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Pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse

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QUALIFICATION PAPER

**“THE QUALIFICATION PAPER
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Contents

Introduction	3
1.0 Chapter I. The survey of the linguistic literature on the problems of modality in Present Day English	6
1.1 The problems of classifying the speech act theory in pragmalinguistics	6
1.2 On the problems of grammatical categories of the verb in Present Day English	15
1.3 Theoretical study of modality in Modern English	24
2.0 Chapter II. The analysis of pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse	28
2.1 Semantic analysis of modal words used in English discourse	28
2.2 The pragmalinguistic analysis of modal words in English discourse	33
2.3 Pragmalinguistic analysis of different means of expressing modality in English discourse	41
3.0 Chapter III. Aspects of teaching modal words in EFL	53
3.1 On the problems of interrelation methods of FLT to other sciences	53
3.2 Pragmalinguistic explanations of the acquisition of modality in early language learning	60
Conclusion	68
Bibliography	71

Introduction

The Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On Further Improving language learning in the Republic” PR №1875 Issued in December, 2012 has obliged educational boards to ensure that school-leavers master a foreign language as a means of communication in two forms – oral and written, therefore proficiency in speaking and reading are the desired skills.

The programs and plans of teaching are re-considered to apply the requirement of CEFR – Common European Framework of Reference¹.

The qualification paper is dedicated to the study of the pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse which presents a certain interest both for theoretical investigation and for practical usage. We have the full basis to approve that many linguists have brought the invaluable contribution to studying various properties of the modal words (in more detail see L.S. Barkhudarov, M.Y. Blokh, G.G. Pocheptsov, A.I. Smirnitsky, Ch. Fillmore, W. Chafe, A. Khudyakov, B.V. Reznik, E.S. Kubrjakova, Ch. Hockett’ works and etc.), that has created necessary theoretical preconditions for describing the semantics of modality. Also I looked through the works written by the scholars of our university like M. Iriskulov, A. Sadikov, T. Ikramov, M. Rasulova, A. Kuldashev, B. Juraev, I. Ibrogimhodjaev and T. Madrahimov.

The **topicality** of the investigation is expressed by the profound interest in learning the modal words, on the other hand by giving a detailed analysis of pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse.

The **aim** of this research is a detailed study of the pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse.

According to this general aim the following particular **tasks** are put forward:

1. To survey of the linguistic literature on the problems of modality and problems of classifying the speech act theory in pragmalinguistics in Present Day English.

¹ Chet tillarni o’rganishning ta’lim standarti. Tashkent, 2013, p. 3

2. To study the problems of grammatical categories of the verb in Present Day English.

3. To describe the contextual semantics of the modality in Modern English.

4. To analyse the semantic features of modal words used in English discourse.

5. To analyse pragmalinguistic properties of modal words in English discourse.

6. To analyse pragmalinguistic features of different means of expressing modality in English discourse.

7. To describe different aspects of teaching modal words in EFL.

The **object** of given investigation is the modal words and the different structural types of the sentences with modal words.

The **subject** is the pragmalinguistic, structural-semantic and functional-contextual features of modal words in English discourse.

The **methods** of investigation used in this research are the complex approach to the study of the sentences with the modal words, including pragmalinguistic, morphological, structural, distributional way of analysis of the English language unit.

Methodological basis of research is Decree of the President of Republic of Uzbekistan about development of languages, education and science, the national programme on a professional training, and also basic researches in the field of the theory of linguistics, in particular Theoretical Grammar of English and Comparative Typology of English and Russian Languages.

The **novelty** of work is determined by the analysis of the works of leading scholars, concrete results of investigation, and the problems and specificity of the linguistic status of the modal words used in different context.

Theoretical value is that it can serve as a basis for studying the contextual-semantics of the modal words. It will allow understanding the importance of studying pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse, which are most of widely formed with the help of the contextual properties.

Practical value of this work is that the theoretical statement of this paper can be used in delivering lectures and seminars on theoretical grammar, general linguistics, typology, and methodology of Teaching English.

The **material** includes textbooks, monographs, articles, written by the leading scholars and internet websites with corresponding headings and data-base.

The **structure** of the work – the given qualification paper consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a bibliography.

1.0 Chapter I. The survey of the linguistic literature on the problems of modality in Present Day English

1.1 The problems of classifying the speech act theory in pragmalinguistics

The term '**pragmatics**' was first introduced by Charles Morris, a philosopher. He contrasts pragmatics with semantics and syntax. He claims that *syntax* is the study of the grammatical relations of linguistic units to one another and the grammatical structures of phrases and sentences that result from these grammatical relation, *semantics* is the study of the relation of linguistic units to the objects they denote, and *pragmatics* is the study of the relation of linguistic units to people who communicate.² This view of pragmatics is too broad because according to it, pragmatics may have as its domain any human activity involving language, and this includes almost all human activities, from baseball to the stock market³.

In our everyday life we as a rule perform or play quite a lot of different roles - *a student, a friend, a daughter, a son, a client*, etc. When playing different roles our language means are not the same - we choose different words and expressions suitable and appropriate for the situation. We use the language as an instrument for our purposes. For instance, (a) *What are you doing here? We're talking*; (b) *What the hell are you doing here? We're chewing the rag* have the same **referential** meaning however their **pragmatic** meaning is different, they are used in different contexts. Similarly, each utterance combines a **propositional base** (objective part) with the **pragmatic component** (subjective part). It follows that an utterance with the same propositional content may have different pragmatic components:

<i>It's hot</i>		just mentioning of the fact
		explanation
		excuse
		inducement to do something about it
		menace


To put it in other words, they are different **speech acts**. That is, speech acts are simply things people do through language - for example, apologizing, instructing, menacing, explaining something, etc. The term 'speech act' was coined

² Iriskulov M.A. Kuldashv A.M. Theoretical Grammar of the English Language. Tashkent, 2008, 208 pages

³ Francis W. N.. The Structure of American English. New York, 2008, 450 p.

by the philosopher John Austin and developed by another philosopher John Searle. John Austin is the person who is usually credited with generating interest in what has since come to be known as pragmatics and speech act theory. His ideas of language were set out in a series of lectures which he gave at Oxford University. These lectures were later published under the title "How to do things with words". His first step was to show that some utterances are not statements or questions however actions. He reached this conclusion through an analysis of what he termed '**performative verbs**'⁴. Let us consider the following sentences:

I pronounce you man and wife. I declare war on France.
 I name this ship The Albatros. I bet you 5 dollars it will rain.
 I apologize.



The peculiar thing about these sentences, according to J. Austin, is that they are not used to say or describe things, however rather actively to do things. After you have declared war on France or pronounced somebody husband and wife the situation has changed. That is why J. Austin termed them as **performatives** and contrasted them to statements (he called them *constatives*). Thus by pronouncing a performative utterance the speaker is performing an action. The performative utterance, however, can really change things only under certain circumstances. J. Austin specified the circumstances required for their success as **felicity conditions**. In order to declare war you must be someone who has the right to do it. Only a priest (or a person with corresponding power) can make a couple a husband ad wife. Besides, it must be done before witnesses and the couple getting married must sign the register. Performatives may be **explicit** and **implicit**. Let us compare

⁴ Francis W. N.. The Structure of American English. New York, 2008, 450p.

the sentences: *I promise I will come tomorrow - I will come tomorrow; I swear I love you - I love you.*

On any occasion the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of three related acts (a three-fold distinction): **locutionary act** - producing a meaningful linguistic expression, uttering a sentence. If you have difficulty with actually forming the sounds and words to create a meaningful utterance (because you are a foreigner or tongue-tied) then you might fail to produce a locutionary act: it often happens when we learn a foreign language; **illocutionary act** - we form an utterance with some kind of function on mind, with a definite communicative intention or illocutionary force. The notion of illocutionary force is basic for pragmatics; **perlocutionary act** - the effect the utterance has on the hearer. Perlocutionary effect may be verbal or non-verbal. E.g. *I've bought a car - Great! It's cold here - and you close the window.* It was John Searle, who studied under J. Austin at Oxford, who proposed a detailed classification of speech acts. His speech act classification has had a great impact on linguistics⁵. It includes five major classes of speech acts: declarations, representatives, expressives, directives and commissives:

Speech act type	Direction of fit	s - speaker, x - situation
Declarations <i>I pronounce you man and wife. You're fired</i>	words change the world	S causes X
Representatives <i>It was a warm sunny day. John is a liar.</i>	make words fit the world	S believes X
Expressives <i>I'm really sorry. Happy birthday! (statements of pleasure, joy, sorrow, etc.)</i>	make words fit the world	S feels X
Directives <i>Don't touch that (commands, orders, suggestions)</i>	make the world fit words	S wants X
Commissives <i>I'll be back (promises, threats, pledges - what we intend to do)</i>	make the world fit words	S intends X

J. Searle can also be merited for introducing a theory of indirect speech acts.

Indirect speech acts are cases in which one speech act is performed indirectly, by way of performing another: *Can you pass me the salt?* Though the sentence is interrogative, it is conventionally used to mark a request - we cannot just answer

⁵ Бархударов Л.С., Штелинг Д.А. Грамматика английского языка. М., 1965, 580 р

"yes" or "no". According to modern point of view such utterances contain two illocutionary forces, with one of them dominating.

Another classification of speech acts was introduced by G. Potcheptsov. It is based on purely linguistic principles. The main criterion for pragmatic classification of utterances is the way of expressing communicative intention. This classification includes six basic speech acts: *constatives*, *promissives*, *menaces*, *performatives*, *directives* and *questions*. Text as a unit of the highest level manifests itself as discourse in verbal communication. Therefore actual text in use may be defined as discourse. Discourses are formed by sequence of utterances. It is obvious that many utterances taken by themselves are ambiguous. They can become clear only within a discourse⁶.

Utterances interpretation, or *discourse analysis*, involves a variety of processes, grammatical and pragmatic. By pragmatic processes we mean the processes used to bridge up the gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the interpretation of utterances in context. Quite often, the sentence may be ambiguous: *His soup isn't hot enough*. The hearer must not only recover the semantic representation of the sentence uttered, however decide who the referential expression *he* refers to, whether the ambiguous word *hot* means *very warm* or *spicy*, whether the vague expression *his food* refers to the food he cooked, the food he brought, the food he served, the food he is eating, etc. Besides, utterances have not only propositional content however illocutionary force, and ambiguities may arise at this level: *You're not leaving*. The hearer must not only recover its explicit propositional content, however also decide whether it is a statement, a question or an order. Furthermore, utterances have not only explicit content however also implicit import: *A: Would you like some coffee? B: Coffee would keep me awake*. The hearer (A) must recover the implication that B does not want any coffee (or, in some circumstances, that he does).


Understanding the meaning of a discourse requires knowing a lot of things. There are times when people say (or write) exactly what they mean, however

⁶ Fries Ch. The Structure of English. 2010, 3rd Ed., 248 p

generally they are not totally explicit. They manage to convey far more than their words mean, or even something quite different from the meaning of their words. It was Paul Grice who attempted to explain how, by means of shared rules or conventions, language users manage to understand one another. He introduced guidelines necessary for the efficient and effective conversation. He defined these guidelines as Cooperative Principle. **Cooperative Principle** presupposes that conversation is governed by four basic rules, **Maxims of Conversation**.⁷ There are four of them:

1. **The Maxim of Quality:** Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say for what you lack adequate evidence.
2. **The Maxim of Quantity:** Make your contribution as informative as required. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
3. **The Maxim of Relevance:** Be relevant.
4. **The Maxim of Manner:** Be clear. Be orderly.

THE PROBLEMS OF CLASSIFYING THE SPEECH ACTS IN PRAGMALINGUISTICS



Communicative maxims make it possible to generate inferences which are defined as *conversational implicatures* and *conventional implicatures*. Conversational implicatures are such components of an utterance that are not expressed semantically however are understood by communicants in the process of communication: *Was it you who broke the cup?* This question presupposes: *Someone has broken the cup*. If you did not do that your normal reaction would be: *What cup?*, while the answer *I didn't do that* shows that you know about the fact.

⁷ Blokh M. Ya. Theoretical English Grammar. Moscow, 2007, 350 p

Conversational implicatures are universal, they do not depend on the language used. The second type of implicatures, conventional implicatures, are derived from a definite lexical or grammatical structure of an utterance: *I saw only John* (conventional implicature – *I didn't see anyone else*), *Even Bill is smarter than you* (*Everybody is smarter than John, John is stupid*). Both kinds of implicatures are of great interest for discourse analysis.⁸ When there is a mismatch between the expressed meaning and the implied meaning we deal with indirectness. Indirectness is a universal phenomenon: it occurs in all natural languages. Let us see how conversational implicatures arise from Maxims of Conversation and thus create indirectness.

A) In the following example Polonius is talking to Hamlet:

Polonius: *What do you read, My Lord?*

Hamlet: *Words, words, words.*

In this dialogue Hamlet deliberately gives less information than is required by the situation and so flouts the Maxim of Quantity. At the same time he deliberately fails to help Polonius to achieve his goals, thereby flouting the Maxim of Relevance. The Maxim of Quantity is also flouted when we say: *Law is law, woman is woman, students are students*. This makes us look for what these utterances really mean.

B) In the utterance *You're being too smart!* the Maxim of Quality is flouted and the hearer is made to look for a covert sense. Similarly, the same maxim is flouted with metaphors. If I say: *He is made of iron*, I am either non-cooperative or I want to convey something different.

