of sensory and motor experience, for example: When we describe the workings of emotion, ideas, or trends of character, we almost invariably employ terms that also denote properties and processes observable in the world of nature". As for Lakoff & Johnson, proposed that abstract concepts are grounded metaphorically in embodied and situated knowledge. For instance once people possess knowledge about their bodies, then abstract concepts draw on this knowledge, for example; love can be understood as eating ("being consumed by a lover"), and affective experience can be understood as verticality ("happy is up, sad is down"). These examples can be seen across different languages. In the work of "Grounded Cognition" Lawrence W. Barsalou [23.p.2] addressed these main questions those can lead to significant implications in cognitive linguistics: How Does the Brain Represent Abstract Concepts? And the answer implies that abstract concepts pose a classic challenge for grounded cognition. How can theories that focus on modal simulations explain concepts that do not appear a modal? As an answer they say "This concern often reflects them is perception described above that conceptual content in grounded theories can only come from perception of the external world. Because people perceive internal states, however, conceptual content can come from internal sources as well. Preliminary evidence suggests that introspective information is indeed central to the representation of abstract concepts" [51.p 18]

As mentioned above, metaphors those are specified as being a person supports introspection information are the core of the representations of abstract concepts, for instance the followings are the linguistic evidences (for more examples and evidences, see articles by Hosiyat Sabirova, 2015) related to metaphors are those where not only physical objects but also in English emotional as well as cognitive processes are specified as an object, but in Uzbek language emotional as well as cognitive processes are specified or personified as being a person as well as a subject and object.

1. English: He went off the top (Frustration is a container to went off the top)

Uzbek: Jahli chiqdi (Brain as a container for frustration to lift from)

Translation word by word: His/her annoyance went out

2. English: I lost my head (head is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Aqlimni o'g'irladi (Mind is as an object that can be stolen by others)

Translation word by word: S/he stole my mind

3. English: He held his breath (Breath is property or object to hold)

Uzbek: Jahilini yutdi (Frustration is as an object that can be swallowed)


Translation word by word: He swallowed his annoyance

Here in these examples, we think of introspection as both subject and object that can run away from our mind as subject and that can be organized or make as an object. Consequently, this helps us to recognize or comprehend a wide variety of experiences with non object entities as well as non human entities in terms of human motions.

People talk ubiquitously about abstract concepts using concrete metaphors, as evidence in these examples, Abstract cognitive process as a Target domain is usually based on Concrete Basic Domain because there is not almost any way to express introspection abstract feelings to others as will be cited in following examples:

In Uzbek

#### As a Subject:



He lost He has something He changed his head in his mind his mind

As we have seen from these examples, cognitions and attitudes in more abstract target domains are usually influenced by manipulating aspects of a concrete source domain. Because, as Glucksberg, Mc.Glone, Manfredi and Ortony said, conceptual metaphors map structure from a concrete source domain to an abstract target domain, but rarely map in the reverse direction and Mark J. Landau [52. p. 39] also defined "manipulating aspects of a concrete source domain influence cognitions and attitudes in more abstract target domains. These studies are consistent with the claim that conceptual metaphors shape thought directionally." For example, all the actions of basic domain are influencing cognition representation in more abstract target domains in the examples I supported above. In this case I refer a conceptual metaphor which is a mapping of entities, structures, and relations from one conceptual domain onto a different domain those are also renamed as "the 'source'" and "the 'target'" as Lakoff & Johnson said. When it comes to the explanation of Diego Fernandez-Duque: "The entities and structures mapped from the source domain give rise to a parallel conceptual structure in the target domain. The cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than merely highlighting preexisting similarities between the source and target domains. For example, when we understand attention as a metaphorical spotlight that shines on various mental objects (i .e ., representations), we utilize the entities and relations within the source domain of physical spotlights and the objects they illuminate, in order to establish the nature of the mental operations that occur when we are attending to some stimulus or mental representation. Although the metaphors do not "create" the phenomena of attention, in the sense of causing processes to exist that did not exist before, they do constitute our conceptual understanding of phenomena associated with attention, and the metaphors give us the means for making sense of those phenomena." [8.p.6]

Thus, almost all examples of metaphors those are related to cognitive as well as emotional experiences I supported, in my both articles and in this research paper, may not "create" the cognitive and emotional phenomena, in the sense of causing processes to exist that did not exist before, but they do constitute our conceptual understanding of phenomena associated with cognition, and these metaphors can give us the means for making sense of those phenomena.

Here are the linguistic evidences and examples that emotional experiences are subjects or objects, properties, substance where the self or mind is container.

Attention and Brain

1. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Diqqatim qochdi (Attention is a subject that can escape)

Translation word by word: My attention ran away

2. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Diqqatim tarqaldi (Attention is a subject that can escape)

Translation word by word: My attention dissipated

3. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Diqqati bo'lindi, buzuldi (Attention is a subject that can be broken)

Translation word by word: My attention is broken dow

Idea and Brain

4. English: I made up my mind about something (Mind is a property or substance to make up)

Uzbek: Fikr keldi (Idea is as a subject to come to)

Translation word by word: I came to this idea

5. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Fikrim tarqadi (Attention is a subject that can escape)

Translation word by word: My attention dissipated

6. English: I have an idea (Thought is a property or object to have)

Uzbek: Fikr tug'ildi (Idea is a subject that can be born)

Translation word by word: an idea was born

Thought and Brain

7. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Xayolim qochdi, uchdi (Attention is a subject that can escape)

Translation word by word: My attention ran away

8. English: I lost my train of thought (Thought is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Xayolim u tamon ketdi (Thought is as a subject that can go toward to someone or something)

Translation word by word: My thought went toward to him/her

Mind and Brain

9. English: I lost my head (head is property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Aqlim Ketdi (Brain is as a container for mind to go from)

Translation word by word: My mind went away

10. English: You came to your sense (Sense is a container to come)

Uzbek: Agling kiribdi (Mind is as a subject that can enter)

Translation word by word: Your mind entered

Conscousness and Brain

11.English: I fainted

Uzbek: Hushim Ketdi (consciousness is as a subject that can go away)

Translation word by word: My consciousness went away

12.English: He came to himself (Himself or consciousness is a subject that can come)

Uzbek: Hushi qaytdi (consciousness is as a subject that can come back)

Translation word by word: My consciousness came back

Memory and Brain

13.English: She is in her mind (She or consciousness is as a subject in the brain container)

Uzbek: Esi, hushi joyida (consciousness is as a subject that is supposed to stay or be in one place)

Translation word by word: His/her consciousness is in its appropriate place.

14.English: She is off her rocker (He is or consciousness is subject that can be off or out of the brain container)

Uzbek: Esi, hushi joyida emas (consciousness is as a subject that can or can not be in one place)

Translation word by word: His/her consciousness is not in its appropriate place.

### a) Emotional Processes are as subjects

Annoyance and Brain

1. English: He went off the top

Uzbek: Jahli chiqdi (Frustration is as a subject that can go out)

Translation word by word: His/her annoyance went out

2. English: He is in a good mood

Uzbek: Jahli biroz tushdi (Frustration is as a subject that can decrease)

Translation word by word: His annoyance decreased little bit

Mood and Brain

3. English: I am in a good mood

Uzbek: Kayfiyat Ko'tarildi (Mood is as a subject that can increase itself)

Translation word by word: His mood lifted

4. English: The bad news shook him up (Input information is a subject to shake the recipient up)

Uzbek: Yamon habar uni kayfiyatini tushirdi (Mood is as a subject that can decrease itself)

Translation word by word: Bad News made his mood drop.

Inspiration and Brain

5. English: I am inspired

Uzbek: Ilhomim, ihlosim, havasim keldi (inspiration is as a subject that can come)

Translation word by word: My inspiration/jealousness came

6. English: I lost muse, inspiration (Inspiration, muse is property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Ilhomim, ihlosim, havasim qaytdi, qochdi (inspiration is as a subject that can run away)

Translation word by word: My inspiration/jealousness went back/ran away

Desire and Brain

7. English: I am raptures over doing something

Uzbek: Ko'rgim, kulgim, nimanidir qilgim keldi. (Desire is as a subject that can come)

Translation word by word: My desire (of seeing, laughing) came

8. English: I am not raptures over doing something

Uzbek: Ko'rgim, kulgim, nimanidir qilgim kelmadi (Desire is as a subject that can't come)

Translation word by word: The desire (of looking, laughing) is not coming

9. English: I want to have a nap (Napping is substance or object to have)

Uzbek: Uyqum keldi (Sleep is as a subject that can come)

Translation word by word: The desire of sleep came

10. English: To be awake, not wanting to have a nap

Uzbek: Uyqum qochdi (sleep is as a subject that can escape)

Translation word by word: The desire of sleep ran away

**Anxiousness and Brain** 

11.English: I had something on my mind (something or concern is a substance to have it on the brain container)

Uzbek: Meni hovotir bosdi (Concern is a subject that can overcome, or conquer the self)

Translation word by word: Anxiousness conquered me

12. English: I got over my concern (Concern is a substance to get over)

Uzbek: Hovotir tarqadi (Concern is a subject that can leave the self)

Translation word by word: Anxiousness dissipated

### b) Mental and Emotional processes are Objects

In the following examples, Mental and Emotional processes are Objects: In these examples also the cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than merely highlighting pre-existing similarities between the source and target domains.

Attention and Brain

13.English: I kept my mind on something (mind, concentration is a property or object to keep on container)

Uzbek: Diqqat jamladim (Attention is as an object that can be gathered)

Translation word by word: I gathered, organized, tide up my attention

14.English: I kept my mind on something (mind, concentration is a property or object to keep on container)

Uzbek: Diqqat qaratdim (Attention is as an object that can be directed)

Translation word by word: I directed my attention

Mouth, information and Brain

15.English: Hold your tongue (Tongue, patience is a property or object that can be hold)

Uzbek: Og'zingni ochma (Output information is as an object that is kept in the mouth)

Translation word by word: Do not open your mouth

Thought and Brain

16.English: Think.

Uzbek: Fikr yurit (Thought is as an object that can be moved)

Translation word by word: move your thought or idea

17. English: I lost my head (head is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Aglimni oldi (Mind is as an object that is taken by others)

Translation word by word: S/he took my mind

18. English: I lost my head (head is a property or object to loose)

Uzbek: Aqlimni o'g'irladi (Mind is as an object that can be stolen by others)
Translation word by word: S/he stole my mind


19.English: He held his breath (Breath is property or object can be hold)
Uzbek: Jahilini yutdi (Frustration is as an object that can be swallowed)
Translation word by word: He swallowed his annoyance

As we have beheld in these examples above, emotional experiences are subjects or objects, properties, substance where the self or mind is container. The point here is that personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors. Furthermore, abstract domain (as personified) based on concrete domain since without this way, it is impossible to express or introspection feelings and experiences.

# 2.3Embodied Spatial Dead Metaphors: Conceptual analyzes of spatial orientational metaphors in English and Uzbek.

Embodied Spatial Concept in English and Uzbek: when it comes to Ontological metaphors, specifically container metaphors, I refer the implications in George Lakoff and Mark Johnsen's "Metaphors we live by" book, those encompass in it that land areas as well as the visual field and events, actions, activities, states are presented as containers [12.p.69] As for Lakoff and Johnsen said "we are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and an outside. Rooms and houses are obvious containers. Moving from room to room is moving from one container to another, which is, moving out of one room and into another."

My findings related to personification of cognitive and Emotional process (CPE) as an object and subject is the person or property that comes to and goes from as well as lifts up and comes down the brain which can be container for CPE, for example:



These examples are inferring that we recognize the brain as container for Cognitive and emotional processes (CPE), or in some cases it is vise verse, the CPE is a container for the self, human.

What's more, Gallagher says "Spatial-relations concepts are embodied in various ways. Bodily projections are obviously based on the human body. Concepts like front and back arise from the body, depend on the body, and would not exist if we did not have the kinds of bodies we have. The same is true of fundamental force-dynamic schemas: pushing, pulling, propelling, supporting, and balance. We comprehend these through the use of our body parts and our ability to move them, especially our arms, hands, and legs. These forms of embodiment arise from the way we schematize our own bodies and things we interact with daily" as Gallagher said. And in addition, the same is true of Cognitive and psychological experience. [12.p.64] Since human concepts are not just reflections of an external reality, but that they are crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensor motor system as inferred in "Metaphors we live by", these following linguistic evidences I support in this research paper can enrich the embodied concept in cognitive linguistics.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's referred "The orientational metaphors those show spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front back, on-off, deep-shallow, and central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial orientation; for example, HAPPY IS UP. The fact that the concept HAPPY is oriented UP leads to English expressions like "I'm feeling up today.""

In the table below, I classified orientational metaphors in Uzbek into "UP-DOWN", "FROM-TO", "CYCLE" and "TRANSITION" categories:

	Ori	ientationa	l meta	phor	s in Uzl	bek			
Vetical Orientation	-								
			<b> </b>						
Up/down	•	English:	The	bad	news	shook	him	up	(Input
		informati	on is a	subje	ect to sh	ake the	recipie	ent up	<u>)</u> )
	Uzbek	: Yamon	habar	uni k	ayfiyati	ni tushi	rdi (M	lood	is as a

subject that can decrease itself) Translation word by word: Bad News made his mood drop. • English: He went off the top (Frustration is a container to went off the top) Uzbek: Jahli Chiqdi (Brain as a container for frustration to lift from) Translation word by word: His/her annoyance went out **Horizontal Orientation** From/to • English: He fainted Uzbek: Hushdan Ketdi (Consciousness as a container to go away from it) Translation word by word: He/she went away from her consciousness. • English: She came back himself (Himself consciousness is a container that can come back come back) Uzbek: Hushiga qaytdi (Consciousness is as a container that can come back to) Translation word by word: He came back to his consciousness Transitional Orientation Through English: I went through a lot during my life (Life is a container to go through) Uzbek: Boshimdan nelar o'tmadi (Brain as a container for cases, days to go through)

Translation word by word: What days didn't pass through my

	head?
Cycle	
put in /take out	<ul> <li>English: He threw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to be thrown)</li> <li>Uzbek: Nazar soldi (Brain is as a container that someone's glance can be put in)</li> <li>Translation word by word: To put a glance in</li> <li>English: I throw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to be thrown)</li> <li>Uzbek: Ko'rib oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some information by looking through eye)</li> <li>Translation word by word: Take by looking</li> <li>English: I drunk information in (Information is a substance or water to drink)</li> <li>Uzbek: Ahborotni tinglab oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some information by listening through ear)</li> <li>Translation word by word: I took information by listening</li> </ul>

We can see by these examples that in Uzbek language most of the mental and emotional processes are based on horizontal and vertical spatial orientation. And most of the vertical spatial orientation belongs to psychological processes.

I want to emphasize the interesting point here that in English language once brain is reasoned as a container and mental as well as emotional processes as a subject or object, some special verbs such as "HAVE and LOOSE" or IN an "OFF" are used to reason. In contrast with Uzbek language: COME in order to inter the container and GO in order to leave from the container are used.