C) The Maxim of Relevance can also be responsible for producing a wide range of standard implicatures:

A: *Can you tell me the time?*

B: *The bell has gone.*

It is only on the basis of assuming the relevance of B's response that we can understand it as an answer to A's question D. A number of different kinds of inference arise if we assume that the Maxim of Manner is being observed. The

⁸ Бархударов Л.С., Штелинг Д.А. Грамматика английского языка. М., 1965, 580 p

utterance *The lone ranger rode into the sunset and jumped on his horse* violates our expectation that events are recounted in the order in which they happen because the Maxim of Manner is flouted. One more explanation of the fact why people are so often indirect in conveying what they mean was put forward by Geoffrey Leech in his book "Principles of Pragmatics". He introduces the Politeness Principle which runs as follows: Minimize the expression of impolite beliefs; Maximize the expression of polite beliefs. According to G. Leech, the **Politeness Principle** is as valid as Cooperative Principle because it helps to explain why people do not always observe Maxims of Conversation. Quite often we are indirect in what we say because we want to minimize the expression of impoliteness:

A: *Would you like to go to the theatre?* B: *I have an exam tomorrow.*

B is saying 'no', however indirectly, in order to be polite.

An important means of accounting for the function of language in context, developed within the philosophy of language, is speech act theory. The first writer on this topic was the British philosopher J.L. Austin, whose Harvard lectures were published in a book entitled *How to Do Things with Words*. Austin's student, the American philosopher John Searle, has carried on his work, first in a book entitled *Speech Acts* and in subsequent work. Linguists have utilized speech act theory in the area of pragmatic analysis; however it has also been applied to literary texts⁹. They observe that – contrary to the position of logicians – not all utterances have “truth value”. He thus makes a fundamental distinction between “constatives”, which are assertions which are either true or false, and “performatives”, which cannot be characterized as either true or false, however are, in Austin's terms, “*felicitous*” (happy) or “*infelicitous*” (unhappy). These are utterances by which the speaker carries out an action, hence the term *speech act*. Examples of performatives are utterances such as the following:

Today I name a new chairman of the Joint Chiefs...

I refuse to believe that my father would make such a deal with you.

9 Quirk R., Greenbaum S., Leech G., Svartvik J. A Grammar of Contemporary English. Lnd., 1972, 1040 p

... we authorize the use of force for certain specified purposes...

I promise you that America will get stronger and more united, more prosperous, more secure.

I congratulate you for a fine campaign.

I bet you a million dollars they're on auto pilot.

I swear it wasn't me.

Simply by uttering each of these statements, the speaker performs an action, such as naming, authorizing, promising, congratulating, and betting. These actions require no further action other than the linguistic action in order to be what they are. As in the examples given, speech acts may contain an explicit performative verb, which is normally first person and simple present tense (i.e. *I name, I congratulate, I promise, I bet*, and so on). Performatives can occur with "hereby", as in the sentence *We hereby promise that we shall accomplish the task entrusted to our care to the utmost of our abilities*. Searle rejects Austin's distinction between constative and performative, interpreting all utterances as performatives, even those which we might understand as representing a state of affairs and hence true or false, for example, *It is raining*. He categorizes such a speech act as a representative. Before looking at his categorization, however, we will consider how he analyzes speech acts and the bases he uses for his taxonomy. The transformational grammar was first suggested by American scholar Zellig Harris as a method of analyzing sentences and was later elaborated by another American scholar Noam Chomsky as a synthetic method of 'generating' (constructing) sentences. The main point of the Transformational-Generative Grammar is that the endless variety of sentences in a language can be reduced to a finite number of kernels by means of transformations. These kernels serve the basis for generating sentences by means of syntactic processes. Different language analysts recognize the existence of different number of kernels. The following 6 kernels are commonly associated with the English language:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| (1) NV - <i>John sings.</i> | (2) NV Adj. - <i>John is happy.</i> |
| (3) NVN - <i>John is a man.</i> | (4) NVN - <i>John hit the man.</i> |

(5) NVNN -*John gave the man a book.*

(6) NVPrep.N - *The book is on the table.*

Constructional analysis of syntactic units was initiated by Prof. G. Pocheptsov in his book published in Kyiv in 1971. This analysis deals with the constructional significance/insignificance of a part of the sentence for the whole syntactic unit. The theory is based on the obligatory or optional environment of syntactic elements. For example, the element *him* in the sentence *I saw him there yesterday* is constructionally significant because it is impossible to omit it. At the same time the elements *there* and *yesterday* are constructionally insignificant - they can be omitted *without* destroying the whole structure. It is primarily concerned with the analysis of utterances from the point of their *communicative value and informative structure*. It deals with the actual division of the utterance - the theme and rheme analysis. Both the theme and the rheme constitute the informative structure of utterances. The theme is something that is known already while the rheme represents some new information¹⁰. Depending on the contextual informative value any sentence element can act as the theme or the rheme:

Who is at home? - John is at home. Where is John? - John is at home.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMALINGUISTICS

Meaning is conceptualisation
There is difference between real world and conceptualised world
There is no direct correspondence between these two worlds
The Cognitive theory of language describes only the organisation of this conceptualised world
Polysemy is fundamental way of meaning creation
The distinction between pragmatics and semantics is negligible
Lexical and encyclopaedic meaning are unseparable

Pragmatic approach to the study of syntactic units can briefly be described

¹⁰ Ilyish B.A. The structure of Modern English. M.-L., 1971, 380 p

as the study of the way language is used in particular contexts to achieve particular goals. Speech Act Theory was first introduced by John Austin. The notion of a speech act presupposes that an utterance can be said with different intentions or purposes and therefore can influence the speaker and situation in different ways:

	I just state the fact;
	I want you to do something about it (close the window);
<i>It's cold here</i>	I'm treating you;
	I'm seeking for an excuse for not doing something;
	I want you to feel guilty of it.

Accordingly, we can distinguish different speech acts. Of special interest here is the problem of indirect speech acts: *Are you leaving already?* In our everyday activities we use indirect speech acts rather willingly because it is the best way to influence people, to get what we want and to be polite at the same time. *Text linguistics* studies the text as a syntactic unit, its main features and peculiarities, different ways of its analysis. *Discourse analysis* focuses on the study of language use with reference to the social and psychological factors that influence communication.

1.2 On the problems of grammatical categories of the verb in Present Day English

Grammatically the verb is the most complex part of speech. This is due to the central role it performs in the expression of the predicative functions of the sentence, i.e. the functions establishing the connection between the situation (situational event) named in the utterance and reality. The complexity of the verb is inherent not only in the intricate structure of its grammatical categories, however also in its various subclass divisions, as well as in its falling into two sets of forms profoundly different from each other: the finite set and the non-finite set.

The complicated character of the grammatical and lexico-grammatical structure of the verb has given rise to much dispute and controversy. However, the application of the principles of systemic linguistic analysis to the study of this interesting sphere of language helps overcome many essential-difficulties in its theoretical description, and also a number of terminological disagreements among

the scholars. This refers in particular to the fundamental relations between the categories of tense and aspect, which have aroused of late very heated disputes.

The general categorial meaning of the verb is process presented dynamically, i.e. developing in time. This general processual meaning is embedded in the semantics of all the verbs, including those that denote states, forms of existence, types of attitude, evaluations, etc., rather than actions. Cf.: Edgar's room led out of the wall without a door. She had herself a liking for richness and excess. It was all over the morning papers. That's what I'm afraid of. I do love you, really I do. And this holds true not only about the finite verb, however also about the non-finite verb. The processual semantic character of the verbal lexeme even in the non-finite form is proved by the fact that in all its forms it is modified by the adverb and, with the transitive verb, it takes a direct object.

Mr. Brown received the visitor instantly, which was unusual. — Mr. Brown's receiving the visitor instantly was unusual. — It was unusual for Mr. Brown to receive the visitor instantly. However: An instant reception of the visitor was unusual for Mr. Brown.

The processual categorial meaning of the notional verb determines its characteristic combination with a noun expressing both the doer of the action (its subject) and, in cases of the objective verb, the recipient of the action (its object); it also determines its combination with an adverb as the modifier of the action.

In the sentence the finite verb invariably performs the function of the verb-predicate, expressing the processual categorial features of predication, i.e. time, aspect, voice, and mood.

The non-finite verb performs different functions according to its intermediary nature (those of the syntactic subject, object, adverbial modifier, attributive), however its non-processual functions are always actualised in close combination with its processual semantic features. This is especially evident in demonstrative correlations of the "sentence — phrase" type. His rejecting the proposal surprised us.— That he had rejected the proposal surprised us. Taking this

into consideration, her attitude can be understood. — If one takes this into consideration, her attitude can be understood.

In other words, the non-finite forms of the verb in self-dependent use (i.e. if they are used not as parts of the analytical verb-forms) perform a potentially predicative function, constituting secondary predicative centres in the sentence. In each case of such use they refer to some subject which is expressed either explicitly or implicitly.

Roddy cared enough about his mother to want to make amends for Arabella. → Roddy wanted to make amends... → Roddy will make amends...
Changing gear, the taxi turned the sharp corner. → The taxi changed gear and turned the corner. Acting as mate is often more difficult than acting as captain. → One acts as mate; one acts as captain.¹¹ From the point of view of their outward structure, verbs are characterised by specific forms of word-building, as well as by the formal features expressing the corresponding grammatical categories.

The verb stems may be simple, sound-replacive, stress-replacive, expanded, composite, and phrasal.

The original simple verb stems are not numerous. Cf. such verbs as go, take, read, etc. However conversion (zero-suffixation) as means of derivation, especially conversion of the "noun — verb" type, greatly enlarges the simple stem set of verbs, since it is one of the most productive ways of forming verb lexemes in modern English. Cf.: *a cloud — to cloud, a house — to house; a man — to man; a park — to park*, etc. The sound-replacive type of derivation and the stress-replacive type of derivation are unproductive: *to feed, blood — to bleed; 'import — to im'port, 'transport — to trans'port*.

The typical suffixes expanding the stem of the verb are: -ate (cultivate), -en (broaden), -ify (clarify), -ise(-ize) (normalise). The verb-deriving prefixes of the inter-class type are: be- (belittle, befriend, bemoan) and en-/em- (engulf, embed). Some other characteristic verbal prefixes are: re- (remake), under- (undergo), over- (overestimate), sub- (submerge), mis- (misunderstand), un- (undo), etc.

¹¹ Khaimovich.B.S, Rogovskaya B. "A course in English Grammar", Moscow,1967.p235

The composite (compound) verb stems correspond to the composite non-verb stems from which they are etymologically derived. Here belong the compounds of the conversion type (blackmail n. — blackmail v.) and of the reduction type (proof-reader n.—proof-read v.).

The phrasal verb stems occupy an intermediary position between analytical forms of the verb and syntactic word combinations. Among such stems two specific constructions should be mentioned. The first is a combination of the head-verb have, give, take, and occasionally some others with a noun; the combination has as its equivalent an ordinary verb to have a smoke — to smoke; to give a smile — to smile; to take a stroll — to stroll.

The second is a combination of a head-verb with a verbal postposition that has a specificational value *stand up, go on, give in, be off, get along, etc.*

The grammatical categories which find formal expression in the outward structure of the verb and which will be analysed further are, first, the category of finitude dividing the verb into finite and non-finite forms (the corresponding contracted names are "finites" and "verbids" this category has a lexico-grammatical force); second, the categories of person, number, tense, aspect, voice, and mood, whose complete set is revealed in every word-form of the notional finite verb.

Each of the identified categories constitutes a whole system of its own presenting its manifold problems to the scholar. However, the comparative analysis of the categorial properties of all the forms of the verb, including the term "verbids"¹² for the non-finite forms of the verb was introduced by O. Jespersen. Its merit lies in the fact that, unlike the more traditional term "verbals", it is devoid of dubious connotations as well as homonymic correlations properties of verbids, shows the unquestionable unity of the class, in spite of some inter-class features of verbids.

Among the various forms of the verb the infinitive occupies a unique position. Its status is that of the principal representative of the verb-lexeme as a

¹² The term "verbids" for the non – finite forms of the verb was introduced by O. Jespersen. Its merit lies in the fact that, unlike the more traditional term "verbals", it is devoid of dubious connotations as well as homonymic correlations.

whole. This head-form status of the infinitive is determined by the two factors. The first factor consists in the verbal-nominative nature of the infinitive, i.e. in its function of giving the most general dynamic name to the process which is denoted by all the other forms of the verb-lexeme in a more specific way, conditioned by their respective semantico-grammatical specialisations. The second factor determining the representative status of the infinitive consists in the infinitive serving as the actual derivative base for all the other regular forms of the verb.

The class of verbs falls into a number of subclasses distinguished by different semantic and lexico-grammatical features. On the upper level of division two unequal sets are identified: the set of verbs of full nominative value (notional verbs), and the set of verbs of partial nominative value (semi-notional and functional verbs). The first set is derivationally open, it includes the bulk of the verbal lexicon. The second set is derivationally closed, it includes limited subsets of verbs characterised by individual relational properties.

Semi-notional and functional verbs serve as markers of predication in the proper sense, since they show the connection between the nominative content of the sentence and reality in a strictly specialised way. These "predicators" include auxiliary verbs, modal verbs, semi-notional verbid introducer verbs, and link-verbs. Auxiliary verbs constitute grammatical elements of the categorial forms of the verb. These are the verbs be, have, do, shall, will, should, would, may, might.

Modal verbs are used with the infinitive as predicative markers expressing relational meanings of the subject attitude type, i.e. ability, obligation, permission, advisability, etc. By way of extension of meaning, they also express relational probability, serving as probability predicators. These two types of functional semantics can be tested by means of correlating pure modal verb collocations with the corresponding two sets of stative collocations of equivalent functions on the one hand, the groups be obliged, be permitted, etc.; *on the other hand, the groups be likely, be probable, etc.*

Tom may stay for the teleview if he will. → Tom is permitted to stay. The storm may come any minute, you had better leave the deck. → The storm is likely to come any minute.

The modal verbs can, may, must, shall, will, ought, need, used (to), dare are defective in forms, and are suppletively supplemented by stative groups similar to those shown above. The supplementation is effected both for the lacking finite forms and the lacking non-finite forms.

The boys can prepare the play-ground themselves. — The boys will be able to prepare the play-ground themselves. — The boys' being able to prepare the play-ground themselves.

The verbs be and have in the modal meanings "be planned", "be obliged" and the like are considered by many modern grammarians as modal verbs and by right are included in the general modal verb list.

Semi-notional verbid introducer verbs are distrihowevered among the verbal sets of discriminatory relational semantics (seem, happen, turn out, etc.), of subject-action relational semantics (try, fail, manage, etc.), of phasal semantics (begin, continue, stop, etc.) The predicator verbs should be strictly distinguished from their grammatical homonyms in the subclasses of notional verbs.

As a matter of fact, there is a fundamental grammatical difference between the verbal constituents in such sentences as, say, "They began to fight" and "They began the fight". Whereas the verb in the first sentence is a semi-notional predicator, the verb in the second sentence is a notional transitive verb normally related to its direct object. The phasal predicator begin (the first sentence) is grammatically inseparable from the infinitive of the notional verb fight, the two lexemes making one verbal-part unit in the sentence. The transitive verb begin (the second sentence), on the contrary, is self-dependent in the lexico-grammatical sense, it forms the predicate of the sentence by itself and as such can be used in the passive voice, the whole construction of the sentence in this case being presented as the regular passive counterpart of its active version.¹³

¹³ Blokh M.Y., "a Course in Theoretical English Grammar" Москва «Высшая школа» 1983, p75.

They began the fight. → The fight was begun (by them). They began to fight. → To fight was begun (by them).

Link-verbs introduce the nominal part of the predicate (the predicative) which is commonly expressed by a noun, an adjective, or a phrase of a similar semantic-grammatical character. It should be noted that link-verbs, although they are named so, are not devoid of meaningful content. Performing their function of connecting ("linking") the subject and the predicative of the sentence, they express the actual semantics of this connection, i.e. expose the relational aspect of the characteristics ascribed by the predicative to the subject.

The linking predicator function in the purest form is effected by the verb *be*; therefore *be* as a link-verb can be referred to as the "pure link-verb". It is clear from the above that even this pure link-verb has its own relational semantics, which can be identified as "linking predicative ascription". All the link-verbs other than the pure link *be* express some specification of this general predicative-linking semantics, so that they should be referred to as "specifying" link-verbs. The common specifying link-verbs fall into two main groups: those that express perceptions and those that express nonperceptual, or "factual" link-verb connection. The main perceptual link-verbs are *seem*, *appear*, *look*, *feel*, *taste*; the main factual link-verbs are *become*, *get*, *grow*, *remain*, *keep*.

As is to be seen from the comparison of the specifying link-verbs with the verbid introducer predicators described above, the respective functions of these two verbal subsets are cognate, though not altogether identical. The difference lies in the fact that the specifying link-verbs combine the pure linking function with the predicator function. Furthermore, separate functions of the two types of predicators are evident from the fact that specifying link-verbs, the same as the pure link, can be used in the text in combination with verbid introducer predicators. The letter seemed to have remained unnoticed. *I began to feel better. You shouldn't try to look cleverer than you are.*

The transformation is unacceptable the use of verbid introducer predicators with the pure link-verb: The news has proved to be true. The girl's look ceased to

be friendly. The address shown to us seemed to be just the one we needed. Besides the link-verbs proper hitherto presented, there are some notional verbs in language that have the power to perform the function of link-verbs without losing their lexical nominative value. In other words, they perform two functions simultaneously, combining the role of a full notional verb with that of a link-verb. Fred lay awake all through the night. Robbie ran in out of breath. The moon rose red.

Notional link-verb function is mostly performed by intransitive verbs of motion and position. Due to the double syntactic character of the notional link-verb, the whole predicate formed by it is referred to as a "double predicate."

Notional verbs undergo the three main grammatically relevant categorisations. The first is based on the relation of the subject of the verb to the process denoted by the verb. The second is based on the aspective characteristics of the process denoted by the verb, i.e. on the inner properties of the process as reflected in the verbal meaning. The third is based on the combining power of the verb in relation to other notional words in the utterance.

On the basis of the subject-process relation, all the notional verbs can be divided into actional and statal.

Actional verbs express the action performed by the subject, i.e. they present the subject as an active doer (in the broadest sense of the word). To this subclass belong such verbs as do, act, perform, make, go, read, learn, discover, etc. Statal verbs, unlike their subclass counterparts, denote the state of their subject. That is, they either give the subject the characteristic of the inactive recipient of some outward activity, or else express the mode of its existence.¹⁴ To this subclass belong such verbs as be, live, survive, worry, suffer, rejoice, stand, see, know, etc.

Alongside of the two verbal sets, a third one could be distinguished which is made up of verbs expressing neither actions, nor states, however "processes". As representatives of the "purely processual" subclass one might point out the verbs thaw, ripen, deteriorate, consider, neglect, support, display, and the like. On closer

¹⁴ Blokh M.Y, "a Course in Theoretical English Grammar" Москва «Высшая школа» 1983, p76-77.p324

observation, however, it becomes clear that the units of this medial subclass are subject to the same division into actional and statal sets as were established at the primary stage of classification. For instance, the "purely processual" verb thaw referring to an inactive substance should be defined, more precisely, as "processual-statal", whereas the "processual" verb consider relating to an active doer should be looked upon, more precisely, as "processual-actional". This can be shown by transformational tests:

The snow is thawing. → The snow is in the state of thawing. The designer is considering another possibility. → The action of the designer is that he is considering another possibility.

Thus, the primary binary division of the verbs upon the basis of the subject-process relation is sustained.

Similar criteria apply to some more specific subsets of verbs permitting the binary actional-statal distinction. Among these of a special significance are the verbal sets of mental processes and sensual processes. Within the first of them we recognise the correlation between the verbs of mental perception and mental activity. E.g.: know — think; understand — construe; notice — note; admire — assess; forget — reject; etc.

Within the second set we recognise the correlation between the verbs of physical perception as such and physical perceptual activity. E.g.: see — look; hear — listen; feel (inactive) — feel (active), touch; taste (inactive) — taste (active); smell (inactive) — smell (active); etc.

The initial member of each correlation pair given above presents a case of a statal verb, while the succeeding member, respectively, of an actional verb. Cf. the corresponding transformational tests:

The explorers knew only one answer to the dilemma. → The mental state of the explorers was such that they knew only one answer to the dilemma. I am thinking about the future of the village. → My mental activity consists in thinking about the future of the village. Etc.

The grammatical relevance of the classification in question, apart from its reflecting the syntactically generalised relation of the subject of the verb to the process denoted by it, is disclosed in the difference between the two subclasses in their aspectual behaviour. While the actional verbs take the form of the continuous aspect quite freely, i.e. according to the general rules of its use, the statal verbs, in the same contextual conditions, are mainly used in the indefinite form. -The continuous with the statal verbs, which can be characterised as a more or less occasional occurrence, will normally express some sort of intensity or emphasis.

1.3 Theoretical study of modality in Modern English

Modality is expression of speaker's attitude to what his utterance denotes. The speaker's judgment may be of different kinds, that is, the speaker may express various modal meanings. Modal verbs unlike other verbs, do not denote actions or states, however only show the attitude of the speaker towards the action expressed by the infinitive in combination with which they form compound modal predicates. These modal verbs may show that the action (or state, of process, or quality) is viewed by the speaker as possible, obligatory, doubtful, certain, permissible, advisable, requested, prohibited, ordered etc. Modal verbs occur only with the infinitive. This or that meaning is to a great degree determined by communicative type of the sentence and the form of the infinitive. That is a huge problem for foreign learners of English, who make a great deal of mistakes in this field. So, the aim of my work is to show how modal verbs can be used, in what case we need one or other verb and why.

English modality can be expressed not only by modal verbs. Modality can be expressed by different linguistic means. In actual speech all forms expressing modality work together to make the meaning clear. However in every case there is some leading form that expresses the main attitude. These forms fall into four categories: phonetic (intonation), grammatical (mood), lexico-grammatical (modal verbs), lexical (modal words and phrases). However the most important from them is the third form, which includes modal verbs. It is important to take into account one more feature peculiar to modal verbs. They all show that a certain action is

represented as necessary, doubtful, etc. From the point of view of the speaker, there are verbs which ‘help’ other verbs to express a meaning: it is important to realize that “modal verbs” have no meaning by themselves. A modal verb such as *would* has several varying functions; it can be used, for example, to help verbs express ideas about the past, the present and the future. It is therefore wrong to simply believe that “*would* is the past of *will*”: it is many other things. English modality can be expressed not only by modal verbs. There are many ways to express it – generally **Mood** shows the relation between the action expressed by the predicate verb and reality. The speaker establishes this relation.

In present-day English **the category of mood** is made up by a set of forms opposed to each other in presenting the event described as **a real fact, a problematic action of as something unreal that does not exist**.

Actions represented as real facts are expressed by **the Indicative Mood**.
E.g. Architects have done some very good work, too, in designing new schools. Many of these **are** prefabricated, which **means** that as much of the building work as possible is **done** not on the building site however in factories where mass production methods **are used**.

When the brothers had gone home, Mr. Waterfall announced that they were a much pleasanter pair of young men than the had been led to believe.

The Indicative mood is characterized by a great number of tense-aspect-phase forms that may be used in the Active or in the Passive Voice. It should be stressed that the use of the Indicative Mood does not always mean that the action expressed by the predicate verb is true to fact, that it actually takes (or took, or will take) place in reality. When the speaker uses the Indicative Mood he merely **represents** an action as a fact, however he maybe mistaken or even telling a lie.

E.g. “*I’ve seen to it,*” he said, *however everyone knew it was not true.*

Commands and requests, which are problematic actions, are expressed by **the Imperative Mood**.

The Imperative Mood is the plain stem of the verb (e.g. *Come over here. Listen to him,* etc.). It may be used in the affirmative and in the negative form The

negative form is an analytical form built up by means of the plain stem of the auxiliary verb **to do** followed by **not (don't)** and the infinitive of the notional verb without **to** (e.g. *Don't go over there. Don't listen to him, etc.*). The negative form of the verb *to be* is also built up by means of the auxiliary verb **to do** (e.g. *Don't be inquisitive. Don't be a fool, etc.*).

If we wish to make a command or request more expressive, we use the emphatic form. It's also an analytical form built up with the help of the plain stem of the auxiliary verb **to do** which is placed before the notional verb, including **to be** (e.g. *Do come over here. Do listen to him. Do be quiet, etc.*).

A command or request is generally addressed to the second person singular or plural. There is usually no need to mention the subject of the action before the verb in the Imperative mood. However occasionally the verb may be preceded by *you* in familiar style (e.g. *You don't worry.*).

A command or request may be addressed to the first person plural. It is also formed with the help of the plain stem of the verb, **to let** followed by the pronoun **us** (the contracted form is **let's**) and the infinitive of the notional verb. This form is actually an invitation to a joint action (e.g. *Let's have a cup of tea. Let's do it together, etc.*). Actions represented as unreal are in present-day English express by a variety of forms.

Among them there is a mood form – the conditional Mood. The fact that there are a number of forms engaged in expressing unreal actions could be explained historically.

In the older periods English used to be a synthetic language and had special forms that served to express unreal actions – the so-called Subjunctive mood. It was built up synthetically by means of inflections. As a result of loss of inflections, the difference between the forms of the Indicative Mood and the Subjunctive Mood has in most cases disappeared. The place of the old Subjunctive Mood was in a number of cases taken up by analytical forms and modal phrases, i.e. combinations of modal verbs with the infinitive. It is this historical process that accounts for the great variety of different forms expressing unreality in modern

English. As some of the forms expressing problematic or unreal actions are modal phrases, it is necessary before describing the different forms of unreality to treat modal verbs first. The speaker's attitude towards the action if the sentence may be expressed in different ways:

1. By one of the mood forms that serve to show whether the action is represented as a real fact or as problematic, or unreal, this form of expression is found in every sentence because it is indispensable to predication.¹⁵
2. By **modal verbs** which represent an action as necessary or unnecessary, possible or impossible, certain or doubtful and the like. However modal verbs need not be used in every sentence and are, therefore, to be regarded as an additional means of expressing the speaker's attitude towards the action in the sentence.
3. By **attitudinal adverbs** such as *certainly*, *perhaps*, *probably*, *luckily*, *unfortunately*, etc. They express different degrees of certainty on the part of the speaker of the desirability of the action from his point of view.

¹⁵ Грамматика английского языка. Пособие для студентов педагогических институтов." Под ред. Ильиша.

2.0 Chapter II. The analysis of pragmalinguistic aspect of modal words in English discourse

2.1 Semantic analysis of modal words used in English discourse

The distinction between modal words is based on two criteria: (1) their meaning: modal words express the speaker's view concerning the reality of the action expressed in the sentence, (2) their syntactical function: they are not adverbial modifiers however parentheses, whether we take a parenthesis to be a special part of the sentence or whether we say that it stands outside its structure.

We must emphasise that this view is far from being the only one possible: one might argue that the meaning of an adverb as a part of speech might be described in such a way as to include what we call modal words, and to mention the function of parenthesis among the syntactical functions of adverbs. Where clear objective morphological criteria fail there will always be room for different interpretations. We will not argue this point any further however start on the assumption that modal words do constitute a separate part of speech.

Modal words have been variously classified into groups according to their meaning: those expressing certainty, such as certainly, surely, undoubtedly; those expressing doubt, such as perhaps, maybe, possibly, etc. The number of types varies greatly with different authors. We need not go into this question here, as this is a lexicological, rather than a grammatical, problem. From the grammatical viewpoint it is sufficient to state that all modal words express some kind of attitude of the speaker concerning the reality of the action expressed in the sentence.