In the following list of examples below, again I refer to the concrete verbs such as "COME and GO", "HAVE and LOOSE", "GET", "RECEIVE", "HELD", "KEEP", "LEND" and "IN, INTO, ON and "OFF, OUT, UP, DOWN, TO, FROM" used to reason abstract introspection experiences in English (these the same features of orientational metaphors can be seen in Uzbek language also, as represented above) However here the examples in English:

	Orientational metaphors in English
Vetical Orientation	
	<b>↓ ↑</b>
Up/Over/Down	<ul> <li>Up</li> <li>He blew up at me (suddenly become angry)</li> <li>The bad news cut me up (upset)</li> <li>The bad news shook me up (upset, disturb)</li> <li>He make up his mind about the plan (to take a decision)</li> <li>Where did you pick up your French? (to learn)</li> <li>I've read this concept up already (Acquire knowledge and information through reading)</li> <li>I put up her feelers (to test the opinion of others by listening carefully or by asking questions so as to know how to act)</li> <li>Experiencing up and downs of the life Over</li> <li>the news bowled me over (greatly astonish)</li> <li>I'm raptures over my iPod (to be extremely delighted, to be very enthusiastic)</li> <li>I got over my old boyfriend (stop being emotionally involved with)</li> <li>We should think the plan over before decision (consider carefully)</li> <li>Down</li> <li>The bad news got me down (depressed)</li> <li>After daydreaming she came down to earth (to return to reality, to give up plans ad ideas which can not be realized)</li> <li>Experiencing up and downs of the life She is down in the mouth (to be in a low spirit, depressed)</li> </ul>
Horizontal Orientat	10n

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	<del></del>
	<b>←</b>
Into/ to/round	<ul> <li>Into</li> <li>She flied into a rage (become angry)</li> <li>He came into fortune (to inherit a lot of money)</li> <li>He brought the note into my mind (to recall something to one's mind)</li> <li>To</li> <li>The novelty came to nothing/little (to be uninteresting, unimportant)</li> <li>The CEO of the company got into hot water</li> <li>He came to after being fainted (regain consciousness)</li> <li>She came to her sense (to act or react normally after being foolish)</li> <li>To my mind, it is good idea (, I think, in my opinion)</li> <li>I called the fixed schedule to mind (to recall something to one's mind)</li> <li>I don't know if I'm coming or going (to be in a state of confusion, disorder, crazy)</li> <li>Round</li> <li>He came round after being fainted (regain</li> </ul>
Out /Off /Away	<ul> <li>He came round after being fainted (regain consciousness)</li> <li>Out</li> <li>She burst out cause of being tired of complaints (exclaim suddenly)</li> <li>He is out of her mind/senses (to be mad)</li> <li>To be out of one's mind (to be mad, crazy)</li> <li>We should think out our plan (work out by careful reasoning)</li> <li>I'm out for all I can (aim, at getting)</li> <li>Out of sight, out of mind (people whom we don not see often are soon forgotten)</li> <li>Off</li> <li>I flied off the handle (suddenly become angry)</li> <li>I went off the top(suddenly become angry)</li> <li>While I was speaking her, she had been dropped off (fall asleep)</li> <li>While I was speaking her, she had been nodded off (fall asleep)</li> <li>I'm going off the coffee (loose one's liking or taste for)</li> <li>My enthusiasm for creative writing has worn off (loose in attraction, power, interest)</li> </ul>

	• Men with fake smile turned me off (cause to loose interest)
	• I'm off the rails (to be in a state of confusion, disorder,
	crazy)
	• She is off her rocker (to be crazy)
	<ul> <li>Now teenagers are/went off their head (to be become mad)</li> </ul>
	• This guy went off his head (to become very excited and act in crazy way)
	• The pop star flied off the handle after paparazzo's
	attitude (to become ferious, to loose one's self control)  • He want off at a tangent (To loose the main point)
	<ul> <li>He went off at a tangent (To loose the main point)</li> <li>He flied off at a tangent (To loose the main point)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Music helps to take my mind off my troubles (to divert</li> </ul>
	one's attention from something unpleasant)
	Away
	My imagination is running away with me (control
	direct: imagination, temper, feelings, etc)
Transitional Orient	ation
Theoret	He want through a let during his life (suffer noin hardship)
Through	He went through a lot during his life (suffer pain, hardship)
On, In Orientation	
,	
	On
	In
On	I have my eye on coding computer programs (to want)
1	or desire something)
	• She is on her last legs (to be in a bad state after
	collapse, to be very ill, about to die)
	He is on velvet (to be in a favorable state)
	• It is noisy here; I can't keep my mind on this issue (to
	concentrate on it)
	• I have an idea on my brain (to think constantly about
	something)
	• She had something on her mind (to be worried about
	something and think about it often)  Have you fixed on a data for the party yet? (decide on
	<ul> <li>Have you fixed on a date for the party yet? (decide on choose)</li> </ul>
	1

	• Have you settled on a date for the party yet? (decide on
	choose)
In	• I'm in a temper (become angry)
	• I was in a flutter once I broke the glass (to be in a state
	of nervous excitement because of small unexpected
	difficulty)
	• She is in a stew because of crises (to be nervous
	because of difficulty)
	• I'm in a whirl (to be confused, to be excited)
	• He is in a temper (to be in a bad temper)
	• He is in the heaven (to be happy)
	• I'm in the doldrums (to be in a low spirit, depressed)
	<ul> <li>He is down in the dumps(to be depressed)</li> </ul>
	• She is down in the mouth (to be in a low spirit,
	depressed)
	<ul> <li>Soccer is not much in my line (to interest)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>he is in deep/hot water (to be in difficulty)</li> </ul>
	• I'm in the soup (to be in difficulty)
	<ul> <li>I am in a tight squeeze (to be in difficulty)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>To be not in one's mind (to be mad, crazy)</li> </ul>
	• You should put her in mind of her promise; otherwise
	she'd have forgotten it (to cause someone to remember
	something)
	• I keep it in my mind (to remember)
	<ul> <li>I bear it in my mind (to remember)</li> </ul>
	• She is in the clouds (to day dream, to think unrealistically)
	• My plan is in the ear (to be uncertain, to be not
	definite)
	• I'm in two minds about to put my plan into action (not
	to be sure, unable to decide)
	• In my mind's eye I can still see the look of my
	mother's face (in one's imagination)
	<ul> <li>In my opinion, it is good idea (I think)</li> </ul>
	• Although you taught about it, it hasn't sunk in (be understood fully)
	• Although you taught about it, I can not take in what
	you meant (understand)
	• She drinks all gossips in (listen eagerly)

Furthermore, as evidenced in both English and Uzbek language [36.p. 63] we are used to personify most of the abstract experiences we have, as we have seen by the examples above. However, personification is not scientific news or

eureka in linguistics field, but what is interesting related to my finding is that in Uzbek almost all cognitive and psychological processes are personified as being subject and object while the brain is container where the personified subjects or objects (introspective cognitive and psychological processes) come, go, stay, etc.

We use objects those are concrete things for all of us (those are perceived as the same entity, color, etc by the same brain capacity of all human beings) in order to express, infer, refer, imply our introspection experience although objects and objective world is not and will not be clear for us cause of the human brain capacity whereas our introspection experience and gestalts are more obvious among us (human being) those we tent to call them as an abstract, because as Pronin as well as other cognitive scientists such as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson [13.p.64] and others implied introspection abstract experience is a subjective phenomenon. What is interesting is-subjective, self understanding is based on mutual understanding as can be seen by "mirror neurons" (see mirror neurons and evidences supported by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in "Metaphors we live by") [12.p.23] although, as Pronin said "Introspection Abstract Experience is a highly subjective phenomenon whereas it can NOT be Objective. [9.p.5] As a consequence a question springs up: "How do we (human beings) understand each other?" The answer can be "As decoding and encoding by the help of personification or our embodied language"

As evidenced in Uzbek language [36.p.63], we are used to personify most of the abstract experiences we have, which means almost all cognitive and psychological processes are personified as based on target domain while more actions are mostly based on the concrete domain that we think as concrete and understandable for all of us, human beings.

In the following table, the verbs GO or Come are used in order to conceptualize and reason about receptive (or input) and productive (or output) of cognitive and psychological processes as if it goes to or comes from the brain container.

Input (Receptive Process)	Output (Productive Process)
Ear, information and Brain	Mouth, information and Brain

English: He doesn't lend her ear to me (Ear, concentration is a property or object that can be given)

Uzbek: Qulog'iga kirmaydi (Brain is as a container where information can enter)

Translation word by word: does it enter into your ear?

English: I made a slip of the tongue (Tongue is a property or object to make a slip)

Uzbek: Og'izimdan chiqib ketdi (Brain is as a container for information goes through mouth)

Translation word by word: It slipped from my mouth

Moreover, in Uzbek language, the verbs such as TAKE OUT and PUT IN are also used to reason about receptive and productive cognitive and psychological processes as following examples:

#### Take

Eye, ear, cognation, information and Brain

• English: I throw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to throw)

Uzbek: Ko'rib oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some information by looking through eye)
Translation word by word: Take by looking

 English: I drunk information in (Information is a substance or water to drink)

Uzbek: Ahborotni tinglab oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some information by listening through ear)

Translation word by word: Take by

### Put, (place in)

Ear, information and Brain

• English: I'm all ears

Uzbek: Quloq soldim (Brain is as a container that someone's ear can be put in)

Translation word by word: To put an ear in

• English: He threw a glanc e(Glance, attention is a property or object to throw)

Uzbek: Nazar soldi (Brain is as a container that someone's glance can be put in)

Translation word by word: To put a glance in

listening	

In English language we can see these following examples of abstract experiences reasoned by personifying as based on target domain while more actions are mostly based on the concrete domain that we think as concrete and understandable for all of us, human beings. For example in these examples cited below we can see that emotional or cognitive experiences are as a Subject or a person:

- 1. Childhood memories <u>came back</u>. (return to one's memory)
- 2. Your telephone number <u>slept</u> my mind (to forget)
- 3. My memory <u>failed</u> (to forget)
- 4. My mind went blank (to forget)
- 5. The bad news <u>cut me up</u> (upset)
- 6. The bad news shook me up (upset, disturb)
- 7. the news <u>bowled</u> me <u>over</u> (greatly astonish)
- 8. The bad news got me down (depressed)
- 9. My imagination is <u>running away</u> with me (control direct: imagination, temper, feelings, etc)

Moreover, in these following examples of abstract experiences reasoned as object or property as based on target domain while more actions are mostly based on the concrete domain as can be seen in the following examples:

### **Object/Property**

- 1. I <u>lost</u> my temper (become angry)
- 2. Keep your head (to remain calm, not to panic)
- 3. I <u>lost</u> inspiration (loose one's liking or taste for
- 4. I <u>lost</u> muse (loose one's liking or taste for
- 5. I <u>lost</u> my head (to loose control, to panic or act in a confused way)
- 6. I <u>lost</u> my head, I can't remember it now (to forget)
- 7. I <u>lost</u> my train of thought (to forget)
- 8. I <u>lost</u> the threat of point (to forget)
- 9. I gave my mind to solve this issue (to give one's attention to solve, finish something)
- 10.I <u>put my mind to</u> solve this issue (to give one's attention to solve, finish something)
- 11.I gave her a piece of my mind (to tell someone exactly what you think about his or her behavior)
- 12.I took a decision (to decide)
- 13. She <u>changed</u> her mind (to make a new different decision)
- 14.I <u>have</u> half of a mind to put my plan into action (not to be sure, unable to decide)

- 15.My boyfriend made a <u>slip</u> of the tongue (to make a mistake when speaking, sometime without noticing)
- 16. She has <u>lost</u> her tongue in front of the audience (to be to shy to speak)
- 17.I can not <u>hold</u> my tongue (to be silent, to keep quite, to say nothing)
- 18.I gained knowledge (to learn something)
- 19.I <u>took</u> a piece of advice (to be advice)
- 20.He gave me advice (to advice)
- 21.I can not keep what you said in mind (one can not understand it at all)
- 22.I can not bear what you said in mind (one can not understand it at all)
- 23.I can not make my head (one can not understand it at all)
- 24.He throw her Can you lend me your ear (attentively)
- 25.a glance (look in a sudden way)
- 26.She tried to feel my <u>pulse</u> (to find out his secret opinions by asking questions which test him)
- 27.I <u>have my eye on coding computer programs</u> (to want or desire something)
- 28. It is noisy here; I can't keep my mind on this issue (to concentrate on it)
- 29.I <u>have an idea on</u> my brain (to think constantly about something)
- 30.She <u>had something on</u> her mind (to be worried about something and think about it often)
- 31. Where did you pick up your French? (to learn)

I want to emphasize one of the interesting findings in this paper. As we see here that most of the psychological processes and experiences are personified or conceptualized as a person in Uzbek language while mental processes are both as a subject and as an object. The reason can be that Attention can easily be controlled compared to desire, depression, annoyance, inspiration. We can behalf the evidence in the following table:

	Cognitive	mental			Emotional feeling
	Process				
	Diqqatim	qochdi			Jahli Chiqdi ( <b>subject</b> )
	(subject)			ınce	
	Diqqat qaratdii	m (object)		Annoyance	Jahildan Tushdi (subject)
		-		Anr	
	Diggat jamladi	m (object)			Kayfiyat Ko'tarildi
	11··· J···-	(***)	nces		(subject)
	Diqqatim	tarqaldi	Abstract emotional experience	Mood	Kayfiyat Tushdi (subject)
	(object)	_	al exj	Ĭ	
uo	Diqqat		otion	a	Ilhomim/Ihlosim/Havasim
Attention	bo'linmoq/buz	ulmoq	t emo	atio]	Keldi (subject)
Atı	(object)		strac	Inspiration	
I n	4 n ,		Ab	Int	Ilhomim/Ihlosim/Havasim

		Qulog'inga Kiradimi		qaytdi/qochdi (subject)
		(subject)	ern	Hovotir bosdi (subject)
			Concern	Hovotir tarqadi ( <b>subject</b> )
-		Og'zingni ochma (object)		Ko'rgim/kulgim/nimanidir
		Og'iz ochma (object)	ire	qilgim keldi ( <b>subject</b> )
		og iz oeimia (object)	Desire	quem keiai (sabject)
	Open	Og'izimdan chiqib ketdi		Uyqum Keldi (subject)
	0	(subject)		
		Quloq solmoq (object)		Uyqum qochdi (subject)
	_	Og'iz solmoq (object)		Uyquga ketayapdi
	Put in		sleep	(subject)
	P	Nazar solmoq (object)	-SI	Uyqudan turdi (subject)
		Ko'rib olmoq (object)	ion	Tushkunlikka tushmoq
		Tinglab Olmoq (object)	Depression	Tushkunlikdan Chiqmoq
	ă,		Dep	(subject)
	Take out	Bilim/tanib olmoq		Boshimga ne kunlar
	Та	(object)		tushmadi ( <b>subject</b> )
		Habar/Bilm/Malumot	₽.0	
		olmoq (object)	Bad feeling	
		Habar/Bilm/Malumot	ad fe	Boshimdan nelar o'tmadi
		bermoq (object)	B	(subject)
e u		Tushunib Yetibsan		
npi Sio		(object)		
Compre hension		Tushunmay qolibsan		
		(object)		
		Fikr yuritayapman		
ject		(object)		
obj		Fikrga Keldim		
an		(container)		
as s		Fikrimdan qaytdim		
.s		(container)		
ıce		Fikrda to'htadim		
rie		(container)		
[be]		Fikr keldi		
ex		(subject)		
ive		Hayolimga nelar kelmdi		
   uit		(subject)		
		Hayolimdan nelar		
ct		o'tmadi (subject)		
tra	ght	Hayol Surmoq (object)		
Abstract cognitive experience is as an object	Thought	Hayolim Qochdi/Uchdi		
A	H	(subject)		

	1	T
		Hayolim u tamon ketdi
		(subject)
		Aqlimni oldi (object)
		riginini oldi (object)
	pu	Aqlimni o'g'irladi
	Mind	(object)
		Tasavvurga sig'dira
	ion	olishlik (object)
	inat	Tasavvurga sig'dira
	Imagination	olmaslik (object)
	I	
		Aqlim Ketdi (subject)
		Aqlim Kirdi (subject)
<b>+</b>	Mind	Aqlinga kelbsan
jec	Mi	(container)
qo		Hushim Ketdi (subject)
an		Hushi qaytdi (subject)
as		Hushdan Ketdi (subject)
i.	ness	Hushiga qaytdi (subject)
ıce	Consciousness	O'zingdan Ketma
riei		(container)
peı	ပိ	O'zinga Kel (container)
ex		Esimdan
ive		Chiqdi/ko'tarilibdi
niti		(subject)
[ <b>6</b> 0		Esiga Tushdi/Keldi
t c		(container)
Abstract cognitive experience is as an object    Consciousness   Min		Esimda qolmadi (subject)
bst	Memory	Esi/Hushi joyida
•	M	(container)

### **Conclusion of II Chapter**

As a deduction of chapter II it is noteworthy to say that all linguistic evidences supported in this chapter show that the brain is as if a container that mental and psychological process comes into, goes out, stays in the brain which is the permanent usual residence or orientation for them that they can stay in their appropriate place or can even come back after going out. Meanwhile, it refers to the evidence of Embodied language and thought of human being. Furthermore, receptive mental experiences are based on the concrete verbs such as "put in" and "take out" since they are the verbs to receive information from outside into

the brain whereas ear and mouth are as if doors to receive and product information through as we have seen in the last table where "to take" and "to put in" verbs demonstrated.

In shorten, conceiving the introspective mental and emotional experiences as subject and object those "comes into, goes from, stay in, stop at, goes through" the brain container where there is doors such as "mouth and ear "where information come into, go out via them. It proves one more time that language and thought are embodied.

All linguistic evidences supported in this chapter show that Brain is as if a container that mental and psychological process comes, goes, stays or brain is the permanent usual residence for them that they can stay in their appropriate place or can even come back after going out.