In the vast majority of cases the modal word indicates the speaker's attitude towards the whole thought expressed in the sentence (or clause),

e.g. Look, there are those doves again. The one is really quite a bright red, isn't it?

She is a delicate little thing, perhaps nobody however me knows how delicate.

If the modal word in each of the sentences is eliminated the whole thought will lose the modal colouring imparted to it by the modal word, and will appear to be stated as a fact, without any specific mention of the speaker's attitude.

However, occasionally a modal word may refer to some one word or phrase only, and have no connection with the rest of the sentence. It may, for example, refer to a secondary part of the sentence, as in the following example: No one expected his arrival, except Rose presumably. The use of modal words depends to a great extent on the type of the sentence.

Modal words have only recently been separated from adverbs, with which they were traditionally taken together. By modal words we mean such words as perhaps, possibly, certainly. Modal words express the speaker's evaluation of the relation between an action and reality. Modal words are invariable and they have the following functions.

(a) Modal words usually do not enter any phrases however stand outside them. In a few cases, however, they may enter into a phrase with a noun, adjective, etc. (he will arrive soon, possibly to-night).

(b) The function of modal words in a sentence is a matter of controversy. We will assume that modal words perform the function of a parenthesis. Modal words may also be a sentence in themselves.

A modal word can also make up a sentence by itself. This happens when it is used to answer a general question, that is, a question admitting of a yes- or no-answer. Certainly, perhaps, maybe, etc. may be used in this way. In these cases, then, modal words are the main part of the sentence. This brings them close together with the sentence words yes and no. ' However, they differ from the sentence words in that the modal words can also be used as parentheses in a sentence. Thus, the question, Are you coming? may equally be answered, Certainly I am, or Certainly. The sentence words yes and no cannot be used as parentheses. Whether the answer is Yes, or Yes, I am, the yes is a sentence in both variants.

It might be possible to argue that if the answer to the question Are you coming? is Certainly, the word certainly is a parenthesis, and the rest of the

answer, / am, is "understood". While such a view cannot be disproved, it seems unnatural and far-fetched, and we will prefer the view that *Certainly* in this case is a sentence.

The problem of modal words is connected with the very difficult problem of modality as a whole. This has been treated repeatedly by various scholars both with reference to English and to Russian and in a wider context of general linguistics as well. We will not investigate here all the aspects of the problem. We will only mention that there are various means of expressing modality — modal words, modal verbs (can, must, etc.) and the category of mood. Since two of them or even all three may be used simultaneously, it is evident that there may be several layers of modality in a sentence. A great variety of combinations is possible here.

Modal words are an invariable part of speech. They may refer to a word, a phrase, a clause, or a sentence. Their syntactical function is that of a parenthesis, they may also be a sentence in themselves, in which case they are used to answer a general question:

Will you help me? Certainly.

Precisely this.

Except this man, of course.

Semantically modal words fall into three groups, denoting:

1. Certainty/doubt (*certainly, of course, indeed, surely, decidedly, really, definitely, naturally, no doubt, etc.*).

Certainly, it was astonishing that she should be preoccupied with her schemes for the welfare of Constance.

Of course, it would have been different if they had married.

In answers the meaning of these words is weakened.

2. Supposition (*perhaps, maybe, probably, obviously, possibly, evidently, apparently, etc.*).

Manson's nature was extraordinarily intense. Probably he derived this from his mother.

You have come quickly to a resolution. However perhaps you have been considering this question for a long time?

Obviously you didn't read it.

3. Estimate proper (*good/bad*) – (*luckily, fortunately, happily, unfortunately, unluckily, etc.*).

Fortunately there were few people at the morning surgery.

Unhappily a terrible storm broke out before the travellers had reached their destination.

Epistemic or propositional modality is concerned with the speaker's "judgments about the factual status of the proposition". The given type of subjective evaluation can be expressed by modal verbs and adverbs in English. The latter are claimed to be used to denote 'degrees of confidence' as in the following examples:

(1) *Perhaps she's there*

She's probably there

She's certainly there

On the contrary, modal verbs express the speaker's strength of the conclusion which is based on inference. Further on, the scholar makes a distinction between 'speculative' MAY and 'deductive' MUST, which can be illustrated by the examples in (2):

(2) All three factors may be at work.

Something beyond biology must be at work, although we do not yet know what ...

Despite the distinction drawn between inference and confidence, Palmer admits that "there seems to be little difference between Mary may be at school and Perhaps Mary is at school" (Palmer 2001: 35) and explains their closeness of meaning as that of between "coffee without milk and coffee without cream." 'Speculative' MAY can be seen as parallel to epistemic possibility or uncertainty while 'deductive' MUST is parallel to epistemic necessity or uncertainty in van der Auwera (2001). The above given modal expressions contain the speaker's

subjective evaluation of the truth-value of the state of affairs. There is much linguistic evidence to support the ‘scalar’ interpretation of epistemic modality because human beings seem ‘to think in terms of a scale’, thus he regards this ‘estimation of likelihood of states of affairs’ as situated on a scale. The so-called ‘epistemic scale’ can be explained in terms of doubt, likelihood, uncertainty, probability. In general, there seems to be no polemic regarding a class of epistemic adverbs in English that express the speaker’s assessment in terms of ‘degree of truth’, ‘indication of belief in various degrees of probability’, ‘degree of certitude of the truth-value’. The authors of *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language* distinguish “three levels of strength, according to the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition” for modal auxiliaries and four levels of strength for modal adverbs:

- (3) a) strong (obviously, necessarily, etc.)
- b) quasi-strong (apparently, evidently, presumably, seemingly, etc.)
- c) medium (likely, probably, etc.)
- d) weak (maybe, perhaps, possibly, etc.)

As the latest contrastive studies show, despite the existing similarity in terms of the ‘auxiliary and adverb strategies’ available for the realization of epistemic meanings of necessity and possibility, speakers of English and Slavonic languages do not use these strategies with equal frequency. The results of the investigation of the Slavonic translational equivalents for the English auxiliaries and adverbs of epistemic possibility show that the degree of polyfunctionality seem to explain some of the reasons why Slavonic modal adverbs are more common as equivalents for the English auxiliary might than for could. It should be noted that this feature appears to be more typical to the South and West Slavonic languages.

Basic types of realizations of epistemic modality in English are illustrated in the examples listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Realizations of epistemic modality in English and Russian

English	<i>Russian</i>
MODAL VERBS (auxiliaries): Everybody says	MODAL VERBS (full): He may

that so it must be true. In theory that might be true. ADVERBS: Maybe/perhaps John has done it. 16	be at home He must be at home MODAL WORDS and particles: Maybe/probably he (is) at home
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There seems to be no polemic regarding the inventory of realizations of the weak level of strength or low probability/doubt (maybe, perhaps, etc.) and those of certainty (certainly, clearly, surely, undoubtedly, definitely, presumably, etc.). However other probability values and a quasi-/medium degree of strength are rather difficult to measure and grade. In Russian grammar, particles are defined as ‘a class of words which serve to give modal or emotional emphasis to other words, or word groups, or clauses’ (Russian Grammar 1997: 395) and the modal meaning is explained in terms of speaker’s certainty and doubt/uncertainty (Laigonaitė 1967: 11-13). My native speaker’s intuition would suggest drawing a distinction between:

- (a) certainty adverbs like (‘surely/certainly’), (‘clearly’) as used in ‘This road is clearly (surely) to Piter’) and modal words denoting certainty like (‘of course/definitely’);
- (b) high probability or quasi-strong confidence adverbs like *возможно, должен*, (‘most likely/probably’); and
- (c) weak or low epistemic possibility words and particles like *может быть* (‘maybe’), *возможно* (‘perhaps’), *возможно* (‘possibly’), etc.

2.2 The pragmalinguistic analysis of modal words in English discourse

Shall is used in many of the same senses as will, though not all dialects use shall. In prescriptive English usage, shall in the first person, singular or plural, indicates mere futurity, however in other persons shows an order, command or prophecy: "Cinderella, you shall go to the ball!" Likewise, will generally indicates futurity in the second and third persons however willingness/determination in the first person. In dialects that seldom use shall, will has a number of different uses. It can express aspect alone, without implying futurity: In "He will make mistakes,

¹⁶ Van der Auwera, Schalley, Nuyts 2005: 201

won't he?", the reference is to a tendency in the past, present, and future and as such expresses habitual aspect. It can express probability in the present time, as in "That will be John at the door", or obligation, as in "You will do it right now". It can express both intention and futurity, as in "I will do it." It can express futurity: "The sun will die in a few billion years." Example: She could only think that all of this was very fascinating, and wish that a portion of it might come to her.

Shall is also used in legal and engineering language to write firm laws and specifications as in these examples: "Those convicted of violating this law shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than three years nor more than seven years," and "The electronics assembly shall be able to operate within its specifications over a temperature range of 0 degrees Celsius to 70 degrees Celsius." In both cases, in accordance with prescriptive usage, shall is used in the third person to express determination on the part of the speaker. The time reference of a shall or will statement can be shifted from the future to a time prior to a specified time in the future by using shall / will + have + past participle of main verb, as in Tomorrow at 5:00 I will have already arrived.

Should is commonly used, even in dialects where shall is not. The negation is "should not" (or the contraction "shouldn't"). *Should* can describe an ideal behaviour or occurrence and imparts a normative meaning to the sentence; for example, "You should never lie" means roughly, "If you always behaved perfectly, you would never lie", so obligation. The sentence "If this works, you should not feel a thing" means roughly, "I hope this will work. If it does, you will not feel a thing", so probability is being expressed. In dialects that use shall commonly, however, this restriction does not apply; for example, a speaker of such a dialect might say, "If I failed that test, I think I should cry," meaning the same thing as, "If I failed that test, I think I would cry"; here the use of should is for conditionality.

In some dialects, it is common to replace the subjunctive mood with the modal auxiliary should: "It is important that the law should be passed" (where other dialects would say, "It is important that the law be passed"); likewise "If it should happen, we are prepared for it" or "Should it happen, we are prepared for it"

(where early Modern English would say, "If it happen, we are prepared for it," and many dialects of today would say "If it happens, we are prepared for it" or would use the subjunctive "If it were to happen, we would be prepared for it.").

The time reference of a should statement can be shifted from the present or future to the past by using should + have + past participle of main verb, as in "I should have done that yesterday" (duty) or, less commonly, "It should have happened by yesterday" (high likelihood).

The contracted form of **would** is 'd as in "I'd go if I could". The negation is either would not or wouldn't. As indicated above, would can be used for the conditional mood in main clauses having a counterfactual meaning: "I would go if I could (however I can't)". Would can be used in some forms that are viewed as more formal or polite: for example, "I would like a glass of water" compared with "I want a glass of water"; and "Would you get me a glass of water?" compared with the bare "Get me a glass of water." Example: She turned about, troubled by her daring, glad of her release, wondering whether she would get something to do, wondering what Drouet would do. It is also used to make a hypothetical statement about a doubtful future situation even if it isn't known to be counterfactual: "If we went to Keri Keri for Easter, that would be nice. The time reference of a counterfactual conditional can be shifted from the present / future to the past by using the would + have + past participle construction, as in "I would have done it yesterday if I had seen the opportunity". This construction is known as the conditional perfect.

Would can also be used for the imperfective aspect in past time. In the sentence "Back then, I would eat early and would walk to school." "would" signifies not the conditional mood, however rather, repeated past actions in the imperfective aspect (specifically, habitual aspect) and one must use care when translating to other languages.¹⁷ Example: *He would not care what became of her.*

Furthermore, would can be used to shift the time of perspective of a future event from the present to the past: "In 1982 I knew that in 1986 I would graduate

¹⁷ Khaimovich B.S., Rogovskaya B.I. A course in English Grammar. M., 1967, 320 p.

from college." The meaning of the negated "would" form depends on the particular usage of "would". In its conditional usage, the main verb is negated: "I would not go even if I could" means "I would not-go..." = "I would refrain from going...." However, in the future-of-the-past form, "In 1982 I knew that I would not graduate in 1986" means "...I not-would graduate..." = "...It isn't that I would graduate...." Likewise, in the past habitual form, "Back then I would not eat early" does not mean "...I would not-eat early" = "...I would fast early" however rather means "...I not-would eat early" = "...it isn't that I would eat early...." In the latter two examples either the modal or the entire verb phrase is being negated.

May and might do not have common negative contractions (equivalents to shan't, won't, can't, couldn't etc.), although mightn't can occur in asking questions. ("Mightn't I come in if I took my muddy boots off?" as a reply to "Don't come in here! You'll get the floor dirty!") Both forms can be used to express a present time possibility or uncertainty ("That may be."). Might and could can also be used in this sense with no past time meaning, although may conveys less hesitance (a somewhat higher probability) than do might and could.

When used in the perfect aspect, "may have" is used to indicate a lack of knowledge about events in the past, and "might have" is used for possibilities that did not occur however could have in other circumstances, in a similar way to other conditional statements.

"She may have eaten cake, if it was there." (Possibly it was there, and possibly she ate it.)

"She might have eaten cake, if it hadn't been gone". (However it was gone; her eating cake in the past was contingent on the untrue circumstance of its not being gone.)

"Lester dear, When you get this I won't be here, and I want you not to think harshly of me until you have read it all. I am taking Vesta and leaving, and I think it is really better that I should. Lester, I ought to do it.

May is also used to express irrelevance in spite of certain or likely truth: "He may be taller than I am, however he is certainly not stronger" may mean roughly,

"While it is true that he is taller than I am, that does not make a difference, as he is certainly not stronger." (However, it may also mean, "I am not sure whether he is taller than I am, however I am sure that he isn't stronger.") This is the meaning in the phrase "Be that as it may." Might can be used in this sense as well.