Moreover, in this chapter I classified orientational metaphors in Uzbek and English language according to their physical spatial orientation.

### CHAPTER III: EXPRESSING ABSTRACT INTROSPECTIVE EXPERIENCES IN UYGUN' AND ROBERT BURN'S POEMS

As we have seen in the second chapter, abstract introspective experiences are subjects or objects, properties, substance where the self or mind is container. In this chapter, as analyzing Uygun's and Robert Burn's poems we can see the same fact that the cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than merely highlighting pre-existing similarities between the source and target domains. Furthermore, linguistic evidences taken from Uygun's poems show us that physical organs such as 'heart, face, eye, and head' are the containers where emotions such as joy, fear, belief, concern, anxiety, love, happiness, revenge can be held. Moreover, since personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors, in the following chapter we can see the evidence that the physical organs including 'heart, face and head' are containers for the Emotional Feelings those are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains, and sometimes those physical organ, 'heart' and physical state are expressed as objects while Emotional Feelings are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains. However, in the following examples we can see that EMOTIONAL FEELINGS are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains.

Furthermore, in Robert Burns's Poems the abstract cognitive and emotional feelings (namely dream, fear, soul, heart, spirit, tears, nerves, rage, courage, joy, burden, admiration, affection, pulse, grief and others) are uttered as basing upon the concrete domain such as clear, deep, bitter, break, touch, destroy and etc. And sometimes both cognitive (including wisdom, mind) and emotional feelings (namely happiness, despair, love, anxious fear, joy, soul, grief) are expressed by personifying and by basing on concrete domains (such as dark, shy, handsome, humid, break, raise, alarm, soothe, wring, etc.)

Our thoughts related to abstract feeling by basing on concrete domains can be uttered by different ways. What is interesting about my findings is that most of

the time one of the physical organs, heart is uttered as personifying in both Robert Burns's and Uygun's poems.

## 3.1 Abstract emotional Feeling in Uygun's poems:

People talk ubiquitously about abstract concepts using concrete metaphors. Abstract cognitive process as a Target domain is usually based on Concrete Basic Domain because there is not almost any way to express introspection abstract feelings to others.

In these following examples, I analyzed Uygun's poems where physical organs such as heart, face, eye, and head are the containers where emotions such as joy, fear, belief, concern, anxiety, love, happiness, revenge can be held in it.

1. Qalbingizga To'ldirolsa shavq (O'quvchiga), [74.p.5]

Word by word translation of the line: If it could fill your heart with joy (In Uygun's poems, we can see the way of expressing emotional feeling by using the heart both as a physical organ and as something fragile feeling. For instance, in this example physical organ, 'HEART' is a container where emotional feeling 'JOY' can be held in it. And, abstract emotional experience 'joy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to fill'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'to fill' is a verb)

2. Qalbdan chiqar edi kuchsiz bir <u>nola</u> (Qiz), [74.p.11]

Word by word translation of the line: Weak groan was coming out from the heart

(Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling groan can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'groan' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to go out'. Abstract domain 'GROAN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to go out' is a verb)

3. Ko'zlarida tengsiz tahlika (Ona), [74.p.68]

Word by word translation of the line: Unlimited concern in her/his eyes (Physical organ, EYE is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on

concrete domain 'unlimited'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'unlimited' is an adjective)

4. Yuzlarida so'ngsiz iztirob (Ona), [74.p.68]

Word by word translation of the line: Unlimited distress in her/his face (Physical organ, FACE is a container where emotional feeling distress can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'distress' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'unlimited'. Abstract domain 'DISTRESS' is a noun while concrete domain 'unlimited' is an adjective)

5. Yuragimga to'ldirib <u>ishonch</u> (Muhabbat), [74.p.121]

Word by word translation of the line: As filling my heart with trust (Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling trust can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'trust' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to fill'. Abstract domain 'TRUST' is a noun while concrete domain 'to fill' is a verb)

6. Ko'zlarim Tolgan G'azab (G'azab), [74.p.123]

Word by word translation of the line: My eyes are filled with annoyance (Physical organ, EYE is a container where emotional feeling annoyance can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'annoyance' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be filled'. Abstract domain 'ANNOYANCE' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be filled' is a verb)

7. Yuzida o'ynardi ma'sum <u>latofat</u> (Uchrashuv), [74.p.145]

Word by word translation of the line: Charm was flashing on her/his face (Physical organ, FACE is a container where emotional information charm can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'charm' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'flashing'. Abstract domain 'CHARM' is a noun while concrete domain 'to flash' is a verb)

8. Boshiga fashistlar solganida g'am (Tasavvur), [74.p.147] Word by word translation of the line: Once fascists brought concerns into his head

(Physical organ, HEAD is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

- 9. Zafaron yuzingdan qayg'ini hayda (Ulug' Ayyom yaqin), [74.p.151] Word by word translation of the line: Expel the concern from your face (Physical organ, FACE is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to expel'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to expel' is an adjective)
  - 10.Qalbim to'la ishonch, qalbim to'la nur (G'urur), [74.p.]

Word by word translation of the line: My heart is full of trust and full of light (Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling trust and light can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'trust' and light' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be filled'. Abstract domain 'TRUST' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be filled' is a verb)

11.Qalbingda yotsa ham bir dunyo <u>alam</u> (Keladi), [74.p.158]

Word by word translation of the line: Although a lot of grief is in your heart (Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling grief can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'grief' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be, to exist'. Abstract domain 'GRIEF' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be, to exist' is a verb)

12. Yuraginga to'lib <u>zardob</u> ila qon

Word by word translation of the line: As serum and blood are filling in your heart

(Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling can be held. And, abstract negative emotional experience is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be filled with serum and blood')

13. Yuragingda <u>razolat</u> zanggi (Men seni Taniyman), [74.p.163] Word by word translation of the line: The rust of meanness in your heart

(Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling meanness can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'meanness' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'rust'. Abstract domain 'MEANNESS' is a noun while concrete domain 'rust' is a noun)

14. Yuraginga sevging solib ket (Yuragimni berib ketsang bas), [74.p.186] Word by word translation of the line: Put your love in your heart as going (Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling love can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'love' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Abstract domain 'LOVE' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

15. Yuzida bahtining quvnoq jilvasi (Qutilish), [74.p.188]

Word by word translation of the line: Merry glitter happiness on her face (Physical organ, FACE is a container where emotional feeling happiness can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'happiness' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'glitter'. Abstract domain 'HAPPINESS' is a noun while concrete domain 'glitter' is a noun)

16.Dil bog'iga qo'ndirmagil g'am (Oro kirgil do'stlar joniga), [74.p.190] Word by word translation of the line: Do not let the concern to land in the heart's garden

(Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to land or to plant'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to land or to plant' is a verb)

17. Qayg'i, alamimni ichimga yutib (Visol Tabassumi), [74.p.199]

Word by word translation of the line: As swallowing the grief

(Physical Inside Organ of the body is a container where emotional feeling concern and grief can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' and grief' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to swallow'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to swallow' is a verb)

18. Yuragimga solib <u>hayojon</u> (O'sha vakzal), [74.p.202]

Word by word translation of the line: As putting excitement into my heart (Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling excitement can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'excitement' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Abstract domain 'EXCITEMENT' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

19. Yuragingda saqlama <u>tugun</u> (Kelib qolar kutganing), [74.p.206] Word by word translation of the line: Do not keep a lump/grief in your heart (Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling can be held. And, abstract negative emotional experience is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to keep')

We know that personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors. Furthermore, abstract domain (as personified) based on concrete domain since without this way, it is impossible to express introspection feelings and experiences. In these following examples also the physical organs including 'heart, face and head' are containers for the Emotional Feelings those are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains.

## 20. Dahshad bosgan edi yuzini (Ona), [74.p.68]

Word by word translation of the line: Fear occupied her/his face

(Physical organ, 'FACE' is a container where emotional feeling 'fear' can occupy. And, abstract emotional experience 'fear' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to occupy, conquer'. Abstract domain 'FEAR' is a subject while concrete domain 'be occupied' is a passive verb)

## 21.<u>Oro</u> kirib biroz joniga

Word by word translation of the line: Pleasure entered into his/her soul (Soul is a container where emotional feeling pleasure can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'pleasure' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to enter'. Abstract domain 'PLEASURE' is a subject while concrete domain 'to enter' is a verb)

## 22.Boshinga solsaham ayriliq soya (Keladi), [74.p.158]

Word by word translation of the line: Although shade brought parting into her head

(Physical organ, HEAD is a container where emotional feeling can be held. And, abstract negative emotional experience related to separation and parting is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Negative abstract domain expressed by 'PARTING' is a subject while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

#### 23. Dilni qoplar shirin bir orzu (Yorning orzusi), [74.p.168]

Word by word translation of the line: Sweet wish covers the heart

(Physical organ, HEART is a container where emotional feeling wish can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'wish' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cover'. Abstract domain 'WISH' is a subject while concrete domain 'to cover' is a verb)

As we have seen in the examples above that physical organs are containers for the Emotional Feelings those are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains.

However, in the examples will be cited below, those physical organ, 'heart' and physical state are expressed as <u>OBJECTS</u> while Emotional Feelings are personified as <u>SUBJECTS</u> and based on concrete domains.

24. Qaddingni buksa ham olam-olam g'am (Keladi), [74.p.158]

Word by word translation of the line: Although a lot of problem bends your shoulders

(Physical organ, HEART is an object while emotional feeling problem is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'problem' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to bend'. Abstract domain 'PROBLEM' is a noun while concrete domain 'to bend' is a verb)

## 25.Qalbingni zabt etib shubha va qayg'u

Word by word translation of the line: As suspecting and concern conquered your heart

(Physical organ, HEART is an object while emotional feeling suspecting and concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'suspecting and concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to conquer or to occupy'. Abstract domain 'SUSPECTING AND CONCERN' are noun while concrete domain 'to conquer or to occupy' is a verb)

26. Yuragimga yondashalmas g'am (Sevgi Mash'ali), [74.p.189]

Word by word translation of the line: The concern can't approach my heart (Physical organ, HEART is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to approach'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to approach' is a verb)

27. Yuragimni kemirgan g'amlar (O'sha vakzal), [74.p.202]

Word by word translation of the line: The concerns chewed my heart (Physical organ, HEART is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to chew'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to chew' is a verb)

28.Qalbini g'am burdalar (Toqqizinchi May), [74.p.213]

Word by word translation of the line: The concern cuts my heart into pieces (Physical organ, HEART is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cut into'. Abstract domain 'CONCERN' is a noun while concrete domain 'to cut into' is a verb)

## 29.Shunda <u>ishonch</u> najot berdi

Word by word translation of the line: That time, the trust helped (Help is an object while emotional feeling trust is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'trust' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to give'. Abstract domain 'TRUST' is a noun while concrete domain 'to give' is a verb)

30.Ko'nglimni zavq asir etdiyu (Hayot ishqi), [74.p.216]

Word by word translation of the line: Joy enslaved my heart

(Physical organ, HEART is an object while emotional feeling joy is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'joy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'enslave'. Abstract domain 'JOY' is a noun while concrete domain 'to enslave' is a verb)

As cited above physical organs including 'heart, face and head' are containers for the emotional feelings those are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains. In contrast, in the following examples we can see that EMOTIONAL FEELINGS are personified as subjects and based on concrete domains.

## 31. Alam qayg'i guli nechun so'lmasin? (O'quvchiga), [74.p.5]

Word by word translation of the line: Why the problem flower should not die? (Emotional feeling grief and concern are personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'grief and concern' are expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to die'. Abstract domain 'grief and concern' are nouns while concrete domain 'to die' is a verb)

## 32. Seni ko'rdim, quvondi ko'zlar (Ashirgul), [74.p.47]

Word by word translation of the line: Eyes were glad once I saw you (In order to express emotional, feeling vision or eye is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'vision or eye' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to light up, to be happy'. Abstract domain 'vision or eye' is a noun while concrete domain 'to light up, to be happy' is a verb)

## 33. Seni ko'rdim, Jo'sh urdi dilim

Word by word translation of the line: My heart/emotion flooded once I saw you (In order to express, emotional feeling heart is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be flooded'. Abstract domain 'to be flooded' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be flooded' is a verb)

## 34. Seni ko'rdim, O'ynadi yurak

Word by word translation of the line: My heart shook once I saw you

(In order to express, emotional feeling heart is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to beat, to dance, to shake'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to beat, to dance, to shake' is a verb)

## 35.Ma'nilarga ko'mildi dilim

(In order to express, emotional feeling heart is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be filled'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be filled' is a verb)

36.G'amga duchor bo'lmadim zarra (Oltin Sevgi), [74.p.49]

Word by word translation of the line: I never came across the concern (Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to come across'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to come across' is a verb)

## 37. Tahqirlangan <u>nomus</u>, <u>Muhabbat</u> (Shoir), [74.p.60]

Word by word translation of the line: Humiliated shame and love

(Emotional feeling love and shame are personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'love and shame' are expressed by basing on concrete domain 'humiliated'. Abstract domain 'love and shame' are nouns while concrete domain 'adjective' is an adjective)

## 38. <u>Dahshad</u> bosgan edi yuzini (Ona), [74.p.68]

Word by word translation of the line: Fear occupied his/her face

(Emotional feeling fear is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'fear' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to occupy'. Abstract domain 'fear' is a noun while concrete domain 'to occupy' is a verb)

39. <u>Umidsizlik qayg'u</u> yo'ldosh bo'lmasin (Hayrlashuv), [74.p.71]

Word by word translation of the line: Never accompany with hopeless and concern

(Emotional feeling hopelessness and concern are personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'hopelessness and concern' are expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to accompany'. Abstract domain 'hopelessness and concern' are nouns while concrete domain 'to accompany' is a verb)

40. Uzoqlarga ketsin desang g'am (Lolalar), [74.p.93]

Word by word translation of the line: If you want the problem/concern go away (Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to go far away'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to go far away' is a verb)

41. Behuda shubhalar qurshamish seni (Sevgi), [74.p.94]

Word by word translation of the line: Nonsense suspectings covered you (Emotional feeling suspecting is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'suspecting' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cover'. Abstract domain 'suspecting' is a noun while concrete domain 'to cover' is a verb)

42. Har qancha sitamgar bo'lsada hijron,

Word by word translation of the line: Although the parting is hard (Negative emotional feeling that is experienced while separation or parting is personified as subject, and it expressed by basing on concrete domain 'how much')

43. <u>Hasratga</u> oshno aylama tilni

Word by word translation of the line: Never accompany your language with grief

(Emotional feeling grief is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'grief' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to accompany'. Abstract domain 'grief' is a noun while concrete domain 'to accompany' is a verb)

44.Bilamiz ruhingiz tushmagan hali (Otkritka), [74.p.110]

Word by word translation of the line: We know your soul has not decreased yet

(Emotional feeling spirit is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'spirit' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to decrease'. Abstract domain 'spirit' is a noun while concrete domain 'to decrease' is a verb)

45. Vahimalar o'rab olgandir (Va'da), [74.p.119]

Word by word translation of the line: Fear might covered you

(Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cover'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to cover' is a verb) Balki yamon og'ir <u>shubhalar</u>

Word by word translation of the line: Perhaps, bad and heavy suspectings (Emotional feeling suspecting is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'suspecting' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'heavy'. Abstract domain 'suspecting' is a noun while concrete domain 'heavy' is an adjective)

46. Oro kirib biroz joniga (Fashistning o'ligi), [74.p.131]

Word by word translation of the line: As pleasure entered his/her soul (Emotional feeling pleasure is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'pleasure' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to enter'. Abstract domain 'pleasure' is a noun while concrete domain 'to enter' is a verb)

47. Hamroh bo'ldi menga jasurlik va shon (Kuz), [74.p.143]

Word by word translation of the line: I was accompanied by braveness and glory (Emotional feeling braveness and glory are personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience '' braveness and glory' are expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to accompany'. Abstract domain 'braveness and glory' are is a noun while concrete domain 'to accompany' is a verb)

48.Qaddingni buksa ham olam-olam g'am (Keladi), [74.p.158]

Word by word translation of the line: Although a lot of concerns or problems bends your shoulder

(Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to bend'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to bend' is a verb)

## 49.Boshinga solsaham ayriliq soya

Word by word translation of the line: Although the parting brought the shade into your head

(Negative emotional feeling expressed with parting or separation is personified as subject and it is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in')

## 50.Qalbingni zabt etib shubha va qayg'u

Word by word translation of the line: As suspecting and concern/problem conquered your heart

(Emotional feeling of suspecting and concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'suspecting and concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to occupy or to conquer'. Abstract domain 'suspecting and concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to occupy or to conquer' is an a verb)

## 51. Dilni qoplar shirin bir <u>orzu</u> (Yorning orzusi), [74.p.168]

Word by word translation of the line: Sweet wish covers my heart

(Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cover'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to cover' is a verb)

## 52. <u>Hijron</u> azobidan qo'rqmagil zinhor (Ayriliq shomida), [74.p.176]

Word by word translation of the line: Do not be afraid of parting hardship (Negative emotional feeling expressed with 'parting or separation' is personified as subject and personified)

## 53. Yuragimga yondashalmas g'am (Sevgi Mash'ali), [74.p.189]

Word by word translation of the line: The concern/problem can't approach my heart

(Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to approach'.

Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to approach' is a verb)

54. Yuragimni kemirgan g'amlar (O'sha vakzal), [74.p.202]

Word by word translation of the line: The concerns chewed my heart (Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to chew'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to chew' is a verb)

## 55.Qizdiradi zafar quyoshi

Word by word translation of the line: Glory sunshine heats

(Emotional feeling glory is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'glory' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to heat'. Abstract domain 'glory' is a noun while concrete domain 'to heat' is a verb)

56.Qaydan keldi bu zo'r <u>hayojon</u>? (Tun shu qadar oydin), [74.p.204] Word by word translation of the line: Where the excitement did came from? (Emotional feeling excitement is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'excitement' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to come'. Abstract domain 'excitement' is a noun while concrete domain 'to come' is a verb)

## 57. <u>Uyqu</u> qurg'ur qayga yo'qoldi?

Word by word translation of the line: Where did the sleep go away?

(Psychological experience sleep is personified as subject. And, Psychological experience sleep is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to leave'. Psychological experience sleep is a noun while concrete domain 'to leave' is a verb)

## 58.Qalbini g'am burdalar (Toqqizinchi May), [74.p.213]

Word by word translation of the line: The concern/problem cuts my heart into pieces

(Emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cut into'.

Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to cut into' is a verb)

## 59.Shunda <u>ishonch</u> najot berdi

Word by word translation of the line: That time, trust gave a hand/help (Emotional feeling trust is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'trust' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to give'. Abstract domain 'trust' is a noun while concrete domain 'to give' is a verb)

60.Ko'nglimni <u>zavq</u> asir etdiyu (Hayot ishqi), [74.p.216]

Word by word translation of the line: Joy enslaved my heart

(Emotional feeling joy is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'joy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to enslave'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'to enslave' is a verb)

61. Qanday qilay <u>sevinch</u> sayratsa tilni! (Qo'shiq), [74.p.236]

Word by word translation of the line: What could I do, if happiness make my tongue sing

(Emotional feeling happiness is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'happiness' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to make sing'. Abstract domain 'happiness' is a noun while concrete domain 'to make sing' is a verb)

## 3.2 Emotional Feeling in Robert Burn's poems.

In this subchapter, I am going to analyze Robert Burns's poems where the abstract cognitive and emotional feelings (namely dream, fear, soul, heart, spirit, tears, nerves, rage, courage, joy, burden, admiration, affection, pulse, grief and others) are uttered as basing upon the concrete domain such as clear, deep, bitter, break, touch, destroy and etc.

- 1. Is there a man whose <u>judgment</u> is clear (A bards epitaph), [30.p.3] (Abstract cognitive experience 'Judgment' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'clear'. Abstract domain 'Judgment' is a noun while concrete domain 'clear' is an adjective)
  - 2. Deep in heart wrung tears I'll pledge you (A fond kiss), [30.p.12]

(Abstract emotional experience 'tears' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'wrung'. Abstract domain 'tears' is a noun while concrete domain 'wrung' is an adjective)

3. I'll ne'er blame my partial <u>fancy</u>

(Abstract emotional experience 'fancy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'partial'. Abstract domain 'fancy' is a noun while concrete domain 'partial' is an adjective)

4. A dear and near my <u>heart</u> I set thee (A poet's welcome to his love begotten daughter), [30.p.15]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'set'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'set' is a verb)

5. An' thy poor, worthless daddy's spirit

(Abstract emotional experience 'spirit' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'worthless and poor'. Abstract domain 'spirit' is a noun while concrete domain 'worthless and poor' are adjectives)

- 6. Wi' you myself I gat a <u>fright</u> (Address to the devil), [30.p.22] (Abstract emotional experience 'fright' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'gat'. Abstract domain 'fright' is a noun while concrete domain 'gat' is a verb)
- 7. Tearing my <u>nerves</u> with bitter pang (Address to the toothache), [30.p.25] (Abstract emotional experience 'nerves' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'Tearing and bitter'. Abstract domain 'nerves' is a noun while concrete domain 'Tearing and bitter' is an adjective and verb)
- 8. Think when your castigated <u>pulse</u> (Address to the Unco child), [30.p.26] (Abstract emotional experience 'pulse' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'castigated'. Abstract domain 'pulse' is a noun while concrete domain 'castigated' is an adjective)
  - 9. One point still be greatly dark

(Abstract cognitive experience 'point or mean existed in mind' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'dark'. Abstract domain 'point or mean existed in mind' is a noun while concrete domain 'dark' is an adjective)

10. Flow gently Aften, disturb not her dream (Aften Water), [30.p.32]

(Abstract emotional experience 'dream' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'disturb'. Abstract domain 'dream' is a noun while concrete domain 'disturb' is a verb)

I charge you disturb not my slumbering fear

(Abstract emotional experience 'fear' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'slumbering'. Abstract domain 'fear' is a noun while concrete domain slumbering' is an adjective)

11. The gloom will soothe my cheerless <u>soul</u> (Again rejoicing nature sees), [30.p.33]

(Abstract emotional experience 'soul' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'soothe'. Abstract domain 'soul' is a noun while concrete domain 'soothe' is a verb)

12. Thou'll break my <u>heart</u>, thou bonnie bird (Bonnie doon), [30.p.45] (In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'break'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'break' is a verb)

13.Fain, fain would my griefs impart (Carigieburn Wood), [30.p.50] (Abstract emotional experience 'griefs' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'impart'. Abstract domain 'griefs' is a noun while concrete domain 'impart' is a verb)

14.But secret love will break my heart

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'break'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'break' is a verb)

15. The youngsters' artless heart o'erfolws wi' joy), [30.p.53]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'artless'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'artless' is an adjective)

16. The wily mother sees conscious flame

(Abstract cognitive experience 'conscious flame' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'sees'. Abstract domain 'conscious flame' is a noun while concrete domain 'sees' is a verb)

17. How guiltless blood for guilty man was shed

(Abstract experience 'guiltless' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'blood'. Abstract domain 'guiltless' is an adjective while concrete domain 'blood' is a verb)

18. Must be my bitter doom (Despondency-An Ode), [30.p.61]

(Abstract emotional experience 'doom' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'bitter'. Abstract domain 'doom' is a noun while concrete domain 'bitter' is an adjective)

19. Give me a <u>spark</u> or nature's fire (Epistle to Lapraik), [30.p.64] (Abstract experience 'spark' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'Give'. Abstract domain 'spark' is a noun while concrete domain 'Give' is an a verb) Touch my heart

20. The <u>sweetest hours</u> that I spend (Green Grow the rashes), [30.p.71] (Abstract emotional experience 'feeling happy' is expressed with sweet hour and by basing on concrete domain 'spend'. Abstract domain 'hour' is a noun while concrete domain 'to spend' is a verb)

## 21. Their <u>hearts</u> can enjoy them

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'hearts' is used by basing on concrete domain 'can'. Abstract domain 'hearts' is a noun while concrete domain 'can' is an a modal verb)

22. May slightly touch the heart (Handsome Nell), [30.p.78]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'touch'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'touch' is a verb)

## 23. Tis this enchants my soul

(Abstract emotional experience 'soul' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'enchants'. Abstract domain 'soul' is a noun while concrete domain 'enchants' is a verb)

24. And glory shall be Thine (Holly Willie's prayer), [30.p.89]

(Abstract emotional experience 'glory' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'be'. Abstract domain 'glory' is a noun while concrete domain 'be' is a verb)

25.A' my flowery bliss destroy'd (I dreamed I lay), [30.p.92]

(Abstract emotional experience 'bliss' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'destroy'd'. Abstract domain 'bliss' is a noun while concrete domain 'destroy'd' is a verb)

26.No anxious fear their little <u>hearts</u> alarms (In the character of ruined farmer), [30.p.93]

(Abstract emotional experience 'hearts' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'little and alarms'. Abstract domain 'hearts' is a noun while concrete domain 'little and alarms' is a verb)

27.But their sake my heart does ache

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'ache'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'ache' is a verb)

28.To show their deadly rage (John Barley corn), [30.p.99]

(Abstract emotional experience 'rage' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'deadly and show'. Abstract domain 'rage' is a noun while concrete domain deadly and show' is a verb)

29. 'Twill make your courage raise

(Abstract emotional experience 'courage' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'make and raise'. Abstract domain 'courage' is a noun while concrete domain 'make and raise' is a verb)

## 30. 'Twill heighten all his joy

(Abstract emotional experience 'joy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain heighten'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'heighten' is a verb)

## 31. 'Twill make the window's heart to sing

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'sing'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'sing' is a verb)

32.To lay some mair blew my <u>head</u> (Lass that made the bed to me), [30.p.110]

(Abstract cgnitive experience 'head' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'blew'. Abstract domain 'head' is a noun while concrete domain 'blew' is a verb)

## 33.A cod she laid blew my head

(Abstract cognitive experience 'head' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'blew'. Abstract domain 'head' is a noun while concrete domain 'blew' is a verb)

34.My <u>heart</u> was formed to prove (Love in the guise of friendship), [30.p.114]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'formed'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'formed' is a verb)

35.My <u>heart</u> is in the highlands, my <u>heart</u> is not here. (My heart in the highlands), [30.p.119]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'is in the highlands and is in the highlands'. Abstract domain

'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'is in the highlands and is in the highlands' is a verb)

36.My <u>heart</u> in the highlands wherever I go

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'in the highlands wherever I go'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'in the highlands wherever I go' is a verb)

37.I know her <u>heart</u> will never change (My highland Lassie), [30.p.120] (Abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'change'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'change' is a verb)

She has my heart, she has my hand

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'to have'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to have' is a verb)

38.Hath <u>happiness</u> in store (Paraphrase of the first psalm), [30.p.133] (Abstract emotional experience 'happiness' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to have'. Abstract domain 'happiness' is a noun while concrete domain 'to have' is an a verb)

## 39. Hath given them peace and rest

(Abstract emotional experience 'peace and rest' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'Hath given'. Abstract domain 'peace and rest' are a nouns while concrete domain 'Hath given' is a verb)

40.Yet sure that ills wring my <u>soul</u> (Prayer under the pressure of Violent anguish), [30.p.139]

(Abstract emotional experience 'soul' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'wring'. Abstract domain 'soul' is a noun while concrete domain 'wring' is a verb)

41. The mare <u>admiration</u> they draw (Ronald's of the Bernals), [30.p.]

(Abstract emotional experience 'admiration' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'draw'. Abstract domain 'admiration' is a noun while concrete domain 'draw' is a verb) [30.p.141]

42. She stills our affections awa, man

(Abstract emotional experience 'affections' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'stills'. Abstract domain 'affections' is a noun while concrete domain 'stills' is a verb)

43. Forsaken and freightless, my <u>burden</u> I bear (Tear drop), [30.p.160] (Abstract emotional experience 'burden' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'bear'. Abstract domain 'burden' is a noun while concrete domain 'bear' is a verb)

44. But this bruised heart that now bleeds in my breast

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' and breast' are used by basing on concrete domain 'bruised'. Abstract domain 'heart and breast' are nouns while concrete domain 'bruised' is an adjective)

45.I can feel by its throbbings, will soon be at rest

(Abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'throbbings'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'throbbings' is an noun)

46.But round my <u>heart</u> ties are bound (The gloomy night is gathering fast), [30.p.177]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'to have and bound'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to have and bound' is a verb and noun)

47. My bursting tears my heart declare

(a In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'declare'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'declare' is a verb)

48. No never pleasure glad my cruel heart (The wounded Hare), [30.p.185]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'cruel'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'cruel' is an adjective)

49. For surely that had touch my <u>heart</u> (To the wood lark), [30.p.199] (In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'touch'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'touch touch' is a verb)

## 50.Or my poor <u>heart</u> is broken

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'broken'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'broken' is an adjective)

In the upcoming examples, both cognitive (including wisdom, mind) and emotional feelings (namely happiness, despair, love, anxious fear, joy, soul, grief) are uttered by personifying and by basing on concrete domains (such as dark, shy, handsome, humid, break, raise, alarm, soothe, wring, etc.)

## 51.Is wisdom's root (A bards epitaph), [30.p.3]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'wisdom' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'root'. Abstract domain 'wisdom' is a noun while concrete domain 'root' is an noun)

52.Believe me <u>happiness</u> is shy (A bottle and friend), [30.p.4]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'happiness' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'shy'. Abstract domain 'happiness' is a noun while concrete domain 'shy' is an adjective)

53.Dark despair around benights me (A fond kiss), [30.p.12]

(Abstract emotional experience 'despair' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'Dark'. Abstract domain 'despair' is a noun while concrete domain 'Dark' is an adjective)

54. The <u>gloom</u> will soothe my cheerless soul (Again rejoicing nature sees), [30.p.33]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'gloom and sad' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'soothe'. Abstract domain 'gloom and sad' are nouns while concrete domain 'soothe' is a verb)

## 55.But secret love will break my heart

(Abstract cognitive experience 'love' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'break'. Abstract domain 'love' is a noun while concrete domain 'break' is an a verb)

56.In bright <u>succession</u> raise, her ornament and guard! (Cotter's Saturday Night),) [30.p.53]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'succession' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'raise'. Abstract domain 'succession' is a noun while concrete domain 'raise' is a verb)

57. May liberty meets wi' <u>success</u> (Here is health to them that's awa), [30.p.80]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'success' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'meets'. Abstract domain 'success' is a noun while concrete domain 'meets' is a verb)

58.Depending on some higher <u>chance</u> (Here is to thy health), [30.p.81] (Abstract cognitive experience 'chance' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'higher'. Abstract domain 'chance' is a noun while concrete domain 'higher' is an adjective)

59.Of many a <u>joy</u> and money destroy'd me (I dreamed I lay), [30.p.] (Abstract emotional experience 'joy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'destroy'd'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'destroy'd' is an a verb)

## 60.I bear a heart that support me still

(Abstract cognitive experience 'joy' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'support'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'support' is an a verb)

61.No <u>anxious fear</u> their little hearts alarms (In the character of ruined farmer), [30.p.93]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'anxious fear' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to have and support'. Abstract domain 'anxious fear' is an adjective and noun while concrete domain 'to have and support' is a verb)

62. Talk not of <u>love</u>, <u>it</u> gives me pain (Love in the guise of friendship), [30.p.114]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'love' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to give'. Abstract domain 'love' is a noun while concrete domain 'to give' is a verb)

63. He (love) bound men in an iron chain

(Abstract cognitive experience 'love' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'bound'. Abstract domain 'love' is a noun while concrete domain 'bound' is a verb)

64.Yet sure that <u>ills</u> wring my soul (Prayer under the pressure of Violent anguish), [30.p.139]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'ills' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'wring'. Abstract domain 'ills' is a noun while concrete domain 'wring' is a verb)

65.Besides a handsome fortune (Tarbalton Lasses), [30.p.159]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'fortune' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'handsome'. Abstract domain 'fortune' is a noun while concrete domain 'handsome' is an adjective)

66.But round my heart <u>ties</u> are bound (The gloomy night is gathering fast), [30.p.177]

These bleed afresh those ties I tear

(Abstract cognitive experience 'ties' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'tear'. Abstract domain 'ties' is a noun while concrete domain 'tear' is a verb)

67. Humid soul of humid affections (To a kiss), [30.p.188]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'soul and affections' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'Humid'. Abstract domain 'soul and affection' is a noun while concrete domain 'Humid' is an adjective)

68.O' speechless grief and dark <u>despair</u> (To the wood lark), [30.p.199] (Abstract cognitive experience 'grief and despair' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'dark'. Abstract domain 'grief and despair' is a noun while concrete domain 'dark' is an adjective)

Moreover, as can be seen in the examples below, abstract Emotional feelings are uttered with 'charm, hearts, blessing' those are expressed by basing on concrete domains including 'broken, Imperial, frosty paw'.

69. We had ne'er been broken <u>hearted</u> (A fond kiss), [30.p.12]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'hearted' is used by basing on concrete domain 'broken'. Abstract domain 'hearted' is an adjective and concrete domain 'broken' is an adjective too)

70. There I'll despise I am Imperial charms (Anna), [30.p.35]

(Abstract emotional experience 'charms' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'Imperial'. Abstract domain 'charms' is an adjective and concrete domain 'Imperial' is an adjective too)

71.But <u>blessing</u> on your frosty paw (John Anderson), [30.p.96]

(Abstract emotional experience 'blessing' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'broken'. Abstract domain 'blessing' is a noun while concrete domain 'broken' is an adjective)

The range of container metaphors those we use to express our introspection experiences are enormous in both English and other languages including Uzbek language. In the second chapter, I have supported a number of examples related to container metaphors those reason abstract mental process, emotional experience as container for mind as well as reasoning the mind or brain as container for the mental experience. The same evidence can be seen in Robert

Burns's poems, for instance I the following two examples mind and breath are containers where emotional and cognitive feeling is kept.

72. And never brought to mind (Auld Lang Syne), [30.p.40] (Mind is containers where emotional and cognitive feeling is kept)

73.Drew blades O' death, till out of breath (Bottle of sherramuir), [30.p.42] (Breath is containers where emotional and cognitive feeling is kept)

## 3.3 Personification in Uygun's and Robert Burns's poems.

There are different ways to utter our thoughts related to abstract feeling by basing on concrete domains. What is interesting about my findings is that most of the time one of the physical organs, heart is uttered as personifying in both Robert Burns's and Uygun's poems.

For instance, in the following lines, extracted from Robert Burns's poems, we can see that in order to express emotional experiences mostly the physical organ-heart is expressed by personifying as subject or object, and sometimes as a property.

• A dear and near my <u>heart</u> I set thee (A poet's welcome to his love begotten daughter), [30.p.15]

(In order to express, abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'set'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'set' is a verb)

• The youngsters' artless <u>heart</u> o'erfolws wi' joy (Cotter's Saturday Night), [30.p.53]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'artless'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'artless' is an adjective)

• Their <u>hearts</u> can enjoy them(Green Grow the rashes), [30.p.71] (In order to express abstract emotional experience 'hearts' is used by basing on concrete domain 'can'. Abstract domain 'hearts' is a noun while concrete domain 'can' is an a modal verb)

• May slightly touch the <u>heart</u> (Handsome Nell), [30.p.78]

(Abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'touch'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'touch' is a verb)

• No anxious fear their little <u>hearts</u> alarms (In the character of ruined farmer), [30.p.93]

(Abstract emotional experience 'hearts' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'little and alarms'. Abstract domain 'hearts' is a noun while concrete domain 'little and alarms' is a verb)

• But their sake my heart does ache

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'ache'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'ache' is a verb)

- 'Twill make the window's <u>heart</u> to sing (John Barley corn), [30.p.] (In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'sing'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'sing' is a verb)
  - My <u>heart</u> was formed to prove (Love in the guise of friendship), [30.p.114]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'formed'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'formed' is a verb)

• My <u>heart</u> is in the highlands, my <u>heart</u> is not here. (My heart in the highlands), [30.p.119]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'is in the highlands and is in the highlands'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'is in the highlands and is in the highlands' is a verb)

• My heart in the highlands wherever I go

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'in the highlands wherever I go'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'in the highlands wherever I go' is a verb)

• I know her <u>heart</u> will never change (My highland Lassie), [30.p.120]

(Abstract emotional experience 'heart' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'change'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'change' is a verb)

She has my heart, she has my hand

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'to have'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to have' is a verb)

• But this bruised <u>heart</u> that now bleeds in my breast (Tear drop), [30.p.160]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart and breast' are used by basing on concrete domain 'bruised'. Abstract domain 'heart and breast' are nouns while concrete domain 'bruised' is an adjective)

• But round my <u>heart</u> ties are bound (The gloomy night is gathering fast), [30.p.177]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'to have and bound'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to have and bound' is a verb and noun)

• My bursting tears my <u>heart</u> declare

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'declare'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'declare' is a verb)

- No never pleasure glad my cruel <u>heart</u> (The wounded Hare), [30.p.185] (In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'cruel'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'cruel' is an adjective)
  - For surely that had touch my <u>heart</u> (To the wood lark), [30.p.199]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'touch'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'touch touch' is a verb)

• Or my poor heart is broken

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'broken'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'broken' is an adjective)

• I bear a heart that support me still (I dreamed I lay), [30.p.92]

(Abstract cognitive experience 'joy' is personified and expressed by basing on concrete domain 'support'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'support' is an a verb)

- But round my <u>heart</u> ties are bound (The gloomy night is gathering fast), [30.p177]
- We had ne'er been broken <u>hearted</u> (A fond kiss), [30.p.12]

(In order to express abstract emotional experience 'hearted' is used by basing on concrete domain 'broken'. Abstract domain 'hearted' is an adjective and concrete domain 'broken' is an adjective too)

As shown above in Robert Burns's poems emotional experiences are expressed as the physical organ-heart by personifying as subject or object, and sometimes as a property.

Moreover, expressing emotional feeling by using the heart both as a physical organ and as something fragile feeling can be seen in the following evidences taken from Uzbek poet Uygun's poems. Furthermore, in these examples we can see that emotional feeling is expressed by various physical organs as information channel including heart, eye, face and head.

• Ko'zlarida tengsiz <u>tahlika</u> (Ona), [45.p.68]

Word by word translation of the line: Unlimited concern in her/his eyes (Physical organ, Eye is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete

domain 'unlimited'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'unlimited' is an adjective)

Yuzlarida so'ngsiz iztirob

Word by word translation of the line: Unlimited distress in her/his face (Physical organ, Face is a container where emotional feeling distress can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'distress' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'unlimited'. Abstract domain 'distress' is a noun while concrete domain 'unlimited' is an adjective)

• Yuragimga to'ldirib ishonch (Muhabbat), [45.p.]

Word by word translation of the line: As filling my heart with trust (Heart is a container where emotional feeling trust can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'trust' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to fill'. Abstract domain 'trust' is a noun while concrete domain 'to fill' is a verb)

• Ko'zlarim Tolgan G'azab (G'azab), [45.p.123]

Word by word translation of the line: My eyes are filled with annoyance (Physical organ, Eye is a container where emotional feeling annoyance can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'annoyance' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be filled'. Abstract domain 'annoyance' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be filled' is a verb)

• Yuzida o'ynardi ma'sum <u>latofat</u> (Uchrashuv), [45.p.145]

Word by word translation of the line: Charm was flashing on her/his face (Physical organ, Face is a container where emotional information charm can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'charm' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'flashing'. Abstract domain 'charm' is a noun while concrete domain 'to flash' is a verb)

• Boshiga fashistlar solganida g'am (Tasavvur), [45.p.147]

Word by word translation of the line: Once fascists brought concerns into his head

(Physical organ, Head is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

- Zafaron yuzingdan qayg'ini hayda (Ulug' Ayyom yaqin), [45.p.151] Word by word translation of the line: Expel the concern from your face (Physical organ, Face is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to expel'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to expel' is an adjective)
  - Yuraginga to'lib zardob ila qon

Word by word translation of the line: As serum and blood are filling in your heart

(Physical organ, Heart is a container where emotional feeling can be held. And, abstract negative emotional experience is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to be filled with serum and blood')

- Yuragingda <u>razolat</u> zanggi (Men seni Taniyman), [45.p.163]
- Word by word translation of the line: The rust of meanness in your heart (Physical organ, Heart is a container where emotional feeling meanness can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'meanness' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'rust'. Abstract domain 'meanness' is a noun while concrete domain 'rust' is a noun)
- Yuraginga sevging solib ket (Yuragimni berib ketsang bas), [45.p.186] Word by word translation of the line: Put your love in your heart as going (Physical organ, Heart is a container where emotional feeling love can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'love' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Abstract domain 'love' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)
  - Yuzida <u>bahtining</u> quvnoq jilvasi (Qutilish), [45.p.188]

Word by word translation of the line: Merry glitter happiness on her face (Physical organ, Face is a container where emotional feeling happiness can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'happiness' is expressed by basing on

concrete domain 'glitter'. Abstract domain 'happiness' is a noun while concrete domain 'glitter' is a noun)

• Dil bog'iga qo'ndirmagil g'am (Oro kirgil do'stlar joniga), [45.p.190]

Word by word translation of the line: Do not let the concern to land in the heart's garden

(Physical organ, Heart is a container where emotional feeling concern can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to land or to plant'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to land or to plant' is a verb)

• Qayg'i, alamimni ichimga yutib (Visol Tabassumi), [45.p.199]

Word by word translation of the line: As swallowing the grief

(Physical organ, Inside of the body is a container where emotional feeling concern and grief can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' and grief' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to swallow'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to swallow' is a verb)

• Yuragimga solib <u>hayojon</u> (O'sha vakzal), [45.p.202]

Word by word translation of the line: As putting excitement into my heart (Physical organ, Heart is a container where emotional feeling excitement can be held. And, abstract emotional experience 'excitement' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Abstract domain 'excitement' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

• Yuragingda saqlama <u>tugun</u> (Kelib qolar kutganing), [45.p.206]

Word by word translation of the line: Do not keep a lump/grief in your heart (Physical organ, Heart is a container where emotional feeling can be held. And, abstract negative emotional experience is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to keep')

• <u>Dahshad</u> bosgan edi yuzini (Ona), [45.p.68]

Word by word translation of the line: Fear occupied her/his face

('Physical organ, Face' is a container where emotional feeling 'fear' can occupy. And, abstract emotional experience 'fear' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to occupy, conquer'. Abstract domain 'fear' is a noun while concrete domain 'is a passive verb)

• Boshinga solsaham <u>ayriliq</u> soya (Keladi), [45.p.158]

Word by word translation of the line: Although shade brought parting into her head

(Physical organ, head is a container where emotional feeling can be held. And, abstract negative emotional experience related to separation and parting is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to put in'. Negative abstract domain expressed by 'parting' is a noun while concrete domain 'to put in' is a verb)

• Yuragimga yondashalmas g'am (Sevgi Mash'ali), [45.p.189]

Word by word translation of the line: The concern can't approach my heart (Physical organ, heart is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to approach'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to approach' is a verb)

• Yuragimni kemirgan g'amlar (O'sha vakzal), [45.p.202]

Word by word translation of the line: The concerns chewed my heart (Physical organ, heart is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to chew'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to chew' is a verb)

What's more, the concrete physical organ 'Yurak' or heart is turned abstract words such as 'Qalb, Ko'ngil, Dil' since 'heart' can feel emotional feelings.

• Yuragimni kemirgan g'amlar (O'sha vakzal), [45.p.202]

Word by word translation of the line: The concerns chewed my heart (Physical organ, heart is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to chew'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to chew' is a verb)

• Qalbini g'am burdalar (Toqqizinchi May), [45.p.213]

Word by word translation of the line: The concern cuts my heart into pieces (Physical organ, heart is an object while emotional feeling concern is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'concern' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'to cut into'. Abstract domain 'concern' is a noun while concrete domain 'to cut into' is a verb)

• Ko'nglimni <u>zavq</u> asir etdiyu (Hayot ishqi), [45.p.216]

Word by word translation of the line: Joy enslaved my heart

(Physical organ, heart is an object while emotional feeling joy is personified as subject. And, abstract emotional experience 'joy' is expressed by basing on concrete domain 'enslave'. Abstract domain 'joy' is a noun while concrete domain 'to enslave' is a verb)

• Seni ko'rdim, Jo'sh urdi dilim

Word by word translation of the line: My heart/emotion flooded once I saw you (Physical organ, heart is personified as subject to express emotional feeling. And, in order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'to be flooded'. Abstract domain 'to be flooded' is a noun while concrete domain 'to be flooded' is a verb)

• Seni ko'rdim, O'ynadi yurak

Word by word translation of the line: My heart shook once I saw you (Physical organ, heart is personified as subject to express emotional feeling. And, in order to express abstract emotional experience 'heart' is used by basing on concrete domain 'to beat, to dance, to shake'. Abstract domain 'heart' is a noun while concrete domain 'to beat, to dance, to shake' is a verb)

## **Conclusion of III Chapter**

All in all, in both Uygun's and Robert Burns's Poems, the abstract cognitive and emotional feelings are uttered as basing upon the concrete domain. And sometimes both cognitive and emotional feelings are expressed by personifying and by basing on concrete domains, and in these cases cross-domain mapping actually constitutes a new conceptual structure in the target domain, rather than

merely highlighting pre-existing similarities between the source and target domains.

Most of the time, one of the physical organs, heart is uttered as personifying in both Robert Burns's and Uygun's poems. In contrast, in Uygun's poems we can see the clear evidence that physical organs such as 'heart, face, eye, and head' are the containers where emotions such as joy, fear, belief, concern, anxiety, love, happiness, revenge can be held.

#### CHAPTER IV: SEMANTIC POWER AND SENSORY-MOTOR

## SYSTEM: LEVELS OF SEMANTIC POWER IN SENSORY-MOTOR

#### **SYSTEM**

A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead" [14.p.18] Why dead metaphors are suggested to paraphrase with some vivid new metaphor? The reason is new metaphors have more influence than dead metaphors those are used unconsciously, automatically. It means, dead metaphors have not as much influence as new metaphors have.

Following this hypothesis of my dissertation paper, this chapter searches answers to these following questions: Do we use the same neuron circuitry or the same neural substrate used in imagining, understanding when reasoning our mental and emotional processes once we use or comprehend dead abstract metaphors UNCONSCIOUSLY without emphasizing on their meaning construction? Or are there any levels those should be able to show the influence of neuron circuitry such as conscious and unconscious levels?

It led me to think about the degrees of neuron circuitry or motor cortex activity that is used in understanding and reasoning. Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff argued and extended about doing and imagining sharing a common substrate via the following hypothesis: The same neural substrate used in imagining is used in understanding. As for the evidence of their hypothesis-that one can imagine grasping an object without actually grasping it. From this, they say, it does not follow that actual grasping and imaginary grasping do not use a common neural substrate. One can reason about grasping without grasping; yet one may still use the same neural substrate in the sensory-motor system.

# 4.1 Automatic Unconsciousness is for DEAD METAPHORS while Consciousness is for NEW METAPHORS.

Perhaps, all neural substrate used in imagining may not be used in understanding in the same level, but rather is used in some levels of cognitive unconscious understanding. I mean, one may NOT still use the same neural

substrate in the sensory-motor system once it is used unconsciously, but used some neural substrate that has some degrees such as unconscious and conscious levels as evidenced by these following examples:

Dead metaphors have not influence,	New metaphors are influential
"Uning Jahli Chiqdi"	"U jahldan portladi"
He is angry	He exploded by embarrassment
"U yoshligida kerakli bilimni olgan"	"U yoshligida kerakli bilimni shimib olgan"
He got the necessary knowledge in	He absorbed the necessary knowledge in his
his childhood.	childhood.
"Diqqatim bo'lindi"	"Diqqatim quyon bo'ldi"
I lost my train of thought	My attention turned to be rabbit (means: run
	away)

As John F. Kihlstrom said that Automatic process consume LITTLE or NO intentional resources. [18.p.12] It means there is difference between neurons those fire when new coined metaphors are understood consciously and those are understood automatically, unconsciously. When it comes to automacity, Yoav Bar-Anan and Brian A. Nosek imply that implicit cognition is closely related to the concept of automaticity – thoughts or actions that occur spontaneously or uncontrollably. Thoughts and actions that occur automatically may occur without attention or awareness. Thoughts and actions can occur WITHOUT AWARENESS and they are efficient in that they can happen while thinking about something else. [50.p.48] In turn, these views support my guessing related to the levels of neural substrate in realizing meaning of content.