May or might can be used in the first person to express that future actions are being considered. "I may/might go to the mall later" means that the speaker is thinking about going to the mall; as such it means the same thing as maybe will.

May and might can indicate presently given permission and presently given mild permission, respectively, for present or future actions: "You may go now", "You might go now if you feel like it." May or might can be used in a question to ask for permission. One who is saying "May I use your phone?" is asking for permission to use the phone of the person being spoken to. "Can" or "could" can be used instead, although formal American English prefers "may". In both cases the preterite form is viewed as more hesitant or polite.¹⁸

For the sense of permission (as opposed to possibility), there is no past form for may: "He may have done it" unambiguously means "Maybe he did it", and not "He had permission to do it". However, "He might have done it" could be interpreted as either "There is a slight possibility that he did it" or "It would have been okay for him to do it".

Example: When your sister Louise came it all came over me somehow, clearly, and I have never been able to think right about it since. It can't be right, Lester, however I don't blame you. I blame myself.

The meaning of the negated "may" or "might" form depends on the usage of the modal. When possibility is indicated, the main verb is negated: "That may/might not be" means "That may/might not-be" = "That may fail to be true." However when permission is being expressed, the modal or the entire verb phrase is negated: "You may not go now" does not mean "You may not-go now" = "You may stay now", however rather means "You not-may go now" = "You are forbidden to go now." Sometimes, though, the main verb is negated by putting

¹⁸ Iofic L.L., Chakhoyan L.P. Readings in the theory of English grammar L., 1972, 240 p

stress on both "not" and the main verb: "You may go or not go, whichever you wish."

Can and could. The negation of can is the single word "cannot", occasionally written as two words "can not" or the contraction "can't". The negation of could is "could not", or "couldn't".

Can is used to express ability. "I can speak English" means "I am able to speak English", or "I know how to speak English". The past form for this meaning is as in "Twenty years ago I could speak [was able to speak] English".¹⁹

Can or could is also used to express that some state of affairs is presently possible, without referring to the ability of a person to do something: "There can be a very strong rivalry between siblings" can have the same meaning as "There is sometimes a very strong rivalry between siblings"; and "That can happen" is similar in meaning to "That could happen" except that using could rather than can expresses more doubt.

Example: When your sister Louise came it all came over me somehow, clearly, and I have never been able to think right about it since. It can't be right, Lester, however I don't blame you. I blame myself.

Cannot and can't can be used to express beliefs about situations: "That can't be true" expresses strong disbelief"; however in the affirmative with doubt, could must be used, as in "That could be true". Both can and could can be used to make requests: "Can you pass me the cheese?" means "Please pass me the cheese". Could can be used in the same way however indicates greater politeness. Informally, can is frequently used to mean may in the sense of permission: "You can go now." The form could can indicate either ability in the past (= was able to) ("I could swim when I was five years old"), permission in the past (= was permitted to) ("My mother said that I could go swimming"), possibility in the present (=maybe) ("It could be raining now"), or conditional ability in the present (= would be able to) ("I could do it if you would let me").

¹⁹ Iofic L.L., Chakhoyan L.P. Readings in the theory of English grammar L., 1972, 240 p

The past counterpart of the use of could to mean present conditional ability ("I could pass that test now (if I were to take it now)") is the use of could + have + past participle, as in "I could have passed that test yesterday (if I had taken it yesterday)". Example: "I wish I could get something to do," she said.

The negative forms virtually always negate the modal or entire verb phrase, and never just the main verb: "I cannot speak English" = "I am not able to speak English"; "You cannot go now" = "You are not allowed to go now"; "He could not do that" implying either permission or ability means "He was not allowed/able to do that." Rarely, the main verb is negated by putting stress on "not" and the main verb: "I could not do that, however I'm going to do it anyway." Example: He could not see clearly enough to wish to do differently. Can is only used in a few situations in the perfect aspect:

With negative polarity: "She can't have finished yet." (The speaker believes that she has not finished.)

Must has no corresponding preterite form. The negative form when the meaning is obligation is "must not" or "mustn't", and the negative form when the meaning is near-certainty is "must not". An archaic variant is the word *mote*, as used in the expression "so mote it be". Must and have to are used to express that something is obligatory ("He must leave"; "He has to leave"). Must can be used to express a prohibition such as "You must not smoke in here", or a resolution such as "I mustn't make that mistake again". There is a distinction between "must" and "have to" in the negative forms: "must not" negates the main verb, while "do not have to" negates "have to". In the sentence "You must not go" = "You must not-go", it is being expressed that it is obligatory for the person being spoken to not go; whereas in the sentence "You do not have to go" it is being expressed that it isn't obligatory for the person to go.

Must and have to can also be used to express strongly held beliefs (the epistemic rather than deontic use), such as in "It must be here somewhere" or "It has to be here somewhere", with the same meaning as "I believe that it's very likely that it is here somewhere." There is a past form for the sense of high probability

("He must have done that" = "He very probably did that"), however there is no past tense form for the sense of obligation ("He must have done that" cannot be understood as "He had to do that" = "He was required to do that").

Ought to and **had better** are used to express an ideal behavior or occurrence or suggested obligation, in a similar way to should. The negations are, respectively, ought not to (or rarely, oughtn't to) and had better not. The "had" in "had better" can be contracted, such as "You'd better shut up." In informal American usage, the had in had better is sometimes omitted. The negative forms negate the main verb: "You ought not to do that" = "You ought to refrain from doing that"; "You'd better not do that" = "You'd better refrain from doing that." In addition, ought to, like should, can be used to express relatively high probability, as in "It ought to rain today." The time reference of an ought to statement can be shifted from the present or future to the past by using ought to + have + past participle of main verb, as in "I ought to have done that yesterday" (duty) or, less commonly, "It ought to have happened by yesterday" (high likelihood).

Dare and **need** are not commonly used as auxiliaries nowadays, however formerly they both were. Neither is used in affirmative declarative sentences. An example in an exclamation is "How dare he!" expressing willingness in the face of fear or contrary obligation. The interrogative form "Dare he do it?" or "Need he do it?" is equivalent to the non-auxiliary form "Does he dare to do it?" or "Does he need to do it?"; need, of course, expresses necessity. In a negative context "He dare not do it" is equivalent to "He does not dare to do it", while "He need not do it" is equivalent to "He does not need to do it". In both cases it is the modal or entire verb phrase, rather than the main verb, that is being negated.

However, in the sentence "He does not dare to lose weight" or "He needs to lose weight," dare or need isn't being used as an auxiliary, as (1) it takes the full infinitive "to lose" as the head of the verb phrase rather than the bare infinitive "lose" that occurs in a sentence like "He can lose weight", (2) it is conjugated in the third person singular, and (3) it can take the auxiliary "does". In its use as a modal auxiliary in the negative, need has a form using "have" that shifts the time

reference to the past ("he need not have done that"); alternatively, the non-modal form can be substituted, as in "He needed to not do that". However, the modal "dare" cannot be given a past time meaning using "have" (one cannot say "He dare not have done that"); instead, the non-modal form must be substituted, as in "He did not dare to do that").

Used to is used to express past states or past actions that were habitual however which are no longer. For example, "I used to go to college" suggests that the speaker no longer goes to college. Constructions negating the main verb exist in expressions such as "She used to not like me", or if the speaker is trying to avoid the split infinitive. Example: "Well, what can you do, Jennie, different from what you ever have done? You wouldn't expect to be a lady's maid again, would you? Or clerk in a store?"

2.3 Pragmalinguistic analysis of different means of expressing modality in English discourse

In linguistics, modality is what allows speakers to evaluate a proposition relative to a set of other propositions. In standard formal approaches to modality, an utterance expressing modality can always roughly be paraphrased to fit the following template:

(1) According to [a set of rules, wishes, beliefs,...] it is [necessary, possible] that [the main proposition] is the case.

The set of propositions which forms the basis of evaluation is called the modal base. The result of the evaluation is called the modal force. For example the utterance in (2) expresses that, according to what the speaker has observed, it is necessary to conclude that John has a rather high income:

(2) John must be earning a lot of money.

The modal base here is the knowledge of the speaker, the modal force is necessity. By contrast, (3) could be paraphrased as 'Given his abilities, the strength of his teeth, etc., it is possible for John to open a beer bottle with his teeth'. Here, the modal base is defined by a subset of John's abilities, the modal force is possibility.

(3) John can open a beer bottle with his teeth.

Cross-linguistically, modality can be expressed by a variety of means, such as auxiliary verbs as in the examples (2) and (3), verbal morphology (mood) or adverbs.

Typological approaches to modality usually favour a slightly wider definition of modality and also include meanings which do not fit the template in (1) exactly.

Semantic approaches dealing with modality are traditionally based on the principles of modal logic. Both works with the notion that propositions can be mapped to sets of possible worlds, that is, a proposition can be defined as the set of worlds in which that proposition is true. For example, the proposition 'the earth is flat' corresponds to the set of possible worlds in which the earth is in fact flat. In this framework, modal expressions such as *must* and *can* are then analyzed as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds. This set of worlds is given by the modal base and is said to be *the set of accessible worlds*: For example, in sentence (2) above, the modal base is the knowledge the speaker has in the actual world. Therefore, the set of accessible worlds is defined by the information the speaker has about John. Assume for example that the speaker knows that John just bought a new luxury car and has rented a huge apartment. The speaker also knows that John is an honest person with a humble family background and doesn't play the lottery. The set of accessible worlds is then the set of worlds in which all these propositions which the speaker knows about John are true.²⁰

The notions of necessity and possibility are then defined along the following lines: A proposition p follows necessarily from the set of accessible worlds, if all accessible worlds are part of p (that is, if p is true in all of these worlds). Applied to the example in (2) this would mean that in all the worlds which are defined by the speaker's knowledge about John, it is the case that John earns a lot of money (assuming there is no other explanation for John's wealth). In a similar way a

²⁰ Coates, J. *The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries*. London: Croom Helm. 1983. 120p

proposition p is possible according to the set of accessible worlds (i.e. the modal base), if some of these worlds are part of p .

Many different kinds of modal interpretations have been observed and studied, resulting in a variety of typologies. What follows below is one of the many ways that modality has been classified. Only broad categories have been distinguished below: the reader is referred to the main articles and the references for more detailed discussions. The closely related realis, declarative, and evidential moods refer to situations that actually exist, are claimed to exist, or are inferred to exist. In contrast, irrealis moods refer to situations that are not known to exist. Two common irrealis moods are the conditional mood, stating what would happen under a certain condition or conditions (expressed periphrastically in English as *would* + main verb), and the subjunctive mood, stating the speaker's preferences for what should occur (such as *he leave* in the English *I demand that he leave*) or hypotheticals (such as English *If I were to go,....*).

Counterfactuals refer to things that are contrary to the actual situation. In English, counterfactuals are expressed in "if"-clauses by using a tense form that normally refers to a time prior to the time actually semantically referred to in the if-clause. For example, *If I knew that, I wouldn't have to ask* contains the counterfactual *If I knew*, which refers to the present tense despite the form of the verb, and which denies the proposition "I know that". This contrasts with the construction *If I know that,....*, which isn't a counterfactual because it means that maybe I know it and maybe I don't (or maybe I will know it, and maybe I will not). Likewise, *If I had known that, I would have gone there* contains the counterfactual *If I had known*, denying the proposition that I knew; despite the pluperfect verbal construction, the time referred to is the past, not the past-of-the-past.

Modality in English and other languages has been the focus of attention of scholars from distinct disciplines and approaches over the last thirty years. Within linguistics, the study of modality has witnessed a gradual shift from a monolithic, static conception to a more dynamic understanding of modality taking into account

the relevance of linguistic and extralinguistic contextual factors in the production and interpretation of modal utterances in discourse²¹ or the creation of modal textual coherence.

The definition and scope of modality: a question of “attitude” The extensive bulk of literature on modality shows a clear tendency among linguists¹ to accept that semantic areas such as possibility, necessity and prediction (knowledge or epistemic “modality”), on the one hand, and “permission”, “obligation” and “volition” (“deontic” or “root” modality), on the other, constitute the domains of modality. A non-concomitant view with the mainstream conception of modality was already advanced by Halliday in the following terms: “Modality ... is the speaker’s assessment of probability and predictability. It is external to the content, being part of the attitude taken up by the speaker”. This “reductionist” view of modality will not be invoked in this paper, since it obscures the fact that deontic modality can nevertheless be regarded as “a form of participation of the speaker in the speech event” and plays a significant role in the interpersonal process of negotiation of meaning.

Instead, the following definition will be adopted, along the lines suggested by Lyons, where the term “attitude” has been expanded into that of “subjectivity”. It is understood as “subject/speaker’s involvement” so as to embrace both types of modality: Subjectivity is a matter of speaker’s, or more generally, of the locutionary agent’s involvement of himself in the utterance. In the case of epistemic modality, what is involved is his knowledge (or beliefs). In the case of deontic modality, it is his will and authority that is involved. However in both cases it is the locutionary agent who is the source of the modality.

In this respect, two more specific criticisms can be levelled against Halliday’s restrictive formulation of modality: (i) the fact that a clear-cut distinction between both types of modality can be challenged at an ideational level, since cases of indeterminacy (“merger”) may occur; and (ii) both epistemic and deontic modality may be geared towards the interpersonal component of the

21 Fleischman, S. “Temporal Distance: A Basic Linguistic Metaphor”. *Studies in Language* 13(1), 1989, pp. .1-50.

language (i.e. politeness strategies in general and face-saving in particular). We shall have more to say about this at a later stage in this paper.

Subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality, which he defines as “the grammaticalization of speaker’s (subjective) attitude and opinions.” In our definition of modality, we shall leave out the “grammaticalization” component as it belongs to the domains of mood rather than modality. Therefore, it can be claimed that modality is concerned with the expression of the subject/speaker’s involvement towards the propositional content of an utterance, whether in the form of agency or subjectivity. An interesting conclusion ensuing from the above definition is that modality need not, and should by no means, be exclusively restricted to modal auxiliary (or semi-auxiliary) verbs. Over the last fifteen years, linguists have concentrated on surveying a more or less comprehensive inventory of modal elements. A representative sampling of which can be said to include (i) adjectives (e.g. “possible”, “necessary”, etc.), (ii) participles (e.g. “alleged”, “demanded”, etc.), (iii) explicitly rejects that semantic notions such as “ability”, “volition” or “futuraity” should be treated as involving modality. This is why linguists have posited a third type of modality known as “dynamic modality”. Unlike epistemic and deontic modality, dynamic modality isn’t subjective and is subject- rather than speaker-oriented: the subject’s ability or willingness is at issue, not the speaker’s attitudes or opinions.

The term “speaker” should be understood here as a general semantico-pragmatic function, in other words, as the subject of modality, “...the one who invests in the Subject as the modally responsible element in the clause and in relation to whom the Finiteness of the proposition is organized”.

- 1) Nouns (e.g. “necessity”, “consideration”, etc.),
- 2) lexical verbs (e.g. “wonder”, “order”, etc.),
- 3) adverbs (e.g. “perhaps”, “obviously”, etc.),
- 4) articles (e.g. “the”/ “a”, “some”/ “any”, etc.),
- 5) tense (usually in “preterite” or marked forms) (e.g. “I thought you in Paris”, “In 1492, Columbus discovers America”),

6) aspect (marked forms) (e.g. “John is having a headache”),

7) particles (e.g. “if”) and truth-functionally equivalent devices (e.g. subject-verb inversion, putative “should”) (e.g. “If you don’t like it 12/ should you not like it, that’s your hard luck”), the degree of morphosyntactic compression in the encoding of a sentential complement (finite, non-finite or verbless clause) (e.g. “They consider that Lyons (1983)²² provides an interesting outline of the many connections between “demonstrative” and “indicative” and Rauch (1983) also further explores the relationship between modality and deixis in general. Further research will have to address how concepts such as anaphora, generality, individuality (and their grammatical correlates such as “number”) relate to modality.

The modal treatment of this marked form (ie. historic present) on the grounds that “it conveys an impression of vividness and subjective involvement”. However, contend that all tense forms imply a given degree of speaker’s distance from and attitude towards a given proposition and can therefore be seen as modalized forms. A dynamic, agentive reading of this sentence is feasible given an adequate supporting context (e.g., “John is simulating a headache or doing something to bring it on). It must be borne in mind that agency is superimposed upon the notion of subjectivity. The exact relationship between subjectivity-agency as the main axes of modality remains to be further explored from a linguistic as well as a socio-semiotic viewpoint. John is intelligent/John to be intelligent/John intelligent”, etc.), hedging expressions (e.g. “She is a great scholar, I think”), “emphatic” do (e.g. “Do be getting sleepy!”), “get”-passives (e.g. “He got elected Class President”), question tags (e.g. “You liked the movie, didn’t you?”), “yes”/ “no” questions (e.g. “Have you ever been to London?”), (rising) intonation (e.g. “I feel happy”), and so forth.

The above inventory, by no means complete, is intended to illustrate how varied and sophisticated the modality system in English is, thus fully endorsing Halliday’s statement that “...there is (thus) no single place in the clause where

²² Lyons, J. “Deixis and Modality”. *Sophia Linguistica* 12, 1983.: pp. 77-117.

modality is located”. However, the linguistic system of modal resources is further enriched by their numberless combinatory possibilities in a given piece of discourse. In the words of Halliday.²³ Nor do the different non-verbal forms of the same lexical item necessarily correspond with each other: “obviously” isn’t the same as “it is obvious that...”, “surely” as “I am sure that”. However there are discernible groupings, and proposes that the modal meaning arises out of a complex, dynamic interaction of the meaning and form properties of the morphosyntactic encoding of the embedded clause with those of the embedding predicate.

“Get”-passives are characterized, among other things, by having more saliently affected subjects than their “be”-counterparts, which motivates their being treated as subjectively modalized. Together with questions, markers of negation are likely candidates for a modal treatment.²⁴

A clear distinction can be drawn between pairs which are felt to be equivalent, and thus reinforce each other (“as concord”) when both are present, as in “Perhaps he might have built it”, and those which are not equivalent and are thus cumulative in meaning, as in “Certainly he might have built it” (“I insist that it is possible” or “I grant that it is possible”). An interesting conclusion ensuing from the above is that modal meaning can be said to resolve itself into a more or less intricate flow of reinforcing or cumulative modal devices which invades the whole lexicogrammatical architecture of the language, always subject to the communicative requirements of the interlocutors in the modalised space-time if dialogic negotiation.

Towards a “dynamic”, context-based view of modal meaning Traditional (and not so traditional) accounts of modality present in our view two important shortcomings when tackling the issue of modal meaning: (i) they fail to separate the intrinsic linguistic meaning of modal verbs from the linguistic meaning of other neighbouring modal items (of different kinds) in the sentential environment in

²³ Halliday, M.A.K. “Functional Diversity in Language as Seen from a Consideration of Modality and Mood in English”. *Foundations of Language* 6: 1970. pp. 322-361.

²⁴ Palmer, F.R. *Modality and the English Modals*. London: Longman . 1979, 64p.

which they are inserted, and (ii) they also fail to distinguish the meaning of modal verbs from the (endless) number of pragmatic uses or functions these may be put to in specific contexts. In addition, it must be borne in mind that modality may be implicated by the semantic structure of the whole utterance without being signalled by any specific (linguistic) markers. English statements like “One just doesn’t do things like that” can implicate the deontic modality interpretation (“You must not do things like that”). In our view, the discourse approach to modality invoked in this paper can prove useful to help to determine to what extent covert modality may be implicated with the aid of neighbouring (linguistic) devices in a given discourse scenario.

The consequences to be derived from this cannot possibly be expected to be advantageous from either a theoretical or descriptive view. Thus, as Walton rightly argues, “...the meanings that are ascribed to modal verbs multiply arbitrarily as more and more context is added, and any reference grammar aimed at recording these meanings will come to resemble a lexicon and still fail to cover them all”.

Of the three, the taxonomy proposed by Hoyer is the one coming closer to the line of research into modality invoked here, since it refrains from attributing the meaning of items in the sentential environment of a sentence (i.e. a hypothetical conditional clause, a concessive clause, etc.) to the modal verb itself (“hypothetical might”, “concessive might”), or even lumping together the inherent meaning of the modal with some of the specific pragmatic functions this verb may fulfill in an also specific context of Leech comes up with something like six different meanings for “might”, namely, (i) past tense of “may”, (ii) a “subjunctive substitute” (in clauses of purpose and concession), (iii) hypothetical past tense, (iv) “polite permission”, (v) possibility and, (vi) “tentative suggestion”. Coates²⁵ makes them eight: (i) epistemic possibility, (ii) past of “may” (“epistemic possibility”), (iii) past of “may” (“root possibility”), (iv) past of “may” (“root permission”), (v) remote of “may” (“epistemic possibility”), (vi) remote of “may” (root possibility) and (vii) remote of “may” (“root permission”). Finally, Hoyer reduces them to three

²⁵ Coates, J. *The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries*. London: Croom Helm. 1983. 94p.

only: (i) epistemic probability/possibility, (ii) non-epistemic (a blending of possibility and permission) and (iii) collocational combinations with “well” “to convey epistemic probability”, with “just” in “...formulaic expressions of politeness (usually to ask for permission)” and, finally, with “(just) as well” to “make a circumspect or sardonic recommendation” utterance (e.g. “polite permission/suggestion”, etc.).

The question now arises as to how modal meaning can be felicitously systematized in order to account for the dynamic, though nevertheless systematic, relationship between modality, the context of utterance and the interpersonal function of politeness. We shall argue for a monosemantic approach to the semantics and pragmatics of modality drawing on intersecting, polysemantic contexts. More specifically, it will be suggested that modal meaning can be shaped and further modulated in terms of (at least) two separate, though closely connected, layers of meaning:

LAYER 1: (i) SYSTEMATIC MEANING (ie., the meaning present in all uses of a modal) in conjunction with (ii) CONTEXTUAL (LINGUISTIC) MEANING (i.e. the reinforcing or cumulative modal nuances introduced by other satellite elements in the neighbouring sentential (or discourse) environment).

LAYER 2: PRAGMATIC (OR INTERPERSONAL) MEANING (i.e. the modulation or fine-tuning on the part of interlocutors of the meaning potential arising out of LAYER 1 basically, though not exclusively, in terms of other non-linguistic features of the context of utterance, with special focus on politeness in general and face-saving in particular).

“Maybe I might miss something out because we are all human and I’ve overlooked it and you’ve remembered it”. Here the linguistic meaning of the modal appears to be that of “remote possibility”, this being at first sight reinforced by the epistemic modal adverb “maybe”. However, as the message progressively unfolds, one finds that the modal meaning is made to contrast sharply with some non-modal forms (e.g. “are”, “have overlooked” and “have remembered”), thus providing

insightful clues as to the intended “factual”-like contextual interpretation of the modal in question by the speaker-addressee.

Contextual features also embrace the field of discourse, the mode of discourse, and the style of discourse and should eventually be extended to embrace the social dynamics of negotiation as a whole. A justification is in order here as to why politeness is given special relevance in comparison to other factors such as formality. The dominant factors affecting formality are external variables such as relative status and intimacy, while politeness is more of a psychological state of a speaker towards his addressee. The consideration of contextual factors suggests that formality is more directly dependent upon socio-situational factors of language use, whereas politeness is more dependent upon the speaker’s attitudinal factors within a particular social setting. It is this proximity with speaker’s attitudinal factors that justifies why politeness is seen here as forming part of modal meaning. As for the specific relevance of face-saving within politeness, see Fraser.

As for the second layer of meaning, one can easily see that the choice of the remote form here is motivated by face-saving factors, or more exactly, the speaker’s plea of sympathy from the audience for any mistake or inaccuracy on his/her part. The point to emphasize, however, is that the choice of the form “might miss out”, unlike any other feasible choice (e.g. “may have missed”, “might have missed” or even the non-modal expression “have missed”) allows the speaker to modulate successfully what is highly likely to be an actual mistake in terms of an eventual (possible) mistake (epistemic modality), while justifying his/her “wrong” course of action in terms of a general weakness of mankind (deontic modality).

“I might go back to Cambridge early or something because I’ve got to write an extended essay”. The use of “might” here could be taken to imply that the possibility of the speaker going back to Cambridge is somewhat remote. However, the neighbouring linguistic environment provides unambiguously “factual” contextual cues which show that the speaker has already made up his mind to go to Cambridge early (e.g. hedging in “or something”, use of a modal phrase implying strong obligation in conjunction with the reinforcing nuance implicated by

“extended”). However, the choice of “might” serves the speaker to reveal his intention of leaving early (dynamic modality) without precluding any change of plans (knowledge modality). As for the interpersonal level of meaning, the high degree of distance of “might” serves the speaker to be conventionally indirect and tactful in communicating the addressee his real intentions.

“(…) Yes, please, don’t bother for a moment because merely I wanted to know whether you disagree, as I think you might do from what you’ve been saying with the passage that I’ve quoted from Dr. Kendall’s evidence (…)”.

In (8) above, the use of “might”, far from signalling remote possibility, mainly reveals the speaker as adhering to the conventions of politeness in an attempt to beg hearer’s forgiveness for a given transgression in the communicative exchange. In fact, the unambiguously factual evidentiality background on which the speaker’s judgement is based (i.e. “you’ve been saying”, “I’ve quoted”) shows that the speaker is quite sure that the hearer disagrees (epistemic modality) and also that it is the hearer’s will to show his/her disagreement (dynamic modality). However, through the use of “might” (skillfully pre-faced by the hedging expression “I think”), the speaker manages to minimize the categoricalness of his/her assertion, thus saving face.

(9) “You might wish to do this because, while you have it: any Class 1 contrihoweverion you pay at a reduced rate do not count for benefit; and you cannot get Home Responsibilities Protection; and you are not allowed to pay voluntary contrihoweverions, and if you are a married woman, you cannot get credits, and from October 1989 you could pay more in contrihoweverion than colleagues with the same earnings however paying standard rate contrihoweverions”. Example (9) above, taken from a governmental leaflet on tax payment, provides clear evidence of how the putative surface interpretation of “might” as conveying remote possibility (epistemic modality) or a tentative suggestion (deontic modality) is progressively re-shaped through a modally consistent network with an overwhelmingly factual, categorical tone (e.g. “do not count”, “are not allowed”, “cannot get”). Therefore, tentative modal stance

encoded in “might wish” becomes more forceful as the text progresses, to end up implying a relatively high degree of possibility (e.g. “You will want to do this”) (epistemic modality) and a forceful recommendation (e.g. “You should do this”)(deontic modality). However, the choice of “might” enables the speaker to mitigate the underlying forceful statement in accordance with politeness strategies in general and the safety claim technique of the discourse of advertising in particular.

Charles: “Tom, can you stop the car?”

Charles: “Sorry, I think I might stay in the pub after all”

Tom: “Why on earth?”

Charles: “Ahm...”

Charles: “No, seriously, I’ m doing some research into pubs with the name “Boat” in the title. I hope to produce the definitive work” (Four Weddings and a Funeral, Filmscript). Example above is perhaps more interesting as it furnishes us with a sample of dialogic interaction. Here we know for sure that Charles wants to stay in the pub to meet Carrie, the girl of his dreams. Hence the need to apologize for a sudden change of plans which might be face-threatening. The modal theme initially brought in by “might” (skilfully pre-faced by the apology marker “sorry”) ramifies across an intricate constellation of modal devices (i.e. the italicized elements above) which help him make it clear to Tom that he is definitely staying at the pub (epistemic modality) and minimize the imposition of his will upon that of his friends (dynamic modality).