As one of the notable startling discoveries of cognitive science is a conceptual system that most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness, inaccessible to consciousness and operating too quickly to be focused on. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson also pointed out that during conversation comprehending the stream of sounds, assigning the structure of the sentence, picking out words and giving them meanings appropriate to context,

making semantic and pragmatic sense of the sentences as a whole, framing what is said in terms relevant to the discussion are done unconsciously, and it is called as a cognitive unconsciousness. They have shown experimentally that to understand even the simplest utterance, we must perform these and other incredibly complex forms of thought automatically and without noticeable effort below the level of consciousness. It is not merely that we occasionally do not notice the processes of cognitive consciousness; rather, they are inaccessible to conscious awareness and control. When we understand all that constitutes the cognitive unconscious, our understanding of the nature of consciousness is vastly enlarged. Consciousness goes way beyond mere awareness of something, beyond the mere experience of qualia (the qualitative senses of, for example, pain or color), beyond the awareness that you are aware, and beyond the multiple takes on immediate experience provided by various centers of the brain. [13.p. 142]

Daniel Kahneman described mental life by the metaphor of two agents, called System 1 and System 2, which respectively produce fast and slow thinking. He says whenever you are conscious, and perhaps even when you are not, multiple computations are going on in your brain, which maintain and update current information. The assessments are carried out automatically by System 1, and one of their functions is to determine whether extra effort is required from System 2. Daniel Kahneman divides mental life "Easy" System 1 and "Strained" System 2. (for more psychological evidences see: Daniel Kahneman, "Thinking Fast and Slow", ,2011). [6.p.25]

Consequently, it leads to a question: System 2 requires more effort from neuron circuits that fire when one is mentally strained compared to System 1 that respectively produce fast thinking or which is called cognitive ease?

As for the linguistic, not clinical, evidences I supported in this paper are used unconsciously or automatically which is called cognitive ease. In Uzbek language, following examples are used and comprehended unconsciously and without emphasizing on their semantic meaning construction:

Diqqatim qochdi

Translation word by word: My attention ran away

(Brain as a container for attention in context)

Explanation: loosing alertness

Equivalent: to loose one's head, loose someone's train of thought

Ear, information and Brain

• Qulog'ingga kiradimi?

Translation word by word: does it enter to your ear

(Brain as a container for information through ear)

Explanation: Being attentive

Equivalent: to lend one's ear to something (eg. Can you lend me your ear?)

• Xayolim qochdi/uchdi

Translation word by word: my though ran away, lifted up

(Brain as a container for thought in context)

Explanation: Being cognitive unconscious

Equivalent: to lose someone's train of thought, to loose one's head, to loose the threat of something

• O'zingga kel

Translation word by word: Come back to yourself

(Consciousness as a container in context)

Explanation: controlling emotions

Equivalent: to come to one's sense

Quloq solmoq

Translation word by word: Put an ear in

(Brain as a container that someone's ear can be put in)

Explanation: Listen by purpose in order to get the main information

Equivalent: to be all ears, to lend one's ear to something, to put out one's feelers or a feeler, to feel someone's pulse

• Og'iz solmoq

Translation word by word: Put a mouth in

(Brain as a container that someone's mouth can be put in)

Explanation: Asking something by purpose or by persuading

Equivalent: to put out one's feelers or a feeler, to feel someone's pulse

• Nazar solmoq

Translation word by word: Put a glance in

(Brain as a container that someone's glance can be put in)

Explanation: Glancing by purpose

Equivalent: to throw a glance

Eye, ear, cognation, information and Brain

• Ko'rib olmoq

Translation word by word: Take by looking

(Brain as a container that can receive some information by looking)

Explanation: Look through quickly

Equivalent: to look through, to be all eyes, to have one's eye on something or

someone

# 4.2. Dead and new metaphors supported with Neurological evidences of Abstract Concepts as well as Exploitation of the Sensory-Motor System.

One more time I am going to refer the previous question "why dead metaphors are suggested to paraphrase with some vivid new metaphor in?" My answer is: because, it can be reason to burn neurons, neuron circuitry and it gives chance to grab recipients' attention easily, because as George Orwell taught that the power of a piece of writing lies in the originality of its metaphors. 'Never use a metaphor, simile or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print,' he advised. He says: "The energy is in a fresh image, transmitted 'live' from the sender and interpreted by the receiver, bringing a release on both sides, whether of insight or inspiration. And that goes for the spoken as well as the written word – something that politicians and their speech-writers know very well. If we apply the same logic to our lives as to writing, the key question is: Am I being original, true to myself? The originality of the image creates the energy. A dying metaphor is one that isn't dead but has been worn out, only

used to avoid the effort of being original; in short, it is a cliché. 'A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead" (eg 'iron resolution') has in effect reverted to being an ordinary word and can generally be used without loss of vividness. But in between these two classes there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors which have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of inventing phrases for themselves. Examples are: "ring the changes on", "toe the line", "ride roughshod over"'... Orwell suggests that writers scan their work for such dying forms and replace them with alternative language patterns. It's not bad advice to take literally and apply to our own lives." [14.p.9]

When it comes to mental image schemas, Vittorio Gallese and Lakoff refers that the congenitally blind have mental images, and that they process them relatively normally (though a bit slower). They appear to have normal image schemas — that is, normal abilities for characterizing paths, containment, parts and wholes, centers and peripheries, and so on. Moreover, as we shall see, the visual system is integrated with the motor system, so that motor input can be used to construct "visual" mental imagery with no input from the retina. [46.p.17] Thus, we can reason our abstract concepts by basing on our bodily experiment or concrete thing as can be seen in metaphors. But, do we have exact and appropriate image schemas of abstract concepts. The reason is, it is not the internal representations of external REALITY, but it is the external representation of internal EXPERIENCE. It means each of us has our own understanding based on our gestalt experience. As argued by Lakoff and Johnson, meaning is private: Meaning is always a matter of what is meaningful and significant to a person. What an individual finds significant and what it means to him are matters of intuition, imagination, feeling, and individual experience. What some-thing means to one individual can never be fully known or communicated to anyone else. Experience is purely holistic: There is no natural structuring to our experience. Any structure that we or others place on our experience is completely artificial. Meanings have no natural structure: Meaning to an individual is a matter of his private feelings, experiences, intuitions, and values. [12.p.117] Thus, we somehow conceptualize them but can NOT imagine or visualize their appropriate universal mundane or natural image. Thus, since meaning is private and experience is purely holistic, the same neuron circuitry or the same neural substrate used in imagining is not used in understanding in this case once concepts are used UNCONSCIOUSLY or without emphasizing on their meaning construction, but there should be some levels of Motor Cortex or Neuron Circuitry which is used in this case.

In a nutshell, the same neuron circuitry or the same neural substrate used in imagining is used in understanding once it comes to mutual understanding or empathy; As G. Lakoff and M. Johnson implied that self-understanding seems prior to mutual understanding, and in some ways it is. But any really deep understanding of why we do what we do, feel what we feel, change as we change, and even believe what we believe, take us beyond ourselves. Understanding ourselves is not unlike other forms of understanding—it comes out of our constant interactions with our physical, cultural, and interpersonal environment. At a minimum, the skills required for mutual understanding are necessary even to approach self-understanding. Just as in mutual understanding we constantly search out commonalities of experience when we speak with other people, so in self-understanding we are always searching for what unifies our own diverse experiences in order to give coherence to our lives. Just as we seek out metaphors to highlight and make coherent what we have in common with someone else, so we seek out personal metaphors to highlight and make coherent our own pasts, our present activities, and our dreams, hopes, and goals as well. A large part of self- understanding is the search for appropriate personal metaphors that make sense of our lives. [12.p.108] In contrast, some of these type of psychological properties such as mutual understanding and empathy are not so ordinary experience that each person can have: here I'm inferring not autism patients but some ordinary people as can be seen everywhere today. Well, what is the reason for this? Again, it is all about the levels of neural substrate in realizing meaning of content, since meaning is private.

In addition to the general view, Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff showed the structure of the argument, and argued that first for the plausibility of an embodied theory in the case of action concepts like grasp. The argument will take the following form.

- Multimodality. We will show that the action of grasping is not amodal, nor
  even unimodal, but rather multi-modal. This will allow us to meet the
  condition that action concepts like grasp must be general.
- Functional Clusters. Multi-modality is realized in the brain through functional clusters, that is, parallel parietal-pre-motor networks. These functional clusters form high-level units — characterizing the discreteness, high-level structure, and internal relational structure required by concepts.
- Simulation. To understand the meaning of the concept grasp, one must at least be able to imagine oneself or someone else grasping an object. Imagination is mental simulation, carried out by the same functional clusters used in acting and perceiving. The conceptualization of grasping via simulation therefore requires the use of the same functional clusters used in the action and perception of grasping.
- Parameters. All actions, perceptions, and simulations make use of parameters and their values. For example, the action of reaching for an object makes use of the parameter of direction; the action of grasping an object makes use of the parameter of force. So do the concepts of reaching and grasping. Such neural parameterization is pervasive and imposes a hierarchical structure on the brain. The same parameter values that characterize the internal structure of actions and simulations of actions also characterize the internal structure of action concepts.

However, as it comes to my hypothesis is:

The structure of Abstract Conceptualizing is Unconscious

- May NOT be Multimodality: It may not be neurally enacted in the same conscious way cause of not using neural substrate that is used for both action and perception when concepts are used unconsciously. It is certainly multimodal once concepts are used consciously.
- May NOT be Functional. Clusters: The same neural structures (F4-VIP neurons) may not be active, specific actions toward objects and (F5ab-AIP neurons) may not be active in unconsciously observing.
- However, the unconsciously used abstract metaphors are not disembodied originally and they are not amodal or symbolic, but they SEEM TO BE amodal, disembodied and symbolic since they are used unconsciously which are not involved in firing of functional cluster of neurons, since they don't require mental effort.

In this fourth chapter of my dissertation paper as a central point, I mostly direct the proposal and implications of "The Brain's Concepts" [46.p.16] by Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff that does not aim to settle the clinical issues but the goal of the proposal was to follow an alternative route, that is, to provide a testable embodied theory of concepts, based on the results of research in neuroscience, neural computation, and cognitive linguistics, capable of reconciling both concrete and abstract concepts within a unified framework. Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff argued and extended about doing and imagining sharing a common substrate via the following hypothesis:

The same neural substrate used in imagining is used in understanding. As for the evidence of this hypothesis-that one can imagine grasping an object without actually grasping it. From this, it does not follow that actual grasping and imaginary grasping do not use a common neural substrate. One can reason about grasping without grasping; yet one may still use the same neural substrate in the sensory-motor system. In addition, when it comes to simulation in canonical neurons as well as the way of how various conceptual relations are realized neurally is that the action-only neurons fire only when actions are carried out. But, Rizzolatti says pre-motor area F5 also contains what are called "canonical

neurons"—grasping- related neurons that fire not only when a grasping action is carried out, but also when the subject (a monkey) sees an object that it could grasp, but doesn't. [31.p.7] Although all of the cases cited above come from studies of monkeys, there are also correlates of the same results for humans [31.p.8]. Certainly, these scientific evidences can be true, because we can imagine and reason by basing on our body; when we see someone doing something we can imagine, understand and even use the same neural substrate in the sensory-motor system, and there are hundreds of scientific evidences for their hypothesis. However, once it comes to NOT seeing someone doing something, but instead, reasoning the abstract introspection processes via metaphors cognitive unconsciously differs from cognitive consciously used metaphors. Even in the past, cognitive unconsciously used metaphors led philosophers think the language as disembodied while it is embodied. As for embodied or disembodied views, both are arguable, here I cited the implications of Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff whose view varies from old western philosophy and from Chomiskian view as well.

Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff implied that <u>MENTAL IMAGERY</u> or embodied simulation used to be thought to be "abstract" and "fanciful," far from, and independent of, the perception of real objects and actions. We now know that this is not true, that visual and motor imagery are embodied.

- 1. Embodied Visual Imagery: Some of the same parts of the brain used in seeing are used in visual imagination (imagining that you are seeing) [10.p.6]
- 2. Embodied Motor Imagery. Some of the same parts of the brain used in action are used in motor imagination (imagining that you are acting). Thus imagination is not separate in the brain from perception and action
- 3. The evidence comes from a variety of studies. For example, the time it takes to scan a visual scene is virtually identical to the time employed to scan the same scene when only imagined [41.p.18] Furthermore, and more importantly, brain imaging studies show that when we engage in imagining a visual scene, we activate regions in the brain that are normally active when

we actually perceive the same visual scene. [41.p.7] This includes areas, such as the primary visual cortex, involved in mapping low-level visual features [20.p.4]. But, since the dead abstract metaphors I supported are used unconsciously, they are free from Embodied Visual Imagery as well as Embodied Motor Imagery those include imagination which is not separate in the brain from perception and action. But, once both dead and new metaphors as well as other any kind of language units are comprehended cognitively consciously-language can be perceived embodied way! Because, there are some scientific evidences that "Motor imagery works like visual imagery. Mentally rehearsing a physical exercise has been shown to induce an increase of muscle strength comparable to that attained by a real exercise.[15.p.32] When we engage in imagining the performance of a given action, several bodily parameters behave similarly as when we actually carry out the same actions. Decety has shown that heartbeat and breathing frequency increase during motor imagery of physical exercise.[7.p.29] As in real physical exercise, they increase linearly with the increase of the imagined effort. So as I said, new coined metaphors are influential and are able to trig motor imagery that works like visual imagery whereas dead metaphors as comprehended unconsciously as can be seen in these following examples:

# • O'zingga kel

Translation word by word: Come back to yourself

(Consciousness as a container in context)

Explanation: controlling emotions

Equivalent: to come to one's sense

## • Quloq solmoq

Translation word by word: Put an ear in

(Brain as a container that someone's ear can be put in)

Explanation: Listen by purpose in order to get the main information

Equivalent: to be all ears, to lend one's ear to something, to put out one's feelers or a feeler, to feel someone's pulse.

However, all these evidences as well as simulation hypothesis of neurons show that human concept, reasoning, cognation are not disembodied, but embodied. As Lakoff and Gallese argued that concepts are neural mechanisms shaped by, and a constitutive part of, our body-brain system as it interacts in the world. The embodied brain creates an embodied mind, but I think dead metaphors are free from embodied visual imagery as well as embodied motor imagery since they are used unconsciously.

As for the simulation is ordinary and typically unconscious, and it is an important discovery that simulation takes place below the level of consciousness in virtually everything we do. Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff showed whether the schema for grasp meets the basic conditions for adequacy for action concepts, as discussed above. They say concepts are 'general' in the sense that they characterize particular instances. There is a functional cluster of neurons that fire when grasping of any kind is performed, observed, or simulated. Governing simulation, there must be a parameter structure — that is, a schema — whose firing governs the simulation of grasping, and that would fire when grasping is performed or observed.

When it comes to using abstract metaphors (concrete metaphors as well) unconsciously that is different from the functional cluster of neurons that fire when grasping is performed, observed as well as simulated, because abstract metaphors are used unconsciously rather than performing or observing. In addition, Lakoff and Gallese argues that concepts are stable and they have internal structure, for example, it contains at least an internal ordering of reaching and pre-shaping the hand, establishing contact, closing the hand, exerting force on the object, and holding the object. Grasping is also purposeful, done so as to be able to manipulate the object. However, unconsciously used abstract metaphors have not internal ordering as the concept "grasping" has. As for Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff's view concepts are meaningful, and their meaning distinguishes one from the other. Meaningfulness requires understanding. Understanding requires a capacity for simulation. The

meaningfulness of concepts derives from our capacity for simulation, which in turn derives from our sensory-motor capacities, given what we know about the embodiment of sensory and motor imagery —namely, some of the same neural substrate used for action and perception is used for simulation. When the mean of the metaphor is comprehended then the same neural substrate used for action and perception may be used once metaphors are used consciously which is different from conscious level.

So far, Lakoff and Gallese reasonably detailed neural theory for one action concept — grasping which can prove that the sensory-motor system can characterize a sensory-motor concept, not just an action or a perception, but a concept with all that that requires and it can be a powerful reply to all those theorists who have claimed over the years that concepts have to be amodal, disembodied (in our sense), and symbolic since understanding requires simulation. However, as I pointed above the unconsciously used abstract metaphors are not disembodied originally and they are not amodal or symbolic, but they SEEM TO BE amodal, disembodied and symbolic since they are used unconsciously which are not involved in firing of functional cluster of neurons, but once they are comprehended or understood in conscious way-they are then multimodal and embodied.

Lakoff and Gallese mentioned not just concrete concepts but also abstract ones such as: causation, love, and grasping idea, and they believe that these too make use of the sensory-motor system, but not in so direct a fashion.

As for Narayanan's theory; metaphorical mappings are physically realized as stable neural circuitry linking the sensory-motor system to other brain areas. Lakoff and Gallese argues that this Narayanan's theory does not mean that abstract concepts have no literal meaning at all. Indeed, they appear to have skeletal meanings that are literal — but even those skeletal meanings, they argued that make central use of some aspects of the sensory-motor system. They called such a use of the sensory-motor system "exploitation."; and they supported example from Gibb's research on the conceptualization of "love" that

includes a young woman's description of her first love experience. And they acknowledged that "love" would not be love without all this metaphorical content, because metaphorical conceptualization adds conceptual content, and with it the capacity to draw new inferences and extended emotional content. The description of the woman shows that even an abstract concept such as love gets rich conceptual content, capacities for inference, and expressibility in language via sensory-motor concepts, which, we argued above, directly use the sensory-motor system. As Lakoff and Gallese said "love" would not be love without all the metaphorical content supported by the woman, it means that just a metaphor or word "love" without content would not be love which is free from neural circuitry.

In turn, the aspect as the Exploitation of Motor Control Schemas, Lakoff and Gallese says: "Any complex coordinated action must make use of at least two brain areas — the pre-motor cortex and the motor cortex, which is separated and is linked by neural connections. The motor cortex controls individual synergies — relatively simple actions like opening and closing the fist, turning the wrist, flexing and extending the elbow, etc. The job of the pre-motor cortex is motor control: structuring such simple actions into coordinated complex actions, with the simple synergies performed just at the right time, moving in the right direction, with the right force, for the right duration. That is, the pre-motor cortex must provide a phase structure to actions and specify just the right parameter values in just the right phases. This information must be conveyed from the pre-motor to the motor cortex by neural connections activating just the right regions of the motor cortex. And of course, the same pre-motor circuitry that governs motor control for actions must govern motor control for simulated actions in our imagination." Of course these scientific evidences support the 'embodied theory'. What's more, Narayanan also (1997) has constructed dynamic neural computational models of such circuitry, including the parameters governing their operation. In doing so, he made an important discovery: The same relatively simple phase structures for bodily actions recur in case after case — sometimes in sequence, sometimes in parallel, sometimes one embedded in another. That is, complex motor control structures are combinations of the same simple motor control structures such as 1) Initial State, 2) Starting Phase Transition, 3) Pre-central State, 4) Central Phase Transition (either instantaneous, prolonged, or ongoing, 5) Post-central Stat (Post-central Options includes a) A check to see if a goal state has been achieved, An option to stop, b) An option to resume, c) An option to iterate or continue the main process), 6) Ending Phase Transition, 7) Final State. As we see the complex motor structures of neural computational models of the circuitry supported by Narayanan means the same pre-motor circuitry that governs motor control for actions must govern motor control for simulated actions in our imagination, but using abstract metaphors unconsciously rather than imagining which simulates actions is totally different from the complex motor structures supported by Narayanan.

In addition, Lakoff and Gallese argue the Container-Schema is a good case in point. The Container Schema has an interior, a boundary, an exterior, and optional portals. The concepts in and out make use of the Container Schema. In perception, the Container Schema fits or imposes an interior-boundary-exterior schema onto entities and regions of space. And a wealth of examples supported in Metaphors We Live by book; for example, a cup is a container and so is a room. The details are very different but we perceive and conceptualize both using the same general image-schema. A tube of toothpaste can be seen as a doorstop, a backscratcher, a weapon — or a container! When we see bees as swarming in the garden, we are imposing a Container Schema onto a space where there are no physical boundaries. As I supported in the second chapter of this research paper there are examples of abstract metaphors those show the brain as a container and cognitive and psychological processes are subjects or objects who stays in that brain container, leaves from it comes back to it, so these examples can be appropriate evidences to the Container Schema since those examples of abstract metaphors have an interior, a boundary, an exterior,

and optional portals, but those abstract metaphors those are used unconsciously as well as ubiquitously everyday life are free from neural circuitry until they are analyzed their logic consciously rather than using or uttering them unconsciously. If the abstract metaphors of cognitive and emotional processes are analyzed one by one rather using unconsciously they also include systems for controlling force in the body that have been studied by neuroscience since conceptual metaphors apply to force-dynamic schemas, the most common of which is the 'Causes Are Forces' metaphor, which maps forces that result in motion onto causes that result in change, (for example; diqqat jamladim, diqqat qaratdim, quloq soldim, og'izsoldim, etc.)

## 4.3 Cognitive Conscious and Unconscious levels in Semantic Power.

All in all, it is time to return to the hypotheses I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: as George Orwell said "A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically "dead".[14.p.7] Here, I want to repeat the same question again: Why dead metaphors are suggested to paraphrase with some vivid new metaphor? New metaphors those have more influence than dead metaphors those are used unconsciously, automatically. It means, dead metaphors have not influence or power, while new metaphors are influential.

Do we use the same neuron circuitry or the same neural substrate used in imagining is used in understanding when reasoning our mental and emotional experiences once we use dead abstract metaphors UNCONSCIOUSLY? Or are there any levels those should be able to show the influence of neuron circuitry such as conscious and unconscious levels?

During researching metaphors related to all introspection experiences, abstract feelings and even concrete objects (although there is not concrete object for human beings cause of his or her ability stemming from human agency and capacity) I raised those questions above related to cognitive conscious and cognitive unconscious which is called by George Lakoff and Daniel Kahnem. However, what attracted my attention and urged me to rethink about the usage

of metaphors, words, phrases and other language units was not only cognitive but semantic consciousness and unconsciousness as well. Here, I refer Rizzolatti's experiment on mirror neurons [31.p.42] that urged all other linguists, scientists to reopen some questions related to science once he said that "what we see is what we do" cause of mirror neurons. In turn, this led George Lakoff to make hypothesis about "what we understand is what we do". [46.p.28] I totally go along with their view, so I speculate that there must be some levels of understanding and realizing of meaning, content and logic those are uttered and used by some type of language units including live metaphors or dead metaphors those are called as words those can be found in dictionaries as simple and wornout words or collocations rather than dead metaphors. These levels I'm speculating are based on not just linguistic but neurological, cognitive, psychological evidences. When it comes to neurological, psychological and cognitive linguistic evidences Rizzolatti and George Lakoff, Daniel Kahnem and other scientists showed enough evidences as I mentioned above. As for Neurological evidence demands more scientific facts, thus I want to highlight some features of peripheral neurons system including efferent motor neurons and afferent sensory neurons those are responsible for adaptation and amplification and top-down and bottom-up including gestalt principle as well as neuroplasticity which encompasses neuron's depression and potentiation.

In academic dissertation, Tina Krenmayr built database of language from various registers including news, fiction, academic texts and conversation annotated for metaphor, especially she focuses specifically on metaphor identification. Furthermore, Tina Krenmayr says that in much of the world metaphors in news texts are easily accessible and play a powerful role in shaping public opinion. [43.p.83]

The same opinion is given in Media Reportage of Agriculture Biotechnology; "Metaphors play an important role in the construction of social, cultural, and political reality". [25.p.7]

Today one can see newly coined metaphors as the headlines of articles on broad newssheets, the reason for this is that journalists know the way of attracting readers' attention by reconstructing morphological and syntactic structure as coining new metaphors. Now let's look through the new coined metaphors used by New York Times press journalists on 24<sup>th</sup> October in 2015, they are followings:

- "Charlie Hebdo's Recovery From Attacks Opens New Wounds for Staff"
   (24.10.15, New York Times, By NICOLA CLARK)
- "Giving More Corporate Chiefs the Steve Jobs Treatment" (24.10.15, New York Times, By NITIN NOHRIA)
- "The Central Bank Skeptic Who Helped Give Birth to the Fed" (24.10.15, New York Times, By ROGER LOWENSTEIN)
- "Growth in the 'Gig Economy' Fuels Work Force Anxieties" (24.10.15, New York Times, By NOAM SCHEIBER)

In order to prove my hypothesis neurological fMRI experiment is required. However, recently I organized survey among 15 students on the influence of 'new and dead metaphors' (May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2016). Survey included examples of both dead and new metaphors those are supposed to be chosen as 'not interesting', 'less interesting' or 'more interesting'. Moreover, there were two more questions in the survey such as 'New metaphors make fiction book interesting' and 'It is difficult to distinguish the difference between old metaphor and ordinary word'. Results of the survey can be seen in the following table below:

More
Interesting
4
7
4
8
4

I <b>TRIED TO KNOW</b> their plan (dead)	7	6	2	
I SMELT their plan (new)	2	2	11	
She GAINED little bit knowledge at school	4	10	1	
(dead)				
She SIPPED little bit knowledge at school	1	1	13	
(new)				
I GOT ENERGY after NAPPING TIME	3	10	2	
(dead)				
I REFILLED FUEL at the NAPPING	3	2	10	
STATION (new)				
In Uzbek		f Survey P	Participants'	
	choice			
	Not	Less	More	
Aytganlarimni <b>esingdan chiqarma</b> (dead)	Interesting 9	Interesting 35	Interesting 3	
Aytganlarimni hotira diskingdan o'chirib	2	33	8	
yuborma (new)	2		O	
Judorina (new)				
Kitobdan KERAKLI MALUMOTLARNI	9	4	2	
OLDIM (dead)	9	4	2	
Kitobni QAYMOG'INI SUZIB OLDIM	2	2	11	
(new)	2	2	11	
(new)				
Diagetim OOCHDI (deed)	5	Q	2	
Diqqatim QUVON RO'L DL (naw)	5	8	2	
Diqqatim <b>QOCHDI</b> (dead) Diqqatim <b>QUYON BO'LDI</b> (new)	5 0	8 5	2 10	
Diqqatim QUYON BO'LDI (new)	0	5	10	
Diqqatim QUYON BO'LDI (new)  Qarorim QATTIQ EMAS (dead)	4	9	10	
Diqqatim QUYON BO'LDI (new)  Qarorim QATTIQ EMAS (dead)  Qarorim QOTIRILMAGAN-hali BO'SH	0	5	10	
Diqqatim QUYON BO'LDI (new)  Qarorim QATTIQ EMAS (dead)	4	9	10	
Diqqatim QUYON BO'LDI (new)  Qarorim QATTIQ EMAS (dead)  Qarorim QOTIRILMAGAN-hali BO'SH (new)	<b>4 5</b>	5 9 4	10 1 6	
Diqqatim QUYON BO'LDI (new)  Qarorim QATTIQ EMAS (dead)  Qarorim QOTIRILMAGAN-hali BO'SH	4	9	10	

Although the result is not as I expected noticeably more participants preferred the 'new metaphors' as interesting or influential compared to 'dead metaphors'. Furthermore, we can see in the following table that significantly more participants (namely 13 out of 15) think 'New metaphors make fiction book interesting' (survey question 1). However, much more survey participants (9 out of 15) believe that it is NOT difficult to distinguish the difference between old metaphor and ordinary word (survey question2).

Survey Question	Number of Survey Participants' choice				
1. New metaphors make fiction book interesting.					
a) Yes	13				
b) No	1				
c) I don't know	1				
2. It is difficult to distinguish	the difference between old metaphor and				
ordinary word.					
a) Yes	5				
b) No	9				
c) I don't know	1				

Although the results of the survey is not as I expected, much more participants preferred 'new metaphors' as interesting or influential compared to 'dead metaphors', and substantially more participants, namely 13 out of 15, believe that new metaphors make fiction book interesting.

In turn, by basing on the facts I supported above I can say that all those facts and survey results give me chance to divide 'the levels of neural substrate in realizing and understanding the meaning of content and logic' into SEMANTIC ADAPTATION level which is like cognitive unconscious level and SEMANTIC AMPLIFICATION level that is similar to cognitive conscious level. A for these two scientific terms I coined by basing on scientific neurological, psychological and linguistic bases, for example "Semantic" refers to meaning, content of any language unit and comprehension, and as for the "Adaptation" is down regulation to sensory receptor of the body which causes less or almost no action potential in contrast with "Amplification" which is upper regulation and causes much more action potential in the body in terms of neurology.

# **Conclusion of Chapter IV:**

Although language is embodied, western philosophy argued that concept or language is disembodied before cognitive linguistics, because of unconsciously used metaphors.

All of Lakoff and Gallese's discussion of abstract concepts is based on linguistic and psychological evidence and the results of computational neural modeling, combined with strong evidence from neuroscience that concrete concepts are embodied in the sensory-motor system. They have strong arguments that concrete concepts are embodied in the sensory-motor system, and extremely plausible arguments that a considerable range of abstract concepts are also embodied in the sensory-motor system. My linguistic and psychological evidences supported in this research show that abstract concepts are also embodied in the sensory-motor system once they are comprehended meticulously or consciously, but they SEEM TO BE amodal, disembodied and symbolic since they are used and accepted unconsciously or without emphasizing on their meaning construction, in turn they are not involved in firing of functional cluster of neurons and seem to be free from neural circuitry although they are not free from neural circuitry and embodied or multimodal. In turn, this requires more serious research on neural theories of abstract concepts.

The linguistic expressions, collocations I supported in this paper such as abstract metaphors those are used unconsciously are far from the traditional disembodied theory of concepts which claims that concepts of all kinds have no sensory-motor content, and thus even sentences expressing action concepts should show no activation in parietal-pre motor cortices. However, I argue that George (and Mark Johnson) as well as Gallese's embodied theory which includes parameters of force and that claims linguistic expressions of action concepts should induce action simulations, and therefore activate the appropriate parietal-premotor cortices, is right to my evidences when they are comprehended or analyzed meticulously in cognitive conscious way.

The argument of George Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese includes four central ideas that come out of neuroscience: multi-modality, functional clusters, simulation, and parameters as well as neuro-scientific results such as Visual and motor mental imagery implies sensory-motor simulation using the same brain resources as in observation and action and the next one is detailed results

concerning mirror neurons, canonical neurons, and action-location neurons. Moreover, the hypothesis of George Lakoff, Cogs which are structuring circuits in the sensory-motor system, which normally function as part of sensory-motor operations, but whose neural connections to specific details can be inhibited, allowing them to provide inferential structure to "abstract" concepts is notable in my research paper. George Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese guessed that abstract reasoning in general exploits the sensory-motor system. I think they are right when it is comprehended consciously rather unconsciously.

By the contributions of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Vittorio Gallese and other contributors, we are just at the beginning of a major revolution in our understanding of thought and language, but the misunderstandings of disembodied thought and language were the result of unconscious mind as Daniel Kahnem divided the metacognation into System 1 and System 2. And, George Lakoff and Gallese are right when they say that neither semantics nor grammar is a-modal, or neither semantics nor grammar is symbolic, in the sense of the theory of formal systems, which consists of rules for manipulating disembodied meaningless symbols, but they seem to be symbolic since they are comprehended unconsciously.

Furthermore, in this chapter I cited examples of metaphors those are being coined by press journalist, and highlighted the influence of newly coined metaphors, and I referred to Rizzoletti's experiment on mirror neurons that urged all other linguists, scientists to reopen some questions related to science once he said that "what we see is what we do" cause of mirror neurons which led George Lakoff to make hypothesis about "what we understand is what we do". In turn I presented new scientific terms in cognitive science about the levels of neural substrate in realizing and understanding the meaning of content and logic those I divided them into SEMANTIC ADAPTATION level which is like cognitive unconscious level and SEMANTIC AMPLIFICATION level that is similar to cognitive conscious level. As for these two scientific terms, I coined them by basing on scientific neurological, psychological and linguistic bases.