3.0 Chapter III. Aspects of teaching modal words in EFL

3.1 On the problems of interrelation methods of FLT to other sciences

Methods of foreign language teaching are understood here as a body of scientifically tested theory concerning the teaching of foreign languages in schools and other educational institutions. It covers three main problems:

- (1) aims of teaching a foreign language;
- (2) content of teaching, i. e. what to teach to attain the aims;
- (3) methods and techniques of teaching, i. e. how to teach a foreign language to attain the aims in the most effective way to meet modern requirements.

We distinguish *general methods* and *special methods*. By the former we mean methods of foreign language teaching irrespective of the language taught (whether it is English, German or French). By the latter we mean methods of teaching a particular foreign language, e. g. methods of teaching English. In the methods course we shall deal mostly with general methods, at least in lectures, because you are trained as teachers of two foreign languages, and we interpret particulars within special methods, in our case, within methods of teaching English.

Methods of foreign language teaching is closely related to other sciences such as pedagogics, psychology, physiology, linguistics, and some others.

Pedagogics is the science concerned with the teaching and education of the younger generation. Since methods also deals with the problems of teaching and education, it is most closely related to pedagogics. To study foreign language teaching one must know pedagogics. One branch of pedagogics is called didactics. Didactics studies general ways of teaching in schools. methods, as compared to didactics, studies the specific ways of teaching a definite subject. Thus, it may be considered special didactics. In the foreign language teaching, as well as in the teaching of mathematics, history, and other subjects taught in schools, general

principles of didactics are applied and, in their turn, influence and enrich didactics. For example, the so-called "*principle of visualization*" was first introduced in teaching foreign languages. Now it has become one of the fundamental principles of didactics and is used in teaching all school subjects without exception. Programmed instruction was first applied to teaching mathematics. Now through didactics it is used in teaching many subjects, including foreign languages.

In foreign language teaching the teacher forms and develops in pupils pronunciation habits, grammar habits, lexical habits and other habits. Since 'habit' is the result of oft-repeated action in the same line pupils can acquire habits by constant steady drill, repeated drill. Therefore the teacher should remember when organizing pupils learning that drill should be constant and accurate. This implies correct copy, clearly presented and easy for imitation and reproduction, given under motivating conditions which favours repetitions which will lead to skills. Since skill is the ability to do something well and in language learning skills are pupils' ability to use the target language for communicative needs, the teacher should form and develop such language skills as listening comprehension, speaking, reading, and writing.

We cannot expect to develop such habits and skills of our pupils effectively if we do not know and take into account the **psychology** of habits and skills, the ways of forming them, the influence of formerly acquired habits on the formation of new ones, and many other necessary factors that psychology can supply us with. At present we have much material in the field of psychology which can be applied to teaching a foreign language. For example, N. I. Zhinkin, a prominent psychologist in his investigation of the mechanisms of speech came to the conclusion that words and rules of combining them are most probably dormant in the kinetic center of the brain. When the ear receives a signal it reaches the brain, its hearing center and then passes to the kinetic center. Thus, if a teacher wants his pupils to speak English he must use all the opportunities he has to make them hear and speak it. Furthermore, to master a second language is to acquire another code, another way of receiving and transmitting information. To create this new code in

the most effective way one must take into consideration certain psychological factors.

Effective learning of a foreign language depends to a great extent on the pupils' memory. That is why a teacher must know how he can help his pupils to successfully memorize and retain in memory the language material they learn. Here again psychological investigations are significant. For example, the psychologist, P. K. Zinchenko, proved that in learning a subject both voluntary and involuntary memory is of great importance. In his investigation of involuntary memory P. K. Zinchenko came to the conclusion that this memory is retentive. Consequently, in teaching a foreign language we should create favourable conditions for involuntary memorizing. P. K. Zinchenko showed that involuntary memorizing is possible only when pupils' attention is concentrated not on fixing the material in their memory through numerous repetitions, however on solving some mental problems which deal with this material. To prove this the following experiment was carried out. Students of group *A* were given a list of words to memorize (voluntary memorizing). Students of group *B* did not receive a list of words to memorize. Instead, they got an English text and some assignments which made them work with these words, use them in answering various questions. During the next lesson a vocabulary test was given to the students of both groups. The results were approximately the same. A test given a fortnight later proved, however, that the students of group *B* retained the words in their memory much better than the students of group *A*. This shows that involuntary memorizing may be more retentive under certain circumstances. Experiments by prominent scientists show that psychology helps methods to determine the role of the mother tongue in different stages of teaching; the amount of material for pupils to assimilate at every stage of instruction; the sequence and ways in which various habits and skills should be developed; the methods and techniques which are more suitable for presenting the material and for ensuring its retention by the pupils, and so on.

Consequently, methods is closely connected with psychology; the latter allows the methodologists to determine the so-called psychological content of teaching, i. e. in what to teach, what habits and skills should be developed in pupils to acquire language proficiency. Psychology also helps methods in selecting techniques for teaching and learning, i. e. in how to teach in a most effective way, for example, under what conditions pupils can learn words, phrases, sentence-patterns more effectively, or how to ensure pupils memorizing new words in an easier way. Since progress in learning is made by the addition of new knowledge the teacher should be aware of what way knowledge may be imparted in teaching a certain group of pupils, what psychological factors should be taken into consideration when imparting new knowledge to pupils.

Methods of foreign language teaching has a definite relation to **physiology** of the higher nervous system. Pavlov's theories of "conditioned reflexes", of the "second signalling system" and of "dynamic stereotype" are the examples. Each of these interrelated theories bears a direct relation to the teaching of a foreign language.

According to Pavlov habits are conditioned reflexes, and a conditioned reflex is an action performed automatically in response to a definite stimulus as a result of previous frequent repetitions of the same action. If we thoroughly study the theory of conditioned reflexes we shall see that it explains and confirms the necessity for frequent repetitions and revision of material pupils study as one of the means of inculcating habits. Pavlov showed that man's higher nervous activities - speaking and thinking - are the functions of a special system of organic structures within the nervous system. This system is developed only in man. It enables the brain to respond to inner stimuli as it responds to outer stimuli or signals perceived through the sense organ~. Pavlov named this the second signalling system. Consequently one of the forms of human behaviour is language behaviour, i.e., speech response to different communication situations. Therefore in teaching a foreign language we must bear in mind that pupils should acquire the language they study as a behaviour, as something that helps people to communicate with

each other in various real situations of intercourse. Hence a foreign language should be taught through such situations.

Pavlov's theory of "*dynamic stereotype*" also furnishes the physiological base for many important principles of language teaching, e. g., for the topical vocabulary arrangement.

Methods of foreign language teaching is most closely related to **linguistics**, since linguistics deals with the problems which are of paramount importance to methods, with language and thinking, grammar and vocabulary, the relationship between grammar and vocabulary, and many others. Methods successfully uses, for example, the results of linguistic investigation in the selection and arrangement of language material for teaching. It is known that structural linguistics has had a great impact on language teaching. Teaching materials have been prepared by linguists and methodologists of the structural school. many prominent linguists have not only developed the theory of linguistics however tried to apply it to language teaching. The following quotation may serve as a proof of this:

"It has occurred to the linguist as well as to the psychologist that the foreign language classroom should be an excellent laboratory in which to test new theories of language acquisition."²⁶

Methods of foreign language teaching like any other science, has definite ways of investigating the problems which may arise. They are:

(1) a critical study of the ways foreign languages were taught in our country and abroad;

(2) a thorough study and summing up of the experience of the best foreign language teachers in different types of schools;

(3) experimenting with the aim of confirming or refuting the working hypotheses that may arise during investigation. Experimenting becomes more and more popular with methodologists. In experimenting methodologists have to deal

²⁶ Bosco F. J., Di Pietro R. J. Instructional Strategies: Their Psychological and Linguistic Bases. - In: IRAL, v. VIII/I, 1970, p. 1.

with different data, that is why in arranging research work they use mathematics, statistics, and probability theory to interpret experimental results.

a) Research in methods usually begins with observation of what is going on in the classroom. For instance:

- how a teacher and pupils react to each other (the division of labour in the classroom);
- how pupils read, understand the teacher, speak, or write; .
- what mistakes pupils make in speaking, reading, or writing;
- what difficulties they encounter while reading, hearing, speaking, or writing;

b) Talks with teachers and pupils with the purpose of finding out something is also used in research in methods. For instance, a research worker wants to know (find out):

- how much time the pupil works at his English in the laboratory (at home);
- how the child does this or that exercise;
- how the teacher individualizes teaching.

Talks with teachers and pupils give him necessary information.

c) Experimental teaching or teaching which differs in some respect from conventional teaching is widely used in methodological researches. For instance, it may differ:

- in presenting some linguistic material;
- in the use of teaching aids, their place and role in the development of this or that language skill;
- in checking pupils' knowledge of linguistic material;
- in reviewing the material covered;
- in involving pupils in independent (seat) work:
- in the amount of material for home reading and pupils' treatment of it;
- in the arrangement of pupils' work while developing some language skill.

d) Experiment or specially arranged teaching with the purpose of solving some methodological problem. It is used for testing some hypothesis. The

experiment is usually conlected with the introduction of some new techniques, material, organization of pupils for learning, shortly with some innovation. To experiment with a new way of teaching one needs experimental groups and control groups. The comparison of results shows the difference in pupils' learning.

The experiment requires the following procedure:

- pre-test in all the groups both control and those taken for experimenting;
- experimental class sessions (lessons);
- post-test.

The difference in results testifies the effectiveness of teaching. For example, the following experiment was carried on. The hypothesis was: the wording of the task is essential for forming speaking skills.

In learning grammar pupils often perform mechanical exercises to acquire habits in using this particular grammar item. To such exercises belongs this one: "Make the following sentences negative", or "Make the following sentences interrogative". In the experiment the assignments were given in the following wording: "Disagree with the speaker", "Ask if it is so". The only variable was the wording of the assignment. This trifle change resulted in an improvement in students' speaking reaching 30%. Here is meant correctness and tempo of speaking. The experiment allowed the experimenter to determine differences in pupils' achievement. e) Questionnaires are extensively used in methods. The research worker turns to the questionnaire whenever he needs answers to the questions he faces. For example, he wants to know how much time teachers spend on checking pupils' homework (or how they check it). He distrihoweveres a questionnaire among teachers, they answer the questions. The analysis of their answers allows the experimenter to get the data.

In recent years there has been a great increase of interest in methods since foreign language teaching has many attractions as an area for research. A great deal of useful research work has been carried out. New ideas and new data produced as the result of research are usually developed into new teaching materials and teaching techniques.

It should be said that we need research activities of the following types: descriptive research which deals with "what to teach", experimental and instrumental research dealing with "how to teach". More research is now needed which compares different combination of devices, various teaching aids, etc.

3.2 Pragmalinguistic explanations of the acquisition of modality in early language learning

In order to predict the specific order of appearance of root vs. epistemic modal interpretations in acquisition, we have to make use of more specific supplementary hypotheses about language acquisition, which will elaborate on the broad cognitive constraints placed by theory of mind development.

A commonsensical, yet controversial, suggestion concerns the role of input in the priming of root over epistemic interpretations in the preschool years. Shatz, Grimm, Wilcox and Niemeier-Wind (1990) gathered samples of maternal speech to infants of around 3 years and found that fewer than 10% of the modals used had epistemic interpretations. Similarly, Wells (1979) remarks that will and can were used by all mothers in his sample, and they were also the most frequently occurring modals; we have seen that these two verbs were the first to be acquired by the children in the sample. Other studies focusing on semantic-pragmatic aspects of modal acquisition also detect a correlation between the input children receive and the type of modals they produce.

The motherese hypothesis has been largely discredited as an explanation of the syntactic aspects of language acquisition; things might be different, though, in the acquisition of word meanings, where lexical entries are mapped onto conceptual addresses. Given a certain stage in cognitive development, input could partially determine the output of the child's production by triggering assignments of word meaning. In the case of modality, it is reasonable to assume that (at least some) root interpretations lie within the cognitive grasp of young preschoolers, since they are taken to involve ability (can), desire (cf. volition in will), and later on permission and obligation (initially understood as normative descriptive statements about what is the case in the actual world; cf. the prevalent use of

root must and can in the first person). The increased frequency of such terms in the children's input is bound to facilitate their acquisition.

A related argument comes from the frequently noted observation that epistemic modals, especially in English, are rather formal expressions, and would be unlikely to arise in children's spontaneous conversation (however cf. other epistemic expressions like *have to*, or mental terms). An indication that register, alongside other pragmatic limitations, may influence the use and mastery of individual modal forms, even in the absence of competence-related obstacles, is the fact that *ought to* seems to lag behind the other modals (it is used to state obligation by only 3% of Wells's sample; Coates's subjects also had difficulty with the verb). Apart from the children's unfamiliarity with epistemic modals, it is also true that children normally find themselves more often in situations where the topic of conversation has to do with permission, ability, intention or obligation, so that even after the age of 3;0 they do not produce as many utterances with epistemic modals as with root ones.

We will finally mention another independently motivated principle which may help to account for the acquisition of the root/epistemic distinction: children, in constructing their lexicon, tend as a rule to avoid synonymy; that is, when forming hypotheses about lexical entries, they try to avoid assigning the same meaning to two different linguistic forms. This principle gives rise to the following prediction: children who have already successfully acquired mental terms will hesitate to assign epistemic interpretations to modal verbs (which they already use for a variety of root meanings) to convey the relative strength of a proposition. Within each member of the root/epistemic distinction, the same principle may be used to explain why more striking oppositions in strength among modals (e.g. *must* vs. *may*) are acquired first, whereas the *is* vs. epistemic *must* contrast is acquired later.