## **General Conclusion:**

There are various controversial views in cognitive linguistics today since the meaning construction of human language and thought are the most arguable field in science. So that, at the beginning of this dissertation paper, namely in the first chapter, I cited various Cognitive Linguistics views and theories related to cognitive linguists who gave their scientific speculations about conceptual metaphor, meaning construction, embodied and disembodied views. And, I added some linguistic views and neurological theories show the difference between the power of new and dead metaphors which can support my hypothesis related to semantic power levels I implied in the fourth chapter. As mentioned above, research on meaning construction of metaphors in English and Uzbek languages as linguistic evidence in cognitive linguistics that researching how people perceive and conceptualize their inner experiences of cognitive and psychological processes, need to be improved and advanced in order to be more aware of the reflection of the objective world in subject's mind. Since people simulate internal states similar to how they simulate external. Because, simulations of internal states could provide much of the conceptual content central to abstract concepts. Since to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. However, the scientific study of concepts has primarily focused so far on concrete concepts; we actually know remarkably little about abstract concepts, even from the perspective of traditional cognitive theories. Nevertheless, abstract concepts appear to play central roles throughout human cognition, especially in meta-cognition, social interaction, education, industry, and social institutions. Regardless of whether simulations of introspections and situations underlie the representation of abstract concepts, much more effort should be devoted to understanding. Thus, the research on metaphors those are used to reason abstract introspective concepts of cognitive and emotional experiences by the tool of metaphors should be advanced in order to be much more aware of the truth, since truth cannot exist independent of the human mind. What is interesting about the findings in this scientific paper is the semantic meaning construction of introspective metaphors those are far from objectivity but those are based upon subjective embodied capacity or human agency. For example, by the help of a number of linguistic evidences taken from "O'zbek Tilining Izohli Lug'ati" and "English Phrases and Idioms" in the second chapter I showed 'the brain' is used as if a container that personified mental and abstract emotional feelings comes into, goes out, stays in the brain container which is the permanent usual residence or orientation for them that they can stay in their appropriate place or can even come back after going out. At the same time, I classified orientational metaphors in Uzbek and English languages according to their physical spatial orientation including vertical, horizontal and transitional orientations those are the physical orientations for abstract cognitive and emotional experiences which can help to reason or construct the meaning of subjective and abstract introspective experiences by basing on concrete objects. Those linguistic evidences, I cited in this paper, can prove one more time that language and thought are subjective and embodied as Lakoff said rather than objective since we are not able to reason our subjective and abstract introspective experiences without the help of physical objects those we feel or sense through our biologic capacity.

In addition, I supported cognitive linguistic analyzes of abstract introspective feelings found in Uygun's and Robert Burns's Poems where the abstract cognitive and emotional feelings are expressed by basing on the concrete domain as personifying mostly the physical organs of human beings. In addition, in Uygun's poems we can see the clear evidence that physical organs such as 'heart, face, eye, and head' are the containers where emotions such as joy, fear, belief, concern, anxiety, love, happiness, revenge can be held.

In the last chapter, by relying on linguistic facts, survey as well as cognitive and neurological evidences, I divided semantic power levels of neural substrate in realizing and understanding the meaning of content and logic, in turn I called these levels as SEMANTIC ADAPTATION level which is like cognitive unconscious level and SEMANTIC AMPLIFICATION level that is similar to cognitive conscious level (there is not any neurological evidences in this paper that can prove my scientific hypothesis related to 'Semantic Power'. (Certainly, there are scientific evidences can be true, because we can imagine and reason by basing on our body; when we see someone doing something we can imagine, understand and even use the same neural substrate in the sensory-motor system, and there are hundreds of scientific evidences for their hypothesis. But, once it comes to NOT seeing someone doing something, but instead, reasoning the abstract introspection processes via metaphors cognitive unconsciously differs from cognitive consciously used metaphors. Even in the past, cognitive unconsciously used metaphors led philosophers think the language as disembodied while it is embodied. As for embodied or disembodied views, both are arguable, in the first and fourth chapters I cited the implications of Vittorio Gallese, George Lakoff whose view varies from old western philosophy and from Chomiskian view as well.)

However, there are surveys that can signal that my hypothesis makes sence: Although the result of the survey is not as I expected noticeably more participants preferred the 'new metaphors' as interesting or influential compared to 'dead metaphors'. Moreover, significantly more participants (namely 13 out of 15) think 'New metaphors make fiction book interesting' (survey question 1). However, much more survey participants (9 out of 15) believe that it is NOT difficult to distinguish the difference between old metaphor and ordinary word (survey question2). Perhaps, there will be some fMRI neurological experiences in the upcoming years to prove my hypothesis about 'Semantic Power'. And, in turn the results as well as examples of my research work can be used as a source in a number of fields, namely in semantics, cognitive linguistics, neurolinguistics, psycholinguistics as well as in mass media.

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	Orientational metaphors in Uzbek						
	Vetical Orientation						
	<b>↓</b> ↑						
Up/down	English: The bad news shook him up (Input information is a subject to						
	shake the recipient up)						
	<b>Uzbek:</b> Yamon habar uni kayfiyatini tushirdi (Mood is as a subject that can decrease itself)						
	<b>Translation word by word:</b> Bad News made his mood drop.						
	<b>English:</b> He went off the top (Frustration is a container to went off the						
	top)  Uzbek: Jahli Chiqdi (Brain as a container for frustration to lift from)						
	<b>Translation word by word:</b> His/her annoyance went out						
	Horizontal Orientation						
	<del></del>						
From/to							
	English: He fainted						
	Uzbek: Hushdan Ketdi (Consciousness as a container to go away from						
	it)						
	Translation word by word: He/she went away from her consciousness						
	English: She came back himself (Himself or consciousness is a						
	container that can come back come back)						
	Uzbek: Hushiga qaytdi (Consciousness is as a container that can come						
	back to)						
	Translation word by word: He came back to his consciousness						
	Transitional Orientation						
	<b>←</b>						
Through	Thought						
	English: I went through a lot during my life (Life is a container to go						
	through)						
	Uzbek: Boshimdan nelar o'tmadi (Brain as a container for cases, days						

	to go through)
	<b>Translation word by word:</b> What days didn't pass through my head?
	Cycle
	<b>★ ↑</b>
put in /take out	
Put III / III out	<b>English:</b> He threw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to
	be thrown)
	<b>Uzbek:</b> Nazar soldi (Brain is as a container that someone's glance can
	be put in)
	Translation word by word: To put a glance in
	<b>English:</b> I throw a glance (Glance, attention is a property or object to be
	thrown)
	Uzbek: Ko'rib oldim (Brain is as a container that can take some
	information by looking through eye)
	Translation word by word: Take by looking
	<b>English:</b> I drunk information in (Information is a substance or water to
	drink)
	<b>Uzbek:</b> Ahborotni tinglab oldim (Brain is as a container that can take
	some information by listening through ear)
	<b>Translation word by word:</b> I took information by listening

Orientational metaphors in English				
Vetical Orientation				
	<b>↓</b> ↑			
Up/Over/Down	<ul> <li>Up</li> <li>He blew up at me (suddenly become angry)</li> <li>The bad news cut me up (upset)</li> <li>The bad news shook me up (upset, disturb)</li> <li>He make up his mind about the plan (to take a decision)</li> <li>Where did you pick up your French? (to learn)</li> <li>I've read this concept up already (Acquire knowledge and information through reading)</li> <li>I put up her feelers (to test the opinion of others by listening carefully or by asking questions so as to know how to act)</li> <li>Experiencing up and downs of the life</li> <li>Over</li> <li>the news bowled me over (greatly astonish)</li> <li>I'm raptures over my iPod (to be extremely delighted, to be very enthusiastic)</li> <li>I got over my old boyfriend (stop being emotionally involved with)</li> <li>We should think the plan over before decision (consider carefully)</li> </ul>			
	<ul> <li>Down</li> <li>The bad news got me down (depressed)</li> <li>After daydreaming she came down to earth (to return to reality, to give up plans ad ideas which can not be realized)</li> <li>Experiencing up and downs of the life She is down in the mouth (to be in a low spirit, depressed)</li> </ul>			
Horizontal Orientation				
Into/ to/round	<ul> <li>Into</li> <li>She flied into a rage (become angry)</li> <li>He came into fortune (to inherit a lot of money)</li> <li>He brought the note into my mind (to recall something to one's mind)</li> </ul>			

- The novelty came to nothing/little (to be uninteresting, unimportant)
  The CEO of the company got into hot water
  He came to after being fainted (regain consciousness)
  She came to her sense (to act or react normally after being
  - To my mind, it is good idea (, I think, in my opinion)
  - I called the fixed schedule to mind (to recall something to one's mind)
  - I don't know if I'm **coming** or **going** (to be in a state of confusion, disorder, crazy)

#### Round

foolish)

• He came round after being fainted (regain consciousness)

## Out /Off /Away

#### Out

- She **burst out** cause of being tired of complaints (exclaim suddenly)
- He **is out** of her mind/senses (to be mad)
- To **be out** of one's mind (to be mad, crazy)
- We should **think out** our plan (work out by careful reasoning)
- I'm **out** for all I can (aim, at getting)
- Out of sight, out of mind (people whom we don not see often are soon forgotten)

#### Off

- I **flied off** the handle (suddenly become angry)
- I went off the top(suddenly become angry)
- While I was speaking her, she had been **dropped off** (fall asleep)
- While I was speaking her, she had been **nodded off** (fall asleep)
- I'm **going off** the coffee (loose one's liking or taste for)
- My enthusiasm for creative writing has **worn off** (loose in attraction, power, interest)
- Men with fake smile turned **me off** (cause to loose interest)
- I'm off the rails (to be in a state of confusion, disorder, crazy)
- She **is off** her rocker (to be crazy)
- Now teenagers are/went off their head (to be become mad)
- This guy **went off** his head (to become very excited and act in crazy way)
- The pop star **flied off** the handle after paparazzo's attitude (to become ferious, to loose one's self control)
- He went off at a tangent (To loose the main point)
- He **flied off** at a tangent (To loose the main point)
- Music helps to take my **mind off** my troubles (to divert one's attention from something unpleasant)

#### Away

• My imagination is **running away** with me (control direct:

imagination, temper, feelings, etc)					
Transitional Orientation					
	<b>←</b>				
Through He went through a lot during his life (suffer pain, hardship)					
On, In Orientation					
On In					
On	<ul> <li>I have my eye on coding computer programs (to want or desire something)</li> <li>She is on her last legs (to be in a bad state after collapse, to be very ill, about to die)</li> <li>He is on velvet (to be in a favorable state)</li> <li>It is noisy here; I can't keep my mind on this issue (to concentrate on it)</li> <li>I have an idea on my brain (to think constantly about something)</li> <li>She had something on her mind (to be worried about something and think about it often)</li> <li>Have you fixed on a date for the party yet? (decide on choose)</li> <li>Have you settled on a date for the party yet? (decide on choose)</li> </ul>				
In	<ul> <li>I'm in a temper (become angry)</li> <li>I was in a flutter once I broke the glass (to be in a state of nervous excitement because of small unexpected difficulty)</li> <li>She is in a stew because of crises (to be nervous because of difficulty)</li> <li>I'm in a whirl (to be confused, to be excited)</li> <li>He is in a temper (to be in a bad temper)</li> <li>He is in the heaven (to be happy)</li> <li>I'm in the doldrums (to be in a low spirit, depressed)</li> <li>He is down in the dumps(to be depressed)</li> <li>She is down in the mouth (to be in a low spirit, depressed)</li> <li>Soccer is not much in my line (to interest)</li> <li>he is in deep/hot water (to be in difficulty)</li> <li>I'm in the soup (to be in difficulty)</li> <li>I am in a tight squeeze (to be in difficulty)</li> <li>To be not in one's mind (to be mad, crazy)</li> <li>You should put her in mind of her promise; otherwise she'd have forgotten it (to cause someone to remember something)</li> <li>I keep it in my mind (to remember)</li> </ul>				

•	I bear it in my mind (to remember)
•	She <b>is in</b> the clouds (to day dream, to think unrealistically)
•	My plan is in the ear (to be uncertain, to be not definite)
•	I'm <b>in</b> two minds about to put my plan into action (not to be sure, unable to decide)
•	<b>In my</b> mind's eye I can still see the look of my mother's face (in one's imagination)
•	In my opinion, it is good idea (I think)
•	Although you taught about it, it hasn't <b>sunk in</b> (be understood fully)
•	Although you taught about it, I can not <b>take in</b> what you meant (understand)
•	She drinks all gossips in (listen eagerly)

# Ilova № 3

Input (Receptive Process)	Output (Productive Process)
Ear, information and Brain	Mouth, information and Brain
English: He doesn't lend her ear to me (Ear,	English: I made a slip of the tongue (Tongue

concentration is a property or object that can
be given)

Uzbek: Og'izimdan chiqib ketdi (Brain is as
a container for information goes through
mouth)

Translation word by word: does it enter
into your ear?

is a property or object to make a slip)

Uzbek: Og'izimdan chiqib ketdi (Brain is as
a container for information goes through
mouth)

Translation word by word: It slipped from
my mouth

#### Ilova № 4

Take	Put, (place in)				
Eye, ear, cognation, information and	Ear, information and Brain				
Brain	English: I'm all ears				
English: I throw a glance (Glance, attention	Uzbek: Quloq soldim (Brain is as a				
is a property or object to throw)	container that someone's ear can be put in)				
Uzbek: Ko'rib oldim (Brain is as a container	Translation word by word: To put an ear in				
that can take some information by looking					
through eye)	English: He threw a glanc e(Glance,				
<b>Translation word by word:</b> Take by looking	attention is a property or object to throw)				
	Uzbek: Nazar soldi (Brain is as a container				
English: I drunk information in (Information	that someone's glance can be put in)				
is a substance or water to drink)	Translation word by word: To put a glance				
Uzbek: Ahborotni tinglab oldim (Brain is as	in				
a container that can take some information by					
listening through ear)					
Translation word by word: Take by					
listening					

## Ilova № 5

	<b>Cognitive mental Process</b>					<b>Emotional feeling</b>
tio	Diqqatim qochdi (subject)	act	on	an		Jahli Chiqdi (subject)
Atteni	Diqqat qaratdim (object)	Abstra	emoti	Annoy	e	Jahildan Tushdi ( <b>subject</b> )

		Diqqat jamladim (object)				Kayfiyat Ko'tarildi
						(subject)
		Diqqatim tarqaldi (object)		Mood		Kayfiyat Tushdi (subject)
		Diqqat bo'linmoq/buzulmoq				Ilhomim/Ihlosim/Havasim
		(object)		tion		Keldi (subject)
				Inspiration		Ilhomim/Ihlosim/Havasim
		Qulog'inga Kiradimi		Ins		qaytdi/qochdi (subject)
	er	(subject)		)(		Hovotir bosdi (subject)
SO	Enter			Conc	ern	Hovotir tarqadi (subject)
Information channels of cognation with specific verbs		Og'zingni ochma (object)		ir		Ko'rgim/kulgim/nimanidir
cific		Og'iz ochma (object)	Desir	e	qilgim keldi ( <b>subject</b> )	
sbe	ue	Og'izimdan chiqib ketdi				Uyqum Keldi (subject)
with	Open	(subject)				
ion		Quloq solmoq (object)				Uyqum qochdi (subject)
gnat		Og'iz solmoq (object)				Uyquga ketayapdi
f cog	in			d		(subject)
els o	Put in	Nazar solmoq (object)	sleep	slee		Uyqudan turdi (subject)
ann		Ko'rib olmoq (object)	<del></del>	io		Tushkunlikka tushmoq
n ch	ıţ	Tinglab Olmoq (object)		Depressio		Tushkunlikdan Chiqmoq
atio	ake out			Dep	n	(subject)
form	Tak	Bilim/tanib olmoq (object)				Boshimga ne kunlar
Ini		Habar/Bilm/Malumot olmoq				tushmadi ( <b>subject</b> )
		(object)		ling		
		Habar/Bilm/Malumot bermoq		Bad feeling		Boshimdan nelar o'tmadi
		(object)		Bad		(subject)
d su	1	Tushunib Yetibsan (object)		1		
Comp	ion	Tushunmay qolibsan (object)				
a) =		Fikr yuritayapman (object)				
nitive as an						
cogn e is a		Fikrga Keldim (container)				
act ienc		Fikrimdan qaytdim				
Abstract cognitive experience is as an		(container)				
e A		Fikrda to'htadim (container)				

		Fikr keldi (subject)
		Hayolimga nelar kelmdi
		(subject)
		Hayolimdan nelar o'tmadi
		(subject)
		Hayol Surmoq (object)
		Hayolim Qochdi/Uchdi
	Mind Thought	(subject)
		Hayolim u tamon ketdi
		(subject)
		Aqlimni oldi (object)
		Aqlimni o'g'irladi ( <b>object</b> )
		Tasavvurga sig'dira olishlik
	Imagination	
		(object)  Tessyrange sig'dire elmeslik
		Tasavvurga sigʻdira olmaslik
		(object)
	Consciousness Mind	Aqlim Ketdi (subject)
		Aqlim Kirdi (subject)
		Aqlinga kelbsan (container)
		Hushim Ketdi (subject)
)ject		Hushi qaytdi (subject)
ın ok		Hushdan Ketdi (subject)
e is as aı		Hushiga qaytdi (subject)
		O'zingdan Ketma (container)
rien	Memory	O'zinga Kel (container)
xpe		Esimdan Chiqdi/ko'tarilibdi
ive e		(subject)
Abstract cognitive experience is as an object		Esiga Tushdi/Keldi
		(container)
		Esimda qolmadi ( <b>subject</b> )
		Esi/Hushi joyida (container)