There is obviously a lot more to be said on the interplay between competence and performance factors in the acquisition of modality, and a fuller picture of the predictions of the theory of mind approach remains to be given. Before

moving on to an outline of this picture, however, we want to consider a possible objection to the analysis as it stands. It might be claimed that we have presented only part of the inquisitional story. In deontic modality, to take a salient example, the individual has to compute whether something is necessary or possible on the basis of social or moral rules and regulations. Such rules are distinct from representations of reality, strictly speaking, in that they constitute descriptions of an ideal/exemplary rather than the actual world. What is more, in order to be able to use root modals to impose an obligation or to grant permission (and not merely note them), the infant must possess some assumptions concerning social relations, authority, etc. Furthermore, many deontic interpretations crucially involve attitudes such as desires, preferences, intentions and goals. Now, suppose, that the basic notion of intention isn't in place before 3;0 (as the theory of mind hypothesis would predict) and develops even up to 6;0 years: as for the acquisition of moral beliefs, it takes place even later. It follows that—the present literature notwithstanding—no genuine (adult-type) deontic modals can appear before these concepts are fully in place.

Our reply is this: we by no means suppose that the development of the theory of mind affects only one side of the root/epistemic distinction; we also agree that some root interpretations will emerge later than others. What is crucial, though, for at least some root interpretations, is that the child may go about using them without having a fully developed representational picture of mind, while in order for epistemic interpretations to arise, this picture should by definition be emerging in the child's psychology. Let us give a sketch of how the development of modal expressions might go, which will help clarify things. The first uses of English modals appear before the third year: consonantly with what a basic desire-intention psychology would predict, 'ability' can and '(quasi-)intention' will are the first modals to be employed to a significant degree by infants. With the emergence of a preliminary copy theory of belief coincide other uses of root modals: must and may appear with increasing frequency at this stage to convey obligation and permission respectively. However, genuine deontic meanings cannot be com-

municated yet, since the child still conceives of the mind as a container, that is, as a simple storage place for immediate and accurate representations of reality which are, so to speak, forced upon it by external stimuli: the inability to form representations which are not identical to reality and to entertain them as alternatives to it disallows the formation of deontic interpretations, for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. When a child utters a statement containing (root) must at this period, she rather intends it as a description of a normative regularity which holds in the actual, and not an ideal, world (and similarly for may). This seems to be corroborated by the empirical data, and squares well with the sort of input the child receives from her caretakers.

Around the third year the use of epistemic modals and mental terms also begins, initially without full understanding of their meaning—these items are simply used as relative strength markers with no explicit representation of their inferential component. Further development of the child's theory of mind leads to the conception of the mind as a processor, that is, a device which actively constructs and handles representations of reality; conceptual developments of this type open the way to the comprehension of mismatches between one's mental constructs and the world (and, thus, to the identification of false belief, degrees and sources of belief, and so on). The child is by now capable of grasping the meaning of mental terms and of properly using epistemic modals like may and might. Between 4;0 and 6;0 the ability to calculate possibility on the basis of available data is solidified, together with an understanding of the differences in strength among modals depending on the type of inferential relation they encode (possibility or necessity): still, a full grasp of the notion of necessity, which involves checking through all possible alternatives, escapes many young children. With regard to root interpretations, the active deployment of alternatives to the actual world, and especially ideal/morally recommended alternatives, clears the way towards a proper use of deontic interpretations: apart from register difficulties, the markedly later emergence of deontic ought to in acquisition can be

attributed to conceptual difficulties associated with the domain of ideals or morality.

After the sixth year the child begins to acquire a fuller understanding of modal notions, particularly of necessity, which gradually proceeds to the full-blown development of the adult modal system. On the semantic side, it is very plausible that, once the theory of mind is fully deployed, the child will reorganize former superficially used root concepts, and will trace the similarities between root and epistemic meanings based on common possibility and necessity underpinnings. By that time, the child will be able to construct a single lexical entry for most modals and treat root or epistemic interpretations as pragmatic enrichments of an underlying unitary modal semantics. Pure repetition. The students have no reason to get involved or to think about what they are saying. Indeed, some students who have no idea what the sentences mean will successfully repeat them anyway, while their minds wander off to other things.

There is little classroom research to support this proposal. In fact, it was the frequent failure of traditional grammar-based methods to produce fluency and accuracy in second language learners which led to the development of more communicative approaches to teaching in the first place.

Supporters of communicative language teaching have argued that language isn't learned by the gradual accumulation of one item after another. They suggest that errors are a natural and valuable part of the language learning process. Furthermore, they believe that the motivation of learners is often stifled by an insistence on correctness in the earliest stages of second language learning. Recently, some researchers and educators have reacted to the trend toward communicative language teaching and have revived the concern that allowing learners too much 'freedom' without correction and explicit instruction will lead to early fossilization of errors. Once again we hear the call for making sure learners 'get it right from the beginning'.

Some further evidence for the account we have been advancing so far comes from another sort of modal notion, which logicians have termed alethic (or logical)

modality. This type of modality concerns logical necessity and possibility defined independently of a thinking agent's mental contents, however in an absolute sense as relations between an (abstract) proposition and a set of propositions. The following are examples of alethic modality:

(a) I have not won the Lottery yet, although we could have.

It is possible that someone we know is going to win the Lottery.

Winning the Lottery does not necessarily make one happy.

This type of modality is either ignored in many linguistic discussions, or hastily conflated with epistemic modality. There are at least three arguments against the last move. First, alethic must p is stronger than the unmodalized p , since the former means that p isn't just true however necessarily true (true in all logically possible worlds). Epistemic must p , though, is felt to be weaker than p , since it conveys that p follows from what the speaker knows/believes. Second, in modal logic p and possibly $\sim p$ are consistent. However, in natural language there is some incompatibility between the two clauses of:

It isn't raining in Chicago, however it may be raining there.

Third, logically speaking, the form must $(p \rightarrow q)$ makes a different statement from $p \rightarrow$ (must q). Yet there is little difference between the English utterances in (6):

(a) It must be that if Bill has a diamond ring, he stole it from someone.

(b) If Bill has a diamond ring, he must have stolen it from someone.

Even though they correspond to distinct types of modality, however, we believe that the ability to entertain alethic concepts is essentially of the same type as the ability to employ epistemic notions: i.e. it rests on the capacity to envisage propositional representations as entities distinct from reality which enter into specific logical relations. Moreover, it marks a more sophisticated step in this direction, in that the subject moves from entertaining thought contents and performing deductive operations on them to realizing that certain logical relations such as compatibility and entailment obtain between propositional contents in the abstract, mind-independently. In other words, alethic concepts presuppose the

ability to reason about what is simply possible or necessary, thereby considering alternatives that are not included in the individual's knowledge however are predicted by general logical laws.

Epistemic and logical interpretations of modal expressions are often empirically hard to distinguish. Still, there seems to be some evidence for the later emergence of pure, alethic concepts in children. Although some sensitivity to logical necessity has been attributed to infants as young as 3;0, it is generally acknowledged that children younger than 4;0 rarely take into account more than one possibility in hidden-object tasks. It is also after 4;0 that an ability to declare a solution to a task undecidable between alternatives arises: it seems that, with training, children can recognize undecidability as early as 5;0. As other studies have shown, children at 5;0 or 6;0 have at least a receptive understanding of the necessary truth or falsity of propositions. More tellingly, though, the ability to reason about hypothetical possibilities, to generate possibilities that have not been specified in advance and to systematically collect and combine the information needed to move from a large set of possibilities to a single necessary conclusion is attributed only to much older children. This ordering is mirrored in the acquisition of modal terms: Perkins (1983) reports that logical (what he calls 'objectified') interpretations of expressions like possibly, it is possible that, there is a possibility that are acquired between 6;0 and 12;0 years.

Metalogical activities are typically conscious, or at least accessible to consciousness. Although we have presented them separately here, we intend them to be construed as a domain closely related to metacognitive/metapsychological processes and developing in parallel with them. Although the situation is extremely complicated, one can complete the picture of the acquisition of modality offered in the previous section by venturing the following speculations: as part of the development of the child's second-order reflective capacities, and after the basic deductive abilities have been mastered, the general metacognitive process of reflecting on one's mental contents could be extended to the more advanced metalogical task of reflecting on one's logical (deductive) processing steps. The

latter capacity proceeds towards freeing propositional representations from the mental repertoire of a thinking agent and viewing them as abstract entities (thereby giving rise to alethic concepts). The development of metalogic, alongside that of metacognition, is accompanied by a deeper understanding of epistemic modal concepts, to the extent that it permits a full grasp of their inferential component. An initial manifestation of the comprehension of logical modality comes from recognizing the solution to a problem as undecidable, when there isn't conclusive evidence available—an ability which surfaces only around 6;0 years. With the stabilization of the ability to check through all possible alternatives and its generalization across environments there emerges the concept of logical necessity, which is firmly established around 11;0 to 12;0 years. The child is then able to completely separate the logical and the empirical domain and to detect the validity of an argument based solely on its form, and not on the content of the premises.

Conclusion

Having thoroughly analysed the problem of pragramlinguistic aspect of modal words in English we have come to the following theoretically and practically important conclusions.

The term '**pragmatics**' was first introduced by Charles Morris, a philosopher. *syntax* is the study of the grammatical relations of linguistic units to one another and the grammatical structures of phrases and sentences that result from these grammatical relation, *semantics* is the study of the relation of linguistic units to the objects they denote, and *pragmatics* is the study of the relation of linguistic units to people who communicate. Speech acts are simply things people do through language - for example, apologizing, instructing, menacing, explaining something, etc. Utterances interpretation, or *discourse analysis*, involves a variety of processes, grammatical and pragmatic. By pragmatic processes we mean the processes used to bridge up the gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the interpretation of utterances in context. *Pragmatic approach* to the study of syntactic units can briefly be described as the study of the way language is used in particular contexts to achieve particular goals.

Grammatically the verb is the most complex part of speech. This is due to the central role it performs in the expression of the predicative functions of the sentence, i.e. the functions establishing the connection between the situation (situational event) named in the utterance and reality. In the sentence the finite verb invariably performs the function of the verb-predicate, expressing the processual categorial features of predication, i.e. time, aspect, voice, and mood. The class of verbs falls into a number of subclasses distinguished by different semantic and lexico-grammatical features. On the upper level of division two

unequal sets are identified: the set of verbs of full nominative value (notional verbs), and the set of verbs of partial nominative value (semi-notional and functional verbs). The first set is derivationally open, it includes the bulk of the verbal lexicon. The second set is derivationally closed, it includes limited subsets of verbs characterised by individual relational properties.

Modal verbs are used with the infinitive as predicative markers expressing relational meanings of the subject attitude type, i.e. ability, obligation, permission, advisability, etc. By way of extension of meaning, they also express relational probability, serving as probability predicators. These two types of functional semantics can be tested by means of correlating pure modal verb collocations with the corresponding two sets of stative collocations of equivalent functions on the one hand, the groups be obliged, be permitted.

Modality is expression of speaker's attitude to what his utterance denotes. The speaker's judgment may be of different kinds, that is, the speaker may express various modal meanings. Modal verbs unlike other verbs, do not denote actions or states, however only show the attitude of the speaker towards the action expressed by the infinitive in combination with which they form compound modal predicates. These modal verbs may show that the action (or state, of process, or quality) is viewed by the speaker as possible, obligatory, doubtful, certain, permissible, advisable, requested, prohibited, ordered etc.

The distinction between modal words is based on two criteria: (1) their meaning: modal words express the speaker's view concerning the reality of the action expressed in the sentence, (2) their syntactical function: they are not adverbial modifiers however parentheses, whether we take a parenthesis to be a special part of the sentence or whether we say that it stands outside its structure. In the vast majority of cases the modal word indicates the speaker's attitude towards the whole thought expressed in the sentence (or clause). If the modal word in each of the sentences is eliminated the whole thought will lose the modal colouring imparted to it by the modal word, and will appear to be stated as a fact, without any specific mention of the speaker's attitude.

A modal word can also make up a sentence by itself. This happens when it is used to answer a general question, that is, a question admitting of a yes- or no-answer. Modal words are an invariable part of speech. They may refer to a word, a phrase, a clause, or a sentence. Their syntactical function is that of a parenthesis, they may also be a sentence in themselves, in which case they are used to answer a general question. modal meaning can be shaped and further modulated in terms of (at least) two separate, though closely connected, layers of meaning:

LAYER 1: (i) SYSTEMATIC MEANING (ie., the meaning present in all uses of a modal) in conjunction with (ii) CONTEXTUAL (LINGUISTIC) MEANING (i.e. the reinforcing or cumulative modal nuances introduced by other satellite elements in the neighbouring sentential (or discourse) environment).

LAYER 2: PRAGMATIC (OR INTERPERSONAL) MEANING (i.e. the modulation or fine-tuning on the part of interlocutors of the meaning potential arising out of LAYER 1 basically, though not exclusively, in terms of other non-linguistic features of the context of utterance, with special focus on politeness in general and face-saving in particular).

Methods of foreign language teaching is closely related to other sciences such as pedagogics, psychology, physiology, linguistics, and some others. In foreign language teaching the teacher forms and develops in pupils pronunciation habits, grammar habits, lexical habits and other habits. Since 'habit' is the result of oft-repeated action in the same line pupils can acquire habits by constant steady drill, repeated drill. Therefore the teacher should remember when organizing pupils learning that drill should be constant and accurate. This implies correct copy, clearly presented and easy for imitation and reproduction, given under motivating conditions which favours repetitions which will lead to skills.

